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Abstract 
This dissertation examines marital relations, and specifically marital conflicts, in early 
colonial Lima in order to analyze gender and power in the Spanish Empire. Through my 
reading of cases held before the ecclesiastical tribunal, I show how wives and their 
supporters resisted and questioned husbands’ authority primarily through reifying of 
patriarchal norms, in the form of the ideals of manhood. Rather than challenges based on 
the perceived rights of women, the citing of failures of marital masculinity dominated the 
discourse of these trials. This marital masculinity encompassed the nature, characteristics, 
and actions expected of a married man. This manhood was rooted in broader early 
modern Catholic ideals and comprised expectations of provision, protection, and fidelity. 
In addition to following Church prescriptions on appropriate behavior for men, the 
patriarchal expectations found in these cases involved upholding the racial hierarchy of 
colonial society. Wives and witnesses highlighted instances such as the use of racial 
epithets and infidelity that crossed racial lines as further failures to live up to the 
masculine ideal. 
 This dissertation approaches the dynamics of gender domination from a number 
of perspectives. In chapter 1, I examine the petitions by women seeking a divorcio 
(ecclesiastical divorce which dictated the separation of bed and board) and analyze how 
they criticize their husbands for falling to fulfill their marital masculinity. Chapter 2 
shows how mothers and brothers intervened in marital conflicts and reveals their 
investment in gendered authority. Looking beyond parents and siblings, chapter 3 
highlights how community members, and especially neighbors and enslaved Africans, 
  v 
helped to police the duties of husbands through their testimonies to the court. Chapter 4 
analyzes the conflicts between married slaves and their masters over relocation that 
would separate the couple to further demonstrate the link between race and manhood, one 
in which white masculinity trumped black masculinity. Throughout these trials, 
arguments based on marital masculinity proved to limit the power of patriarchs, namely 
husbands, but, as I demonstrate, did little to mitigate the extent of gender domination 
ingrained in the patriarchal structures of Lima and the broader Spanish Empire, as the 
patriarchal authority shifted from husbands to Church officials.  
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Introduction: Gender, Authority, and the Law in the Spanish Empire 
 
Musicians: A man and wife may disagree 
  But decent folk, of course, 
  Know reconcilement, eve the worst, 
  Is better than the best divorce. 
   -Miguel Cervantes, El juez de divorcio 1  
 
Marriage and Its Discontents 
The opening to this refrain in the short interlude by Miguel de Cervantes states what was 
patently obvious in early modern Spain: husband and wife often quarreled. Marriage was not 
a utopian union. Certainly there were many couples who lived out happy lives together. Yet 
we also know that marriages throughout the empire ruptured, at times in chaotic and harmful 
ways. This dissertation takes a look at these “disagreements” in colonial Lima, from 1569-
1630. In particular, I examine how these couples (or at least one party) exhausted their other 
options and sought the help of the Church courts to separate through an ecclesiastical 
divorcio (divorce) or to restore a marriage.2 Analyzing the moments of the rupturing of the 
                                                 
1 Miguel de Cervantes, El juez de los divorcios: Ocho Comedias y Ocho Entremeses Nuevos Nunca 
Representados Compuestas por Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra (Madrid: Viuda de Alonso Martín, 1615). 
Cervantes’ interludes have been translated many times into English, see for example Cervantes, Eight 
Interludes, trans. and ed. Dawn Smith (London: Orion, 1996), 19. 
2 This dissertation builds on work about the sacrament of marriage and marital conflict in colonial Latin 
America and early modern Spain, especially Nancy E. van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly: The 
Institutional and Cultural Practice of Recogimiento in Colonial Lima (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001); Charlene Villaseñor Black, “Love and Marriage in the Spanish Empire: Depictions of Holy Matrimony 
and Gender Discourses in the Seventeenth Century,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 32, no. 3 (2001); Bernard 
Lavalle, Amor y opresión en los andes coloniales. (Lima: Instituto Estudios Peruanos, 1999); Pilar Gonzalbo 
Aizpuru, “Las cargas del matrimonio. Dotes y vida familiar en la Nueva España,” in Familia y vida privada en 
la historia de Iberoamerica, ed. Pilar Gonzalbo y Cecilia Rabell (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1996), 207-
226; Alberto Flores Galindo and Magdalena Chocano, “Las cargas del sacramento,” Revista andina 3, no. 2 
(1984): 402-434; Sarah Chambers, “‘To the Company of a Man like My Husband, No Law Can Compel Me’: 
The Limits of Sanctions against Wife Beating in Arequipa, Peru, 1780-1850,” Journal of Women's History 11, 
no. 1 (1999): 31-52; Noble David Cook and Alexandra Parma Cook, Good Faith and Truthful Ignorance: A 
Case of Transatlantic Bigamy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Richard Boyer, Lives of the Bigamists: 
Marriage, Family, and Community in Colonial Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); 
Patricia Seed, To Love, Honor and Obey in Colonial Mexico: Conflicts over Marriage Choice, 1574-1821 
(Stanford University Press, 1988); Allyson Poska, “When Love Goes Wrong: Getting Out of Marriage in 
Seventeenth-Century Spain.” Journal of Social History 29, no. 4 (1996): 871-882; Edward Behrend-Martínez, 
“An Early Modern Spanish ‘Divorce Court,’ and the Rhetoric of Matrimony (1654-1715)” in Disciplines on the 
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sacrament will allow me to explore the broader relationship between marriage, gender, and 
power in colonial Lima. For a thorough investigation of these social relations, I have chosen 
to retain a wide scope throughout this study. In addition to husbands and wives, the following 
pages illuminate the roles of the ecclesiastical court, its personnel, extended family, 
neighbors, colleagues, and masters.  
The majority of complaints and legal petitions came from wives, many of them 
claiming horrific abuse and neglect. The many stories of domestic violence present a picture 
of colonial life in which women suffered under the thumbs of powerful, controlling 
husbands. Yet, the legal proceedings themselves provided potential redress for wives, and 
perhaps institutional accountability for these husbands. The apparent abuse of power by 
husbands and the potential avenues for accountability has given rise to debate among 
historians. To what extent did social and political institutions privilege all things male and 
masculine? Can the relationship and power dynamic between husbands and wives be 
characterized as patriarchal? To what extent did members of the local community and church 
officials intervene in marriages in the Spanish Empire? Do these trials provide examples of 
justice or equity for women of seventeenth-century Lima? The answers to these questions, 
which strike at the heart of gender relations during this period, are not clear-cut or simple. 
Variations abound from case study to case study, and examples of the extent of male 
domination as well as successful female resistance can be held up as illustrations for either 
side of the argument. As has been argued for indigenous and African populations within 
                                                 
Line: Feminist Research on Spanish, Latin American, and US Latina Women, ed. Anne Cruz, Rosalie 
Hernandez-Pecoraro, and Joyce Toliver (New York: Juan de la Cuesta Press, 2003), 145-166; Silvia Arrom, The 
Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985).  
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Spanish America, colonial institutions were simultaneously modes of domination and 
resistance for women.3    
 In the following pages, I argue that patriarchal norms, in the form of ideals of 
manhood, served as a tactic for resistance against patriarchs. I start, as many of the cases 
themselves do, by pointing to the modes of recourse for women, especially those who 
suffered—or at the very least, claimed to suffer—abuse and neglect at the hands of their 
husbands. The legal systems of the Spanish Empire, as has been noted by numerous 
historians, provided a space for women to air grievances, a rare institutional provision in the 
early modern world (roughly sixteenth century through the eighteenth century).4 But pushing 
past the simple fact that women could and did use the courts, this study dissects their broad 
motivations for doing so and the tactics they employed before ecclesiastical judges. In 
particular, I take an uncommon approach to the role of “honor” in the proceedings.5 While 
previous studies have highlighted the importance of feminine honor, my research reveals that 
                                                 
3 See for example Steve Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Susan Kellogg, “Hegemony Out of Conquest: The First Two 
Centuries of Spanish Rule in Central Mexico,” Radical History Review 53 (1992): 27-56; Kellogg, Law and the 
Transformation of Aztec Culture, 1500-1700 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995); and Brian 
Owensby, The Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2008). Herman Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole 
Consciousness, 1570-1640 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
4 See Edward Behrend-Martínez, “An Early Modern Spanish ‘Divorce Court,’ and the Rhetoric of Matrimony 
(1654-1715)”; Behrend-Martínez, Unfit for Marriage: Impotent Spouses on Trial in the Basque Region of 
Spain, 1650-1750 (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 2007); Kimberly Gauderman, Women’s Lives in 
Colonial Quito: Gender, Law, and Economy in Spanish America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 2003).  
5 There is an extensive body of work on honor in the Spanish Empire. Lyman Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-
Rivera, Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in Colonial Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1998), includes a good overview of the historiography as well as in-depth case studies. I follow 
Scott Taylor’s critique that honor has, to some extent, been overstated in early modern Spanish societies, 
especially its role in provoking violence. He notes that an overreliance on Golden Age literature as instructive 
for the practice of honor in everyday life has distorted interpretations of honor in the daily lives of early modern 
Spaniards. Taylor, Honor and Violence in Golden Age Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  
  4 
these cases are overwhelmingly concerned with “marital masculinity”—by which I mean the 
performance of being a good husband. This masculinity is both practical and prescriptive (or 
perhaps normative); it is the intersection of what men think, say, and do and what they are 
expected to think, say, and do.6 As extensive research on masculinity and critical men’s 
studies has shown, there was not a single ideal manhood. Expectations of men in the Spanish 
Empire could vary based on social identities (e.g., priest, soldier, tailor, etc.). Certain roles, 
responsibilities, and expectations, moreover, were placed on husbands because they were 
husbands. How they functioned as male heads of household mattered to ecclesiastical 
authorities as well as members of colonial society, and these ideals received extensive 
attention within the ecclesiastical court.7 While this archetype overlapped in a number of 
ways with what was expected in other regions of the Catholic world, I also highlight how the 
context of the colonial society added a new layer to marital masculinity in early modern 
Lima.  
Ultimately, I argue that petitions by women, and the responses to those petitions by 
husbands, judges, and witnesses, were not primarily tied to the rights of women. While the 
honor of women does make its appearance within these trials, feminine rights and actions fall 
to the background. Instead, the character, actions, and corresponding rights and 
                                                 
6 Here I draw on Matthew Gutmann’s discussion of the various conceptual approaches to masculinity in 
Matthew Gutmann, “Introduction: Discarding Manly Dichotomies in Latin America,” in Changing Men and 
Masculinities in Latin America, ed. Matthew Gutmann (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). The discussions 
of masculinity here also build on many of the important theoretical conclusions of scholarship outside of Latin 
America, especially Raewyn Connell’s work on hegemonic masculinities in Masculinities 2nd ed. (Berkley: UC 
Press, 2005); Derek Neal, The Masculine Self in Late Medieval England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008); Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
7 This marital masculinity is similar to what Ruth Karras would refer to as an alternative masculine subculture. 
From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 1. 
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responsibilities of men occupy the central space within these transcripts.8 These divorciadas 
(a term used to identify women engaged in divorce proceedings) and their allies build their 
legal arguments around husbandly failures. Any recourse within the courts (or in society) 
hinged upon proving a husband’s failure to live up to the ideals of marital masculinity, 
prescriptions driven at once by religious and social expectations. This discourse demonstrates 
the primacy of male authority. Being a husband meant being endowed with authority. The 
challenges to husbands were derived not from the rights of women, but instead took aim at 
the failure of husbands to be (good) men as understood by members of society and 
authorities within colonial institutions. Such shortcomings left unfulfilled the prerequisites 
for the authority of husbands. While highlighting failures of masculine attributes could 
undermine individual patriarchs, patriarchy and male domination remained a constant in 
colonial society. Although petitioning wives might win divorce or separation, they did not 
secure autonomy. Instead, I argue that by appealing for divorce women replaced unfit 
husbands with judges, lawyers, and priests as authority figures. While patriarchs (husbands) 
could be challenged, patriarchy itself (manifested through institutions such as the Church) 
could not.  
What exactly was marital masculinity in colonial Peru? What were the expectations 
of husbands and who policed these norms? First and foremost, we must concede that the 
Church played a vital role in determining what it meant to be a married man. After all, the 
Church had maintained sole control over marriages in the Catholic world for centuries and 
this dominion was further outlined at the Council of Trent (1545-63), which declared the 
                                                 
8 Edward Behrend-Martínez, “Taming Don Juan: Limiting Masculine Sexuality in Counter Reformation Spain,” 
Gender & History 24, no. 2 (2012): 339. 
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orthodox views on marriage as a response to the growth of Protestantism and increasing local 
practices that deviated from religious prescription.9 As the arbiters of creating, dissolving, 
and mediating marriage, Catholic leaders played a central role in monitoring and judging the 
conduct of married men, not unlike the ways they influenced conduct and morality in the 
larger population. The Church’s influence on the expectations of masculinity are readily 
apparent in the documents and will provide few surprises for those familiar with early 
modern Catholicism. An expectation of monogamous sexual fidelity is perhaps the most 
obvious derivation from Catholic theology. The Church’s obsession with sexuality can hardly 
be overstated. Even those instances when a couple, and its immediate community, took no 
issue with extramarital promiscuity, it elicited the attention of visitadores (imperial officials 
conducting investigations) and the Inquisition.  
Despite such influence, the Church alone did not create or define “husbandry,” to 
borrow from Derek Neal’s study of masculinity in late medieval and early modern England.10 
The social realities of Lima likewise influenced the elaboration of manhood within the 
confines of marriage (as well as other interactions of masculinity). As but one example, we 
see this manifested in Limeño litigants’ and witnesses’ expectations of husbands to be 
providers and protectors of their wives and families. These norms derived from both spiritual 
prescriptions and social pressures for communal stability.  
The parameters of marital masculinity, for the most part, fit within broader early 
modern expectations of husbands, and this should not be surprising. The Church remained as 
influential in Peru as it did in Spain, and its proclamations on marriage had a significant 
                                                 
9 For more information on the Council of Trent, see the discussion in Chapter 1.  
10 Neal, The Masculine Self in Late Medieval England. 
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impact on the expectations of husbands in Lima, as seen in the documents. And the majority 
of officials that sought to police the actions of colonial residents, including husbands, were 
themselves Iberians by birth.11 Yet the broader population of Lima was distinctly colonial, 
and this demography created a social order vastly different from Spain. This meant that 
social ordering took on new meaning. Within the new urban center of Lima lived a racially 
diverse population. This population functioned amidst an elaborate racial hierarchy, both 
through the laws that governed them and the social practices that guided daily life. As the 
following analysis of cases will demonstrate, upholding this hierarchy became an essential 
component of marital masculinity. Tamar Herzog has argued that the legal system in Quito 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century “was open to influence through social 
networks, rumor, and systems of reputation” and “was not autonomous from other 
[extralegal] types of knowledge.”12 We see such influences evidenced clearly in the functions 
of racial hierarchies within ecclesiastical marriage cases. For example, women would seek to 
shame husbands by noting that their infidelity occurred with negras. Litigants and their 
witnesses also deplored the verbal abuse of husbands who hurled racial slurs at their wives. 
Though the theology of the sacrament of marriage gave no attention to racial politics, this 
social hierarchy infiltrated Limeño marital masculinity within the ecclesiastical court. In 
short, gender was clearly not the only power structure at work in colonial society. Indeed, 
scholars have shown that modes of power seldom work independently; instead, institutions of 
                                                 
11 Though this certainly changed later in the colonial period with more and more American-born Peruvians 
serving in the Church administration.  
12 Tamar Herzog, Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650-1750) (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 8. See also Bianca Premo’s discussion of infrajustice, “Before the 
Law: Women’s Petitions in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Empire,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 53, no. 2 (2011): 263. 
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domination are most often intertwined and interdependent. And in Lima, where negras, 
indias, and españolas lived together as Limeños, matters of race influenced masculinity.13  
 The following pages will outline a prominent and persistent discourse of marital 
masculinity found within the records of the ecclesiastical tribunal. Through this discussion, 
my intervention into the literature on masculinity is twofold. First, I hope to bring greater 
attention to what I have termed marital masculinity. As the notes throughout this dissertation 
illustrate, studies of masculinity have tended to focus on the bedroom and the battlefield, 
even as scholars acknowledge the numerous iterations of what it means to be a man based on 
cultural values, race/class status, occupation, and relationships, among other variables. Still 
very few studies have attempted any meaningful research into the masculine expectations of 
husbands in the Spanish Empire.14 Here I have shown that there was substantial consensus in 
these expectations and the failures to live up to these ideals could bear tangible, effective 
consequences.  
 Secondly, this research shows the complexity of marital masculinity, one in which the 
racial politics of colonial Lima played a significant role. The religious precepts associated 
with the sacrament play a large role in discussions of marital masculinity in these cases. 
Canon law’s prescription of fidelity, provision, and just treatment figure in many of the 
                                                 
13 Throughout this dissertation, I use Limeño as a shorthand for peoples and institutions of the Archbishopric. 
As a city with a constantly evolving population, I do not suggest that the residents of the city fixed their identity 
to their current locale. However, in these cases they are functioning as parishioners of the archbishopric and are 
participating within this colonial society.  
14 Steve J. Stern, The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Grace Coolidge, “Contested Masculinity: Noblemen and Their 
Mistresses in Early Modern Spain,” in Contested Spaces of Nobility in Early Modern Europe, ed. Mathew P. 
Ramaniello and Charles Lipp (Ashgate, 2011); and Behrend-Martínez, “Taming Don Juan.” Beyond the 
Spanish Empire, see Susan Mosher Stuard, “Burdens of Matrimony: Husbanding and Gender in Medieval Italy” 
in Medieval Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages, ed. Clare Lees (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994).  
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criticisms of bad husbands. But also important is the extent to which the racial hierarchies of 
Lima influenced perceptions of manhood in these trials. In chapter 1 we will see how wives 
singled out infidelity that crossed racial lines and highlighted racial slurs used by their 
husbands as a way to discredit their claim to patriarchal authority. Witnesses cited in chapter 
3 substantiated many of those claims as well. Furthermore, that slaves testified to these 
deplorable actions proved especially harmful for the culprit’s manhood. The impact of a 
female African slave demonstrating a stronger moral compass than a Spanish-born husband 
was surely not lost on the litigants, lawyers, judges, and broader community. Chapter 4 
shows how slaves could use their claims as good Christians, seeking to “make the married 
life” to protest relocation. Yet, as those cases proceed, we find that courts unsurprisingly 
privileged “white” marriages over black ones. Theological precepts clearly still held great 
importance for marital masculinity, but social structures and prejudices of colonial society 
likewise proved potent, even within the religio-legal realm of the ecclesiastical tribunal.  
 
Gender and Power in the Spanish Empire: Patriarchy Revisited 
Colonial preoccupation with male authority and marital masculinity pushes us to further 
refine our interpretation of gender relations and power dynamics within the early modern 
Spanish Empire. Spain and its colonies seem contradictory and confusing when viewed 
through the lens of gender. At once, it was the world of don Juan, articulated most clearly in 
Golden Age dramas exemplifying a sexualized masculinity, but also played out in everyday 
forms of gendered violence.15 At the same time, women in the early modern Spanish world 
                                                 
15 On Golden Age literature, see Taylor, Honor and Violence in Golden Age Spain; Gabriela Carrión, Staging 
Marriage in Early Modern Spain: Conjugal Doctrine in Lope, Cervantes, and Calderón (Bucknell University 
Press, 2011); Also on this archetype in early modern Spain, see Behrend-Martínez, “Taming Don Juan.”  
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possessed greater legal rights than their counterparts in many other pre-modern empires, and 
the Church increasingly sought to police the sexuality of men, particularly after the Council 
of Trent.16 So on one side we have the man who is oversexed, engages in gender violence, 
and is the head of all social and political structures;17 and on the other, institutions such as the 
Church placing limits on male sexuality and ecclesiastical courts enforcing those limits, 
giving a venue for women to challenge and criticize men. The picture becomes further 
complicated when considering the frequent economic activity of women, their ability to own 
land, and their governing of households in the absence of men.18 
 The scholarship on gender in Spanish America has continually grappled with this 
dichotomy. Early research sought first and foremost to bring women into the 
historiographical conversation.19 Through these works we received biographical knowledge 
of women and their roles within society, as scholars emphasized their subordination within 
                                                 
16 We see this trend in cases from early modern Spain. Edward Behrend-Martínez noted that in amacebamiento 
(concubinage) cases, men were overwhelmingly charged with the crime, even though both the man and woman 
involved had broken canon law. The courts went so far as to omit the name of the women from the transcript, in 
a sense exonerating them from guilt and possible social consequences. Behrend-Martínez, “Taming Don Juan,” 
336-340. 
17 With Queen Isabella being the notable exception.  
18 On the economy, see Chad Black, Limits of Gender Domination: Women, the Law, and Political Crisis in 
Quito, 1765-1830 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011); David Norton, “Women in the City: 
Women as Economic and Legal Actors in Valladolid, Spain, 1580-1620” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 
2005); Gauderman, Women’s Lives in Colonial Quito. This complexity is amplified in the reconquista and 
colonial contexts in which migration changed the demographics of cities, making women even more active 
(even powerful) within communities. Heath Dillard, Daughters of the Reconquest: Women in Castilian Town 
Society, 1100-1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); On women as heads of household, see 
Stephanie Fink De Backer, Widowhood in Early Modern Spain: Protectors, Proprietors, and Patrons (Leiden: 
Brill, 2010); Bianca Premo, “From the Pockets of Women The Gendering of the Mita, Migration and Tribute in 
Colonial Chucuito, Peru” The Americas 5, no. 1 (2000): 63-94.”  
19 The edited volumes by Asunción Lavrín stand at the forefront of the field, Sexuality and Marriage in 
Colonial Latin America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) and Latin American Women: Historical 
Perspectives (London: Greenwood Press, 1978). See also, Arrom, The Women of Mexico City.  
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society.20 Yet, accompanying those studies were works highlighting the modes of resistance 
used by women, mirroring to an extent the literature on other marginalized populations. 
Despite these avenues for recourse, scholars emphasized the pervasiveness of patriarchy and 
the institutional structures that maintained gender domination.21  
More recent studies, however, have begun to challenge this narrative claiming that 
patriarchy was less a colonial product and more a result of imperial centralization, the rise of 
the nation-state, and growth of capitalism.22 One clear point of disagreement within this 
debate is exactly what we mean when we invoke patriarchy. Chad Black, drawing on the 
work of Lisa Mary Sousa, uses patriarchy to refer to absolute and uninhibited male power.23 
He argues that such an all-encompassing patriarchy was for the most part absent in colonial 
Quito, in large part as a result of the decentralized nature of Spanish institutions.24 This early 
modern legal culture that emphasized overlapping jurisdictions, negotiation, and flexibility 
prohibited the full manifestations of patriarchy, according to Black. Furthermore, male 
domination actually grew more potent in the eighteenth century under the Bourbon 
                                                 
20 For the primary example of the biographical approach, see Luis Martin, Daughters of the Conquistadores: 
Women of the Viceroyalty of Peru (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).  
21 For the colonial period, in addition to literature cited in note 14, see Irene Silverblatt, Moon, Sun and Witches: 
Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Early Modern Peru (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); 
Karen Graubart, With our Labor and Sweat: Indigenous Women and the Formation of Colonial Society in Peru, 
1550-1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), esp. Ch. 3; Boyer, Lives of the Bigamists; Sarah 
Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender and Politics in Arequipa, 1780-1854 (University Park: 
Penn State University Press, 1996); Karen Viera Powers, Women in the Crucible of the Conquest: The 
Gendered Genesis of Spanish American Society, 1500-1600 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
2005); Frank Salomon, “Indian Women of Early Colonial Quito as Seen Through Their Testaments,” The 
Americas 44, no. 3 (1988): 325-341; Steve Stern, The Secret History of Gender.  
22 Seed, To Love, Honor, and Obey; Gauderman, Women’s Lives; Black, The Limits of Gender Domination.  
23 Black, The Limits of Gender Domination, 9-11. 
24 Though some have argued that such absolute male domination is similarly absent in the period (1790-1810) 
where Black identifies patriarchal norms. See Erin O’Connor, “Review of The Limits of Gender Domination,” 
American Historical Review 117, no. 1 (2012): 258.   
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monarchs, who sought to further centralize imperial control, and continued into the national 
period. The work of Black and others are important for two reasons. First, they undermine 
the progressive narrative that proposes that modernity and the nation-state helped to usher in 
more enlightened, equitable forms of gender relations. Second, Black rightly notes that 
patriarchy is often invoked with little contextualization, as if all patriarchy looked and acted 
the same. As historian Judith Bennett previously argued, “Patriarchy might be everywhere, 
but it is not everywhere the same, and therefore patriarchy, in all its immense variety, is 
something we need to understand, analyze and explain.”25 As myriad studies for both Latin 
America and beyond have demonstrated, male domination varied in time and space, and 
more to the point, was fluid and malleable even within a given community.  
Judith Bennett’s History Matters has provided a thorough analysis of various 
meanings of patriarchy in scholarship, which can be divided into three main uses: 1) 
ecclesiastical power, 2) power and authority of husbands and fathers over their households, 
3) broad ordering of gendered power. This third classification is the iteration with which this 
dissertation is concerned, though certainly the religious and familial models of early modern 
Spanish and Spanish American societies fell within this broader system. Adrienne Rich has 
argued that patriarchy “is a familial-social, ideological, political system” that subjects women 
to male authority through force and more subtle means.26 For Allan Johnson, a society that is 
patriarchal is “male dominated, male identified, and male centered.”27 Building on these 
                                                 
25 Judith Bennett, History Matters: Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 54. The discussion of Rich and Johnson below were drawn from Bennett’s 
exploration of the uses of patriarchy.  
26 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born (New York: Norton Press, 1976), 57.  
27 Allan Johnson, The Gender Knot: Unraveling our Patriarchal Legacy, revised edition (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2005), 5. 
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understandings of the term, I invoke patriarchy in this dissertation to label a systematic and 
structural limitation on women’s autonomy; the term identifies structures and institutions of 
power that were predisposed to empowering men and oppressing and/or marginalizing 
women. Patriarchy is both institutional and practiced. It functions only when a society’s laws 
and/or customs privilege male power, and exists only where men take advantage of these 
institutional features. When using the word I make specific reference to the ways in which 
this systemic gender domination manifested itself in colonial Lima. It is true that men were 
not all-powerful or above the law, nor were women left without rights or access to recourse 
and claims to justice. As these cases show, challenges to patriarchs arose only out of broader 
conceptualizations of manhood and authority in the Spanish Empire. In essence, the early 
modern ideals of patriarchy provided limits on individual patriarchs, a step that allowed for a 
form of gender domination that pervaded the household and the courtroom alike.  
 
Assessing Gender Domination in Lima  
As I show, wives in Lima sought to police the patriarchal authority of their husbands by 
homing in on marital masculinity, but so too did the rest of the community, as seen through 
witness testimony. By appealing to this gender performance, wives and their legal allies held 
husbands accountable for their actions and brought into question their rights and authority: 
their right (and duty) to cohabitate with their wives, benefit from their labor, have sex, etc.; 
and their authority over their households, namely their wives.  
 Indeed, at the initiation of these trials, women were released from the marital home 
and placed in recogimientos or casas de divorcios (religious institutions similar to convents 
which could house women engaged in divorce disputes) that placed their bodies outside the 
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control of their husbands.28 It is important to note that this was an immediate action in nearly 
every divorcio proceeding. By simply filing suit, a woman brought serious consequences on 
her husband, both in everyday life and in the public’s perception of his manhood. By 
pursuing litigation within the Church courts, women challenged the most intimate form of 
male domination. On the basis of their husbands’ shortcomings (and therefore, failure to be 
good men), wives contended they no longer deserved to be husbands, or receive the 
rights/privileges corresponding to that position. Witnesses likewise called into question 
husbands’ authority by criticizing their marital masculinity. Importantly, these criticisms of 
men were at least partially effective. At least in the interim, courts removed many of the 
rights of husbandry from them. 
 But what of the implications for a divorciada (a woman filing for divorce)? Does this 
initial legal victory signal a triumph of gender equity? Do such rulings invalidate common 
interpretations of male domination and female inferiority within Spanish American society? 
Such broad strokes cannot be made based on these limited gains. There is no disputing that 
the courts gave women a voice, but we should be careful in assessing the potency of this 
voice in colonial society. As a more thorough examination of the cases demonstrates, the 
consequences of these trials are more losses for husbands than they are victories for women.  
It is important to emphasize the physical bodies of women, and the control exercised 
over them by their husbands. Women identified offenses against their bodies—in the form of 
domestic violence, failure to provide, and sexual infidelity (which was also a failure to fulfill 
the conjugal debt)—as major sources of their grievances. The initial movement of a 
divorciada outside the marital home removed her body from husbandly control. The fruits of 
                                                 
28 The essential reading on recogimientos is van Deeusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly.  
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her body’s labor, too, were then withheld from her husband. This severing of authority, I 
contend, was a central goal for these women.  
Yet, we must be clear that separations from husbands did not give women complete 
control over their own bodies. Instead, ecclesiastical officials claimed control. A move to a 
recogimiento was essentially forced by the Church. These institutions were not places of 
solace; women often lamented their time within these shelters. To make matters worse, they 
relied on their husbands for financial support while residing in the casa de divorcio, and 
unsurprisingly these men on trial often neglected to send necessary goods and funds. Many 
of the women instead requested placement in a casa honrada, the home of a respected family 
in the city. Such concessions were not common and came only after numerous petitions. So, 
in practice, women did not gain control over their bodies through these proceedings; instead 
authority over them moved from husbands to ecclesiastical authorities. To fully understand 
the legal agency of women, we must account for the limits of the legal process and, more 
broadly, the social and institutional limits that defined the Spanish Empire.   
 Thus for married women, gender domination was real, lived, and pervasive, even if 
not unlimited. The decentralization of Spain’s institutions allowed for individual patriarchs, 
in this case husbands, to be challenged, constrained, and punished. Their sex endowed them 
with power; it did not impart omnipotence or immunity. Likewise, decentralization did not 
produce autonomous women, and it did not eliminate gendered authority. Instead, the 
Church, as a powerful global patriarchal institution, took control, asserting itself at the top of 
the hierarchy of colonial society.   
 
The City of Kings 
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My research centers on Lima from 1569-1630. Lima, as a colonial urban center, is an ideal 
site for a study of gender, family, and authority in Latin America due in large part to its 
demography, especially the racial diversity within the city. Rather than following the model 
of New Spain (Mexico) in which Spaniards co-opted the indigenous capital, Spanish 
conquistadores set out to establish the South American capital on the relatively sparsely 
populated Pacific Coast, not the inland Inca capital of Cuzco, following the conquest of the 
Inca Empire in 1532-33. The Valley of Lima was populated by distinct communities, though 
there was certainly overlap in language and many cultural markers. Paul Charney has 
estimated an indigenous population of 204,000 in 1525; due to warfare, disease, and 
migration (both forced and elected), that number fell to 2,037 by 1600.29 A decrease in the 
indigenous population, however, coincided with an influx of new peoples. From 1540-1570, 
Europeans, indigenous peoples from the mountainous regions, and African slaves flooded the 
new colonial center. The population rose to 13,000 by 1593 and to over 24,000 in 1615. After 
soaring to 40,000 by 1640, growth then slowed, peaking in the colonial period around 60,000 
in 1746.30  
The urban center was among the most diverse in all of the New World. Spanish, 
indigenous peoples from throughout the Americas, Africans, mestizos, mulattos, and other 
mixed-race categories were represented in the colonial capital.31 This diversity allows me to 
                                                 
29 Paul Charney, Indian Society in the Valley of Lima (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), Table 
1.1, see also appendix 5. The first figure is explicated from the “household” count of 25,500, using multipliers 
of 6-10.  
30 Adam Warren, Medicine and Politics of Colonial Peru: Population Growth and the Bourbon Reforms 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 8; Kenneth Mills, et. al. Colonial Latin America: A 
Documentary History (Lanham: SR Books, 2002), 186. 
31 As Nancy van Deusen rightly noted, “it was the blood, bones, and breath of thousands of indigenous and 
African diasporic and local peoples who made Lima the urbs of grandeur that it would become. And this came 
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look at racial politics at play in disputes over gender and power. One of the earliest detailed 
censuses from Lima, taken in 1619, records the population of the urban center at 25,167 (see 
table 1). Nearly half of this population was classified as “black” (negro), with another 5% 
denoted as mulatto.32 Especially considering the low number of indigenous peoples in the 
city (around 5%), the demography of Lima stood out from other colonial locales. Lima’s high 
African slave population was particularly unique for an urban center in the midst of a largely 
indigenous hinterland. By contrast, in the late sixteenth century Mexico City had a majority 
indigenous population with a much smaller African population.33  
Table 1. Lima Population by Race, 1619.34 
RACIAL 
CATEGORY35 
Spanish/Mestizo  Black (negro) Mulatto Indian 
GENDER Male  Female Male  Female Male Female Male  Female 
POPULATION 5,728 3,978 6,135 5,862 510 656 755 651 
                                                 
at quite a price.” “Diasporas, Bondage, and Intimacy in Lima, 1535 to 1555,” Colonial Latin American Review 
19, no. 2 (2010): 267.  
32 The census was commissioned by Monteclaros in 1614, Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 340. 
While the census simply labeled these African immigrants as negros, there was a linguistic and cultural 
diversity to those of African descent, who hailed from various regions on the continent. See Kris Lane, 
“Captivity and Redemption: Aspects of Slave Life in Early Colonial Quito and Popayán,” The Americas 57, no. 
2 (2000): 229 and Alexander L. Wisnoski III, “‘It is Unjust for the Law of Marriage to be broken by the Law of 
Slavery’: Married Slaves and their Masters in Early Colonial Peru,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave 
and Post-Slave Studies 34, no. 2 (2014): 237-238. 
33 Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, La población negra de Mexico: estudio etnohistórico, segunda edición (Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1972), 210. 
34 Fredrick P. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1974), Appendix A, 340. The mulatto population of the San Sebastian parish was not divided by gender. 
Bowser took the average male/female ratio of the other parishes, 44 percent male and 56 percent female, to give 
an approximation for the parish. The census provides a similar population breakdown to two earlier censuses. In 
each survey, more than 40% of the population was of African descent.   
35 The Spanish/Mestizo category likely includes some people of direct indigenous descent who were “passing” 
as mestizo or Spanish. Yet, because they were able to “pass” for the census, this new identity likely represents 
the identity they held in most social circumstances. For this reason, the descent of a person, especially for this 
study, is not as important as the identity they claimed for themselves and that was accepted by their 
contemporaries. See note 47.  
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These demographic shifts brought about a change in the residential layout of the city, 
changes that held tangible effects for the populations of Lima. The creation of a European-
style city combined with the urbanization at the turn of the century brought the populations 
of the capital into close quarters, both figuratively and literally. Outside the city center, 
reserved for the most elite in Peruvian society, segregation based on race and class proved 
impossible leaving Spaniards, Africans, Indians and the ever-growing mixed race population 
living side by side.36 Cramped living spaces in Lima similarly limited the racial and social 
segregation of society. Large multi-residential structures housed the majority of the 
population, which placed residents of all classes right beside and on top of one another 
thereby limiting the privacy of domestic life. Further defying the goals of colonization, the 
high population of African slaves and the domestic work in which they participated meant 
the daily, private lives of residents became public knowledge to other Limeños, regardless of 
status.  
The institutional development of Lima, which occurred alongside the rapid 
urbanization, likewise make it an ideal case study for this project. Lima was a coastal city 
and go-between for New and Old World goods and people. The city was the official capital 
of the Viceroyalty of Peru (essentially all of Spanish South America in this time period), and 
the viceroyalty’s highest bureaucratic officials and courts resided in Lima. The Crown placed 
                                                 
36 Not unlike what has been shown for Mexico later in the century. See, R. Douglas Cope, The Limits of Racial 
Domination: Plebian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660-1720 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1994).  
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a branch of the Inquisition in the capital.37 Lima was also the seat of the Archbishop of Lima, 
and served as the Church’s South American headquarters. The presence of secular and 
ecclesiastical courts and more importantly the surveillance provided by numerous colonial 
officials, made it a key battleground for enforcing imperial and religious expectations.  
As a center of the South American Spanish Empire, Lima shared many cultural 
attributes of the metropole, which will be evident in this dissertation. Yet, the nature of the 
colonial enterprise ensured that the city was not simply the southern hemisphere’s version of 
Seville or Valladolid. In particular, the racial dynamics in Lima were unlike those in Spain 
and in many of its colonies as well. Lima had a higher percentage of African-descended 
residents than other urban areas in Latin America or Iberia during this period. Through this 
dissertation, my goal is to highlight the norms and practices of colonial Lima; when these 
characteristics ring dissonant with what the scholarship has established for Spain, I will seek 
to make that clear.  
   
Sources and their Problems 
This dissertation covers cases from 1569 to 1630, starting with the earliest extant 
ecclesiastical trial records from Lima, and thus provides a window into how Spanish legal 
practice was transferred across the Atlantic.38 This period is critical because it followed the 
                                                 
37 Lyman Johnson and Susan Socolow, “Colonial Centers, Colonial Peripheries and the Economic Agency of 
the Spanish State” in Negotiating Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas 1500-1820, ed. Christine 
Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 61-62.  
38 I am most inclined to presume that litigation began earlier than 1569 but that inconsistencies in early 
archiving, earthquakes, and various conflicts in and around Lima caused the loss of these earlier transcripts. By 
legal practice, I mean to draw attention to the point of friction between law codes as written and how the law 
was put to work within the ecclesiastical courts. When referring to legal practice, I am identifying what 
litigants, lawyers, and judges portrayed as right, just, and in keeping with the law.  
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Council of Trent (1545-1563), when the Church began to push for increased doctrinal 
uniformity throughout the Catholic world. This increased focus on orthodoxy took hold in 
Lima with the second Council of Lima (1568-69), which also marks the earliest existing 
divorcio transcript. By continuing to 1630, I have more than a half-century of cases to probe 
the continued evolution of marital doctrine and the increasing activity of ecclesiastical courts 
pertaining to marital matters. This time also marks a change in colonial periodization, 
transitioning away from the early foundational era. While Mark Burkholder has used 1640 as 
the beginning of the “mid-colonial period,”39 I have chosen 1630 as the point of transition to 
a more developed colony. This shift is reflected foremost in the activity of ecclesiastical 
institutions, including the frequency of divorcio petitions. Though the number of cases rose 
steadily through the first thirty years of the century, the 1630s witnessed a 60% increase over 
the previous decade. This periodization also coincides with the changing of the archbishop 
and just before Lima’s next population boom.40 This era has also been one of the most 
understudied in colonial Latin American History despite its role as the formative years of 
many of the imperial institutions.   
I conducted the research for this project at the Archivo Arzobispal de Lima, which 
houses the majority of ecclesiastical records from the archbishopric. I focused on the 
Archbishop’s archive and the Church’s records because at this point the ecclesiastical 
                                                 
39 Mark Burkholder, Idolatry and Its Enemies: Colonial Andean Religion and Extirpation, 1640-1750 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4-5 
40 Though Lima witnessed a boom in the first years of the seventeenth-century, there was a leveling off 
sometime in the 1610s. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 337-341. Also, Fernando Arias de Ugarte 
took over as Archbishop in 1630.  
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tribunal had jurisdiction over all marital issues.41 The secular, imperial were courts were 
active and present in Lima, but disputes involving spouses that fell short of murder were 
heard before religious officials. After a survey of their holdings through reading archival 
guides and surveying sample cases from relevant collections, I focused on a body of more 
than 200 cases that most revealed the dynamics of married life and conflict in the capital.42 
Four collections make up the foundation of this study: Divorcios, Causas Criminales de 
Matrimonio (CCM), Causas Litigios Matrimoniales (CLM), and Causas de Negros (CN).43 
Divorcios are exactly as the title suggests, proceedings for divorcio, in which one spouse 
sought a permanent separation from the other, though without the right to remarry.44 These 
cases varied in both duration of the trial and number of folios; they could be as short as a 
single day and folio, or go on for several years and more than 400 folios. Cases found in the 
CCM and CLM collections are similar to each other. They center on one or both spouses 
violating orthodox marriage practice (e.g. lack of cohabitation). The goal of each case was to 
evaluate the possible offense and, when necessary, rebuke the offending party (or parties) to 
                                                 
41 Later in the colonial period, financial matters related to marriage and divorce were handled through state 
courts, Arrom, Women of Mexico City, 225. 
42 In addition to the cases that received significant attention, I also surveyed the Esponsales, Bigamias, Causas 
de Amancebamientos, Causas Criminales, and Nulidades collections held at the AAL.  
43 Noticeably absent from this source base is Bigamias (bigamy cases). While on the surface these documents 
might seem useful, the content of those cases rarely touch on the relationship and married lives of husbands and 
wives. More often they are disputes about whether a first marriage was indeed a valid marriage. The breakdown 
of cases consulted for this dissertation is as follows: D- 141, CCM-11, CCM-15, CN-42. 
44 For the Divorcios cases, which range from a single folio to more than 200, I opted to conduct a close reading 
of a random sample (every fifth case). In addition to this close reading, I also surveyed all other diorrcio cases 
and conducted a close reading of those cases which seemed particularly rich in addressing the questions at the 
center of this research. For more on the parameters of divorcio in the early modern Spanish Empire, see Chapter 
1. For some earlier analyses of this source base, see van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly; and 
Bernard Lavalle, “Divorcio y nulidad de matrimonio en Lima (1650-1700): La desavenencia conyugal como 
indicador social,” Revista Andina 4, no. 2 (1986). This research is also reprinted in his Amor y opresión en los 
Andes colonial (Lima: IEP, 1999).  
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restore appropriate observance of the sacrament. Many of these cases were initiated ex 
officio, at times tipped off by a community informant or by an aggrieved spouse. These cases 
have been consulted far less by historians than the better known divorcio cases. By bringing 
these related but disparate legal proceedings into conversation, my dissertation is able to 
comment on the array of responses to marital conflict, especially by showing the extralegal 
responses of wives to domestic violence. Through petitions and witness testimonies, Limeños 
reveal the goings on outside the court, at times showing wives fleeing their husbands as a 
means to escape troubled or dangerous married lives. The Causas de Negros collection 
includes all cases involving a slave as litigant, as well as cases regarding the treatment and 
sale of slaves. For this collection, I have focused on the cases involving married slaves whose 
conjugal cohabitation was jeopardized by their owners. The conclusions of this study are 
built mostly on the qualitative analysis of over 200 cases from these collections. Through a 
close reading of the words attributed to litigants, judges, and witnesses, I attempt to uncover 
their understandings of gender, authority, and the law in colonial society. In a few instances, 
my analysis has relied more on quantitative methods. For each quantitative analysis, I 
provide a detailed outline of my data samples, and how they were chosen and compiled.  
Despite the inherent difficulties that come with using legal sources—the ambiguities 
of authorship, the privileging of deviance over normative behaviors, the difficulties of 
parsing exaggeration and embellishments—they are an invaluable resource.45 Throughout the 
Spanish empire legal sources abound and address aspects of life not highlighted by any other 
                                                 
45 On the problem of legal sources revealing deviancy over common practice, see William B. Taylor, Drinking, 
Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979). For more on 
the complexity of legal sources and authorship, as well as prompts on how to best deal with these issues see, 
Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial 
Peru (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Premo, “Before the Law.” 
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extant source base. Indeed for this project, there is no other documentation from colonial 
Peru that provides the insight into a range of domestic issues found in ecclesiastical court 
records. While their value is undeniable, the complications encountered when examining 
these documents deserves attention from the start.  
1. Whose voices do we hear? In this dissertation, I will often make reference to the legal 
arguments of the litigants. In doing so, I am not asserting that the affidavits submitted to the 
courts are their unfiltered words. Of course, nearly all litigants had the aid of lawyers 
(procuradores), who also contributed to the process. Nevertheless, these arguments belong to 
the legal personae of litigants. According to the courts, these were their words. Certainly the 
arguments and claims that appear on these pages derive from a collaborative effort. They no 
doubt reflect (if to varying degrees) the experiences of those who signed their names 
asserting their truthfulness. But the lawyers and notaries, whose hands put these experiences 
and arguments to paper, and therefore into the historical record, likewise played a crucial role 
in the construction of this discourse.  
While we have limited information on the collaboration that went on between lawyers 
and litigants, it is widely assumed that the legal professionals educated the laity on the 
common processes of litigation. Lawyers also aided their clients in crafting petitions and 
arguments according to the legal logic of the era. While certain legal statutes were well-
known, it is unsurprising that the everyday resident of Lima was not well-versed in the Leyes 
de Toro, New Laws, Siete Partidas, and the local councils, to name just a small part of the 
legal labyrinth. For that reason, legal professionals were essential in guiding their clients’ 
cases toward their legal strengths. When possible I have tried to acknowledge the role of 
lawyers, especially when they have submitted materials in the first-person, clearly 
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delineating their role in the process. At other times when the lawyers’ role is more obscured, 
we are left with informed speculation. 
The reader will also note the prominent presence of women’s voices in the following 
pages. This is reflective of the cases themselves. Because many instances of marital conflict 
before the courts were brought by women (especially in divorcio cases), the burden of proof 
was on them. As such, their petitions were more frequent, lengthy, and detailed. They also 
called the overwhelming number of witnesses, leaving even the voices of husbands’ allies 
rather muted. Even still, judgments did not come quickly or easily—as the next section 
makes clear—and husbands knew this. Some men avoided the courts for periods of time, 
likely trying to work out some form of compromise outside the legal setting. When the 
husbands’ voices are obscured, I have tried to read through silences whenever possible.46    
2. How did it end? Approaching these sources for the first time, I was obsessed with finding 
out the verdicts to each case. For example in divorce cases, after reading some of the 
impassioned pleas that will be seen in chapter 1, a legal separation seemed all but assured 
from this naive modern author’s vantage. Yet, decisions in the court came in piecemeal 
fashion and “final verdicts,” declaring whether or not a divorce was merited, seldom appear. 
Even in these rare occurrences, judges did not often elaborate on their decisions. In the case 
of Ysabel Ruiz and Pedro Sanchez, the provisor only commented that he had not seen 
sufficient evidence to grant a divorce.47 Although a frustrating aspect of the sources, this void 
also tells us a great deal about marital conflict within the courts. As Tamar Herzog has 
                                                 
46 It is worth acknowledging that this preponderance of women’s voices, at the expense of men’s perspective, 
stands in stark contrast to the vast majority of the historical record in colonial Latin America.   
47 AAL, D 2.3, unmarked (penultimate folio).  
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convincingly demonstrated, early modern Spanish courts (both secular and ecclesiastical) 
served as keepers of the social peace, not as dissectors of legal precedence.48 Keeping parties 
content and finding compromise often guided proceedings as much as strictly following law 
codes. Given the makeup of these sources, the following analysis will rarely mention final 
decisions of judges. While this certainly limits what questions can be asked of ecclesiastical 
proceedings (especially as they relate to judicial opinion), it does not prevent us from probing 
marital relations and gendered authority as it was represented, disputed, and negotiated by 
litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the infrequent interjections of judges.  
3. Identity and Classification. In my first research trip to the archives in Lima, my hope was 
to compare how women of various racial and social classes challenged oppressive husbands. 
The records, however, did not always provide the relevant details to identify the litigants, an 
especially surprising omission given the colonial obsession with racial classification. This is 
not to say that those composing these records were not at all concerned with race, but that the 
labeling of calidad, which combined skin color, parentage, occupation, wealth, and other 
social traits, was selectively employed.49 The courts were most focused on labeling those 
whose race they deemed problematic. As far I can tell, those of African descent were always 
noted as such in their first appearance within the transcript. Indias/indios were also 
frequently labeled by the courts, though not always, as at times litigants or witnesses with 
indigenous names received no racial classification in the documents. Many litigants, 
                                                 
48 Herzog, Upholding Justice.  
49 For more on race and calidad see, John Chance, Race and Class in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1978); Robert McCaa, Stuart B. Schwartz, and Arturo Grubessich. “Race and Class in 
Colonial Latin America: A Critique,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 3 (1979); Richard 
Boyer, “Negotiating Calidad: The Everyday Struggle for Status in Mexico” Historical Archeology 31, no. 1 
(1997).  
  26 
however, were assigned no racial designation. While it is impossible to know for sure, it is 
likely that all of the unclassified persons were considered to be from the dominant social 
group, “regular” residents not of “inferior” race. They comprised peninsulares (those born in 
Iberia who migrated to the colonies) as well as those of Spanish blood born in the Americas 
(criollos).50 The absence of references to mestizos (descendants of Spanish-Indian parentage), 
considered alongside the volume of racial mixing that existed during that time, suggests that 
they too did not necessitate categorization before the court. Also a contributing factor was 
that distinguishing mestizos from Spaniards could be a tricky game, especially considering 
that calidad did not rely exclusively on phenotype/genotype, but also wealth, language, 
honor, and other social traits. Indeed, “passing” as another race was far from uncommon at 
this point.51  
 The perception of identity and its impact on the reputation of residents in Lima as 
well as the inherent difficulties in race-making served to limit how the courts could identify 
those who came before it. In order to present the ambiguity of legal personhoods, I will 
identify the litigants and witnesses using the identifiers that appear in the record. When the 
documents supply this information, I will likewise provide it for the reader, whether in the 
form of mulata, don, libre (free), etc. I will avoid in-text speculation when no such 
elaboration is found. In this way, I seek to represent how notaries, judges, and other legal 
                                                 
50 These colonial-born residents could be labeled criollos though this term also applied to Africans born in the 
Americas (a strange linguistic overlap).  
51 For more on the evolution of mestizo in the colonial period, see Johanne Rappaport, The Disappearing 
Mestizo: Configuring Difference in the Colonial New Kingdom of Granada (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2014). For a critical appraisal of Rappaport’s arguments, see Adrian Masters, “The Disappearing Mestizo, by 
Joanne Rappaport (2014)” Not Even Past (Feb. 9, 2015), accessed at https://notevenpast.org/the-disappearing-
mestizo-by-joanne-rappaport-2014/.  
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personnel perceived these historical actors, either simply as residents of Lima or as colonial 
inhabitants whose classification merited inclusion in the record.   
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of divorcio in colonial Lima and examines the contents of 
petitions for marital separation, giving special attention to the ways these petitions articulated 
a “marital masculinity.” I outline the common accusations by wives of their husbands and 
describe how these accusations could be perceived within colonial society. These petitions 
begin to show how, in addition to religious expectations, upholding the social hierarchies of 
Lima mattered to marital masculinity.  
  Chapter 2 looks to the role of the broader family in marital conflicts. While 
there is much scholarly work on familial influence on betrothal, far fewer studies, especially 
focused on colonial Latin America, have probed the continued role of parents and siblings in 
marital relationships. Through examples of the involvement of parents, especially mothers, 
and siblings within marital conflicts, this chapter illustrates the legal/extra-legal parameters 
that guided family intervention into the matters of husbands and wives.  
Chapter 3 broadens the scope of opinion on marital conflict, bringing the community 
of the couple into focus. Through an analysis of witness testimony, I demonstrate how the 
community shared similar views on marital masculinity. I argue that while challenges to 
husbands outside the court were rare, community members from all sectors of society readily 
testified to perceived abuses of power and authority by husbands.  
 In the fourth chapter, I look to enslaved married couples as a way to broaden the 
investigation of marital authority, patriarchy, and power in colonial Lima. In this chapter I 
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examine cases in which married slaves sued masters who attempted to prevent them from 
cohabitating (literally, making the married life, hacer vida maridable). As enslaved husbands 
sought to fulfill their manly duties by residing with their wives, their subjugation to their 
masters meant conflicting obligations. While slaves experienced some successes, masters 
were still able to disrupt slave marriages, often by invoking their own marital obligations. 
Such cases demonstrate the hierarchies at work in patriarchy and the intricate relationship 
between race and gender within the empire. 
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Chapter One: Divorcio and the Articulation of Marital Masculinity  
In well-governed kingdoms and republics, 
marriages should have a time limit, and every 
three years they should either be dissolved or 
confirmed anew, like a rent contract.52 
             –Mariana to the ecclesiastical judge 
 
Introduction 
Despite the wishes of Mariana in Miguel Cervantes’ The Judge of the Divorce Court, a 
marriage in the Spanish empire was not like a rent contract. Once the couple had exchanged 
wedding vows before a priest and consummated their union, there were few ways to escape 
one another. For those living in Peru and throughout the Spanish world in the seventeenth 
century, marriage was an indissoluble covenant. Yet, more than a few spouses found the state 
of marriage too much to bear. For a number of reasons, husbands and wives in colonial Lima 
sought to escape their spouses and the marital household, many of them choosing to take 
official legal action in the ecclesiastical court. This chapter investigates these ruptures for 
what they can tell us about how familial authority was structured in colonial Lima. Through 
these proceedings, I probe how Limeños of various backgrounds and experiences conceived 
of husbandly duties, and how failure to fulfill those duties inhibited claims to authority.  
In the following pages I look at divorce cases, giving special attention to the 
overwhelming majority of cases that were brought by women. I focus on the accusations 
made by aggrieved wives, especially how they characterized their husbands in comparison to 
an early modern marital masculinity that was intimately tied to Church prescriptions on 
marriage. This marital masculinity defined what it meant to be a married man in the colonial 
                                                 
52 Miguel de Cervantes, “The Divorce Court Judge” in The Interludes of Cervantes, trans. and ed. S. Griswald 
Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), 4-5. 
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Catholic world, and articulated the duties and characteristics expected of husbands. The focus 
on religious precepts such as sexual fidelity fit with the expectations of husbands cited in 
other parts of the Catholic world, as scholarship on the Basque regions of Castile and Venice 
has shown.53 The colonial context of Lima added yet another dimension to what it meant to 
be a man. Within these criticisms of masculinity, we see that upholding the racial hierarchies 
of Lima mattered a great deal to marital masculinity. Armed with these expectations, wives 
in Lima brought the Church, by way of the ecclesiastical court, into their marriages, thus 
disrupting the monopoly of power previously held by husbands. The Church replaced the 
husband as a source of authority in these marriages. Ecclesiastical judges had the power to 
order temporary (and permanent) separations, levy fines, jail culprits who most diverged 
from accepted conduct, and pass judgment in the matters of person and property, not to 
mention the possibility of excommunication.  
By appealing for divorce, these wives dethroned their husbands from the head of the 
marriage, giving way to the power and influence of Church officials and to religious power 
structures more broadly. Even as a woman was released from obligations to the marital 
home, the ecclesiastical judges placed her in Church institutions, such as the recogimiento, to 
maintain a watchful eye over her. These cases provide examples of how gendered authority 
did not begin and end with husbands, but instead, extended to the ecclesiastical system. 
Women enlisted the ideals of manhood, rooted in Catholic expectations and racial politics, to 
challenge their husbands, and many achieved partial victories that limited the authority of 
                                                 
53 See Behrend-Martínez, “Don Juan” and Joanne M. Ferraro, Marriage Wars in Late Renaissance Venice 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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particular men. In appealing to the courts, however, women remained subjected to patriarchal 
power.   
 
Marriage, Church, & Trent 
The period under study falls in the immediate aftermath of the Council of Trent. Indeed the 
earliest extant divorce trial from Lima occurred six years after the close of the conference. 
The Council brought with it renewed interest in the sacrament of marriage, and this shift was 
felt throughout the Catholic world. Not only did ecclesiastical authorities hold their 
parishioners to the standards of Trent, but the litigants themselves, along with their lawyers, 
would cite the conclusions of the Council when it suited their arguments.54 To understand the 
religious landscape of colonial Lima, especially as it concerns marriage, we must take into 
account the proceedings at Trent.    
The result, or the epitome, of the Counter Reformation, Trent was a vital point in the 
religious upheaval of sixteenth-century Europe. As Martin Luther’s followers spread out 
from Wittenberg and Calvinism emerged and flourished in France and the rest of Europe, the 
Catholic Church’s survival appeared to its leaders to be in jeopardy. New theology, which 
evolved from reformation leaders such as Luther, Calvin, Huss, and others, threatened the 
Catholic hierarchy and rejected the sovereignty of the Pope. Perceiving his Church to be 
under siege, Pope Paul III called the first council in more than thirty years.55  
                                                 
54 For examples of cases that invoked the Council of Trent, see AAL, D 6.1, D 7.5, CLM 1.24, CCM 1.11, CN 
1.9a, CN 3.16 and CN 4.15. 
55 Martin D.W. Jones, The Counter-reformation: Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1995), 65-66. 
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 According to the papal bull Laetare Jerusalem, the Pope sought the meeting to 
address “the uprooting of heresy, the restoring of peace and unity, and the reformation of 
ecclesiastical discipline and morals.”56 The Council was intended to unify the Catholic 
Church and publicly declare the unquestionable beliefs of the Church on many theological 
issues including marriage.57 The declaration of the twenty-fourth session, in which marriage 
was the first of two topics, articulates why the Church included the topic among the other 
theological issues.58 The introduction to the session noted that “impious men” had introduced 
“a carnal liberty” and asserted “many things alien from the sentiment of the Catholic 
Church.”59 The session was intended to call out these heresies and clearly define the tenets 
and limits of Catholic marriage. 
The outcome of the Council of Trent, as seen through the twelve canons and ten-
chapter decree from this session, provided guidelines on marriage. The first canon affirmed 
that marriage was indeed a holy sacrament. The Church leaders also stressed the enduring 
aspects of a marriage; the Council declared that marriage was “perpetual and indissoluble.”60 
To express further the relationship between the husband and wife, the declaration derived 
from Genesis 2:24 and Ephesians 5:31 and states, “Wherefore a man shall leave father and 
                                                 
56 Papal bull of Pope Paul III, 13 December 1545, as cited in Jones, The Counter-reformation, 68. For a good 
synthesis on Trent, see also, R. Po-Chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540-1770 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 23-25. 
57 For its aims to demarcate the borders of Catholicism, Jones has referred to Trent as the “theological Berlin 
Wall.” Jones, The Counter Reformation, 68. 
58 The other topic being the “Doctrine of Reformation” which generally addressed the conduct and practices 
associated with Bishops.  
59 The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent, trans. and ed. J. Waterworth 
(London: Dolman, 1848), 193-194 (available online at https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent.html. Accessed 
1/5/2015) 
60 Ibid., 193. 
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mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.”61 This uniting 
analogy was invoked again, “therefore now they are not two, but one flesh; and straightaway 
confirmed the firmness of that tie.”62 This firm tie, once made, could not be undone.  
 The last canon issued on marriage at the Council of Trent reaffirmed that matrimonial 
matters “belonged” to ecclesiastical judges. This was not a break from past prescription, but 
followed the larger goal of Trent to systematically bring religious matters further into the 
institutions of the Church.63 Following this canon, Lima’s ecclesiastical judges, and not its 
secular officials, always presided over divorce cases.64 Their adjudication of the trials 
examined herein is rooted in the declarations of the Council of Trent.  
Half of the official canons that resulted from Trent’s discussion on marriage 
addressed ending or altering the marital union.65 Of the twelve canons at the Council, five 
addressed what conditions could or could not alter a marriage, with four specifically dealing 
with grounds for annulment. Canon VIII, the only one to address divorce, validated the 
Church’s authority to grant separations to married couples: “If any one saith, that the Church 
errs, in that she declares that, for many causes, a separation may take place between husband 
and wife, in regard of bed, or in regard of cohabitation, for a determinate or for an 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Most studies note that prior to Trent the making of marriages and mediating marital conflicts in Iberia was 
rooted more in local practice and popular opinion than based on canon law. See, for example, Alison Poska, 
“When Love Goes Wrong: Getting Out of Marriage in Seventeenth-Century Spain,” Journal of Social History 
29, no. 4 (1996): 871-82. 
64 The secular court system in the Spanish Empire normally only involved itself if marital disputes resulted in 
the death of a spouse.  
65 Canons 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.  
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indeterminate period; let him be anathema.”66 As seen in this passage, the finer details 
regarding divorce were not clearly defined or enforced.67 Historians of Spain have argued 
that medieval secular practices including clandestine marriage, bigamy, and non-marital 
cohabitation endured through the seventeenth century.68 Whereas Trent articulated its 
position on clandestine marriage and bigamy clearly and in detail, likely due in part because 
of its widespread practice, the subject of divorce was given short shrift. While the Church 
intended to define its stance on marriage, and therefore divorce, the final conclusions still 
allowed clergy and laity flexibility with regards to troubled marital unions; Canon VIII is by 
far the most ambiguous statement on marriage. Whereas the previous canons placed clear 
reasons for why annulments could not be granted—for example, for adultery or “irksome 
cohabitation”—reasons for separation and even the length of time of the separation were not 
specified. The remaining outcomes of Trent regarding marriage likewise make no other 
specifications or limitations on the granting of separations.  
No Limeños were present at the conference, but the Spanish did have a strong 
contingent, though their influence manifested itself most clearly in the third session.69 As a 
Catholic power, the monarchs of Spain had a vested interest in disseminating the “truths” of 
Trent to their subjects throughout the global empire. The results of the Council were spread 
                                                 
66 The Canons and Decrees, 195 (my emphasis). 
67 For example, Hubert Jedin, “Catholic Reformation or Counter Reformation?” in The Counter-Reformation: 
The Essential Readings (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 38-40.  
68 See, for example, Poska, “When Love Goes Wrong”; Poska, Regulating the People: The Catholic 
Reformation in Seventeenth-Century Spain (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Henry Kamen, The Phoenix and the Flame 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Renato Baharona, Sex Crimes, Honour, and the Law in Early 
Modern Spain: Vizcaya, 1528-1735 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).  
69 Timothy Shmitz, “The Spanish Hieronymites and the Reformed Texts of the Council of Trent,” Sixteenth 
Century Journal 37, no. 2 (2006): 375, though he cites Sara Nalle, God in La Mancha: Religious Reform and 
the People of Cuenca (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992) and Henry Kamen, The Phoenix and the Flame. 
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throughout the Catholic world in religious texts published by the Hieronymite monastic 
order.70 Though surely not all Spanish American inhabitants could recite Trent’s 
declarations, many of its sentiments were widely known.71 In addition to the well-trained 
clergy, the residents of Lima themselves demonstrated their knowledge (or at the very least, 
their lawyers’ knowledge) by referencing it in their trials. However, as we will see, local 
conditions and popular conceptions of appropriate behavior also came to pervade appeals for 
divorce.72   
 
Divorce, Legal Negotiation and Power 
As noted previously, the overwhelming number of troubled marriages appear in the archives 
in the form of divorcio proceedings, and the vast majority of these cases were initiated by 
women.73 From the very outset, such legal proceedings lead us to question assumptions of 
male control and female subjugation.74 A permanent, legal divorce (divorcio) relieved 
spouses of any obligation to each other.75 The requirement of cohabitation was removed. 
                                                 
70 Shmitz, “The Spanish Hieronymites” studies the unique behind-the-scenes negotiations between Phillip II, 
Pope Gregory XI, and the order on publishing the texts.  
71 On the impact of Trent on local culture and practice, see Nalle, God in La Mancha.  
72 Ibid., 194-204. 
73 There have been few systematic studies of divorce in colonial Peru. In her discussion of recogimiento, Nancy 
van Deusen provides an extensive study of Lima’s divorce proceedings, Between the Sacred and the Worldly. 
Bernard Lavalle provides a summative analysis of divorcio cases from Lima in “Divorcio y nulidad de 
matrimonio en Lima. For Spain, see Behrend-Martínez, “Early Modern Divorce Court Judge.” For Italy, see 
Joanne Ferraro, “The Power to Decide: Battered Wives in Early Modern Venice” Renaissance Quarterly 48, no. 
3 (1995) and her Marriage Wars in Late Renaissance Venice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
74 To be clear, divorcios were not criminal trials, and even when acts that contradicted secular and canon law 
were addressed, rarely did criminal filings follow. While the goal of the case was to make an argument for a 
divorcio, more often than not this took the form of highlighting the failures and misdeeds of a husband. 
75 The cases occasionally will blend the Spanish and Latin references to the separation referring to a divorcio 
“quoad thorum et mutua cohabitationem.” See for example AAL, D 7.3. For a discussion of divorce in the 
Catholic world, see for example Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society 
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Their money and possessions were split according to the law; the wife received half of the 
possessions and money that the two had acquired since their union.76 Additionally, the court 
returned to the wife the dowry, as well as any other possessions she had brought into the 
marriage, although husbands and wives certainly sought ways to gain larger shares than they 
were owed.77 This separation of body and possessions effectively severed a husband’s 
control over his wife. Yet, even before such final judgments, the initiation of a divorce had 
tangible consequences for the authority of husbands.  
To enter a discussion of divorce in the early modern Spanish Empire, we must 
acknowledge the extensive legal system and the litigiousness of these societies. In his 
seminal Lawsuits and Litigants, Richard Kagan argued that Castile experienced a “legal 
revolution” beginning around 1500, a sharp change that was part of a broader evolution of 
conceptions of “law” and “rights.”78 In no small part enhanced by the increase in professions 
related to the law, civil litigation rose dramatically. This change proved contagious 
throughout the empire. The legal system in many parts of the Spanish colonies was well-
                                                 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Behrend-Martínez, Unfit for Marriage, esp. 2-4; Silvia 
Arrom, Women in Mexico City, 1790-1857 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), Chapter 5.   
76 Canon law was rather ambiguous about alimony payments at this time, and the cases from Lima provide little 
clarification on how often husbands were required to continue supporting their families. According to 
Brundage, local practice tended to guide judges’ decisions in most late-medieval European courts. For poorer 
women, judges were far more likely to compel husbands to continue with some measure of support. Child 
support, however, seems to have enjoyed broader support. James Brundage, Law, Sex, & Christian Society in 
Medieval Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 479-480. The Siete Partidas did not place child 
support solely on the husband, but instead on the party at fault for the separation and the spouse with the 
greatest means. Siete Partidas, Part. IV, Tit. XIX, Law III.  
77 Brundage, Law, Sex, & Christian Society, 480. Here Brundage relies on canonists Bartholomew of Brescia 
and Pierre de la Palude in addition to French jurist Beaumanoir.  
78 Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants.  
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developed and well-staffed. Certainly the urban centers housed the most elaborate legal 
apparatus, but even in more rural, less-populated regions, the courts were visible and active.79  
To speak of a legal system, in the singular form, is perhaps to undersell the 
complexity of the legal sphere during this period. The “law” had many layers in Spain and 
Latin America. In the broadest sense, secular and ecclesiastical systems coexisted, 
overlapping at several points. This allowed litigants the option of “jurisdictional shopping” or 
“forum shopping” to locate the court most likely to turn out a favorable decision.80 This 
forum shopping was, however, rather limited for conflicts between spouses. The Church’s 
monopoly on marital matters, which continued through the first half of the colonial period, 
meant that ecclesiastical courts would adjudicate appeals for divorce as well as other 
complaints regarding the sacrament. In Lima there was an elaborate system in which to 
resolve conflicts and a society acquainted with, and well-versed in, legal matters.81 It is 
within this context that women sought to free themselves of their husbands’ power.  
 
Presenting a Cause for Separation 
To initiate a divorce proceeding, a woman submitted to the court a demanda (the initial 
affidavit requesting the separation), often composed with the help of a lawyer. The petition 
generally opened by naming the spouses, and at times included the length of the marriage, 
                                                 
79 Take for example, Trujillo, which housed an active judicial system. Rachel Sarah O’Toole, Bound Lives: 
Africans, Indians, and the Making of Race in Colonial Peru, Pitt Latin American Studies Series (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 
80 For one example of this legal tactic in colonial Latin America, see McKinley, “Fractional Freedoms”; For its 
manifestations throughout the early modern world, see Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal 
Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
81 For more on the litigiousness of Latin American societies see, Herzog, Upholding Justice.  
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whether the couple had children, and location of their residence. The bulk of the affidavit, 
however, focused on the various misdeeds of husbands. Upon receiving the written petition, 
the judge would confirm receipt and ask for additional information, and at times, request a 
reply from the offending party. From there the cases could take a number of directions. 
Often, the plaintiff would follow with additional briefs that further outlined the offenses of 
the spouse. The court would acknowledge the receipt of each additional deposition. If the 
defendant had still not replied to the charges, the judge would issue what amounted to a 
summons, often threating excommunication if the party did not answer the accusations. In 
addition to eventual rebuttals, submission of witness testimony, and further accusations, 
litigants might make intermediate requests regarding person and property during the trial. For 
example, wives might ask to reside in a casa honrada (the home of a respected citizen of the 
city) instead of being housed in the recogimiento.82 This process could vary in time, from a 
day or two to several years. As noted in the introduction, it is the rare case that concludes 
with a clear indication of whether the judge allowed the divorce. Here I focus most intently 
on the demandas and analyze these petitions, not for what they tell us about these individual 
men and their various shortcomings, but rather to expose the ideals of manhood through their 
transgression. Through these cases we will see that marital masculinity necessitated 
upholding the racial hierarchy of colonial society in addition to following long-held Church 
prescriptions of fidelity and just treatment. Women then utilized this rhetoric of masculinity 
to challenge the authority of their husbands. To begin this discussion, I present two petitions 
for divorce that provide exemplars of how litigants invoked marital masculinity before 
                                                 
82 See for example, AAL D 5.3 and AAL D 7.7.  
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moving into a more thorough analysis of the intricacies of these trials and what they tell us 
about masculinity and patriarchy.  
In 1601, Francisca de Los Reyes, through her lawyer, formally requested a divorce 
from her husband, Juan de Lava. The couple had been married for about twelve years and 
had two legitimate children, daughters aged nine and four. According to Francisca’s account, 
the decade-long marriage had not lived up to the ideals of marital harmony. Instead, her 
testimony depicts a life of pain and despair. Her petition for divorce includes descriptions of 
the most extreme physical violence: 
[F]rom the point that I entered into the power of my said husband until the 
present, he has inflicted upon me such cruelty and mistreated me like no slave 
ever experienced... because he frequently gives me blows, kicks and punches 
and he drags me by the hair and he has tried to kill me more than fifty times 
with a drawn sword in the deserted countryside or on farms where he has 
taken me.83   
These charges, however, were not the end of her criticism of her husband. She followed up 
stories of physical violence with examples of verbal abuse. In particular, Juan had insulted 
her calling her “a mulata whore.” Furthermore, Francisca stated in her petition that “he [Juan] 
was not content with [these] offenses.”84 She told the court that “for some time now he has 
had an affair with an Indian [woman].”85 On the basis of these deviations from the 
expectations of a husband, Francisca asked for justice in the form of a separation.  
                                                 
83 Archivo Arzobispal de Lima (hereafter, AAL), Divorcios (hereafter D) 1.12, fol. 1. (In citing the archival 
manuscripts, I list the legajo number first, followed by the expediente number, separated by a period.) “y desde 
el punto de entre en poder de suso dicho hasta el presente me ha hecho tan cruel y maltratamiento que ninguna 
esclava expiara...Por que de ordinario me da palos, cozeos, y bofetadas, y me arrastra de los cabellos y hay 
querido matarme mas de cinquenta veces con una espada desnuda en campo despobleado y en estancias por 
donde me â traido.”  
84 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “no contento con tantos offensas.” AAL, Divorcios, 1601, Francisca de los Reyes contra 
Juan de Lava, fol. 1. 
85 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “a mucho tiempo que está amancebado con una india.”  
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Juana Chumbi, one of the few indigenous women to appeal for a divorcio in Lima, 
filed her petition in 1622.86 She was represented at the trial by a “protector,” a legal 
representative sponsored by the crown, Cortez de Mena, who submitted her complaints to the 
court.87 While we have little information on the process at work when protectors and 
indigenous litigants worked together, it is likely that Cortez listened to Juana’s recounting of 
her marital troubles and then distilled those details into an official petition. Unlike other 
notaries and lawyers, Cortez wrote in his own voice, describing the events of Juana’s life in 
the third-person.  
According to the demanda, Juana’s pursuit of a divorce was due to the “frequent 
mistreatment” and the “mala vida” that she suffered at the hands of her husband Lorenzo de 
Heredia.88 The abuse was so extreme that Cortez noted, “She was at the point of death two 
times.” Her husband also regularly threatened to kill her, and Juana believed he would one 
day make good on his threats. In explaining the precariousness of her situation, her lawyer 
claimed that because of Lorenzo’s actions, “her life is in grave danger.”89 Like the demanda 
of Francisca, however, Juana’s petition did not end with charges of violence. In this case, it 
continued in its criticisms of Lorenzo, taking aim at his duties as the provider of the 
household. She said that he did not provide, sustain, or give what was needed for her to 
                                                 
86 The surname of Chumbi makes it very likely she was of indigenous descent. 
87 The Crown viewed indigenous peoples as minors, and therefore, ensured that legal representatives would aid 
them in litigation. Jeremy Ravi Mumford, “Litigation as Ethnography in Sixteenth-Century Peru: Polo de 
Ondegardo and the Mitimaes,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88, no. 1 (2008): 11 and note 18, which 
provides an extensive bibliography on the practice.  
88 Boyer, “Women, La Mala Vida,” provides a study of this phrase’s use in colonial Mexico.  
89 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1. “por lo que corre su vida mucho riesgo y no tiene seguiridad con su companía.”  
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survive.90 The attention then turned to Lorenzo’s associations. First, the demanda pointed out 
that he would sometimes leave the house with “negros and mulatos” and get drunk. But his 
drunkenness was only the beginning of the problem. Lorenzo’s infidelity was also brought to 
the court’s attention. In the filing, Cortez stated that “it is common that he has affairs with 
black and mulatto women.”91 Concluding the petition, restating that remaining with Lorenzo 
placed her at risk, Juana asked and pleaded for a divorce.  
 These women crafted testimonies that reflected their experiences and invoked official 
and unofficial expectations about marriage. In essence, these petitions argued that these men 
failed as husbands, which is to say, they failed to perform marital masculinity. This marital 
masculinity was shaped by political, religious, and social expectations about appropriate 
treatment, fidelity, and providing for one’s family in addition to holding up other colonial 
ideals.92 By appealing to this rhetoric of masculinity, women challenged the patriarchal 
authority of their husbands.     
 
From Marital to Martial  
The concept of appropriate treatment is broad, and the criticisms surrounding inappropriate 
treatment were diverse, ranging from verbal insults to attempted homicide. More divorciadas 
cited physical abuse than any other transgression. Furthermore, the petitions frequently spent 
more time describing these misdeeds than other wrongdoings. While the Council of Trent 
                                                 
90 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1. “no la alimenta ni sustenta ni da lo que menester antes lo que ella tabaza para su sustento 
se lo quita como esta dicho a.”  
91 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1. “esta de ordinario amancebado con negras y mulattas.”  
92 Stern deduced similar expectations of men in his study of gender and power in Mexico. Stern, Secret History 
of Gender.  
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had left open the door to what constituted grounds for a separation, the Church would not 
tolerate the threat to a wife’s life. While other offenses had moral and, in the Church’s eyes, 
eternal consequences, the corporeal risks at work in domestic violence demanded attention.  
 The reason for emphasizing the excessive nature of the abuse was intimately tied to 
the power relationship between husband and wife, and canon law was the ultimate guide for 
these relationships.93 It seems clear that in many locales, domestic violence aimed at 
“correcting” wives’ behavior was part of everyday life, but its legitimacy before the law is 
not nearly as clear. In one of the most thorough treatments of domestic relationships in canon 
law, James Brundage traces the characterizations of power and rulership in Gratian’s 
Decretum (ca. 1140). Brundage has shown the gender imbalance related by ancient and 
medieval canonists and the husband’s power over his wife. This power is seen quite clearly 
in the Decretum as Gratian cites the Venerable Bede: “Even the poor man [has the right] to 
rule his house, the rich man to control his household, the husband to exercise authority over 
his wife, the father to govern his child, the judge to rule his province, the king to govern his 
people.”94 Brundage acknowledges that the canonist gave husbands “charge” over their wives 
and, within a society in which the acceptability of force/violence accompanied authority in 
nearly every power relationship, interprets this passage as an assertion for the legality of 
physical correction by husbands.95 However, there is perhaps more nuance in the original 
version of Decretum than Brundage originally asserts. In a passage that Brundage cites, 
                                                 
93 The following discussion of canon law leans heavily on Brundage, “Domestic Violence in Classical Canon 
Law” in Violence in Medieval Society, ed. Richard Kaeuper (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2000) and Henry 
Ansgar Kelly, “Rule of Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband’s Stick,” Journal for Legal Education 44, no. 3 
(1994): 341-365. For consistency, I have used their translations from the original Latin. 
94 Gratian C. 23 q. 4 c. 35. Cited in Brundage, “Domestic Violence.”  
95 Brundage, “Domestic Violence,” 186. 
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Gratian building on the second Council of Toledo notes, “If the wives of any clerics (priests) 
have transgressed, their husbands may use non-deadly force in order to deprive them of any 
license to misbehave further. The husband may exercise the power to confine them, to place 
them under constraints within the house, to impose appropriate limits on their diet.” (Clerical 
marriage was still permitted at the time of Gratian’s composition.)96 This passage strays far 
from a full endorsement of spousal violence. Though some physical force is permitted, the 
directive allows for force to prevent further wrongdoing. Importantly, it does not give 
husbands permission to punish transgressions through force or violence, though Brundage 
labeled these “disciplinary powers.” Gratian’s first attempt at creating consensus on 
husbandly powers fell short of complete endorsement of physical punishment as an endowed 
right of husbands.  
 Later versions of the Decretum, added to by other Church Fathers, explored the issue 
in greater detail, though not without inherent contradictions. Referencing clerical husbands 
Laurence Hispanum (d. 12??) stated that “For even if he [the husband] beat her badly, except 
for the reasons expressed in the law, he would be punished with a monetary fine.”97 Here 
Laurence both discourages excessive violence while indicating that there exist reasons in the 
law for beatings, though he was speaking only about clerical husbands.98 He went on, 
however, to deny that laymen held the same right. It seems for Laurence, and likely other 
                                                 
96 Gratian, C. 33q. 2c. 10, cited in Brundage, “Domestic Violence,” 185.  
97 Though here Laurence is citing Blackstone’s novel, Si qui autem and Code 5.17.11., Corpus juris civiles, 
cited in Kelly, “A Rule of Thumb,” 358. 
98 Clerical celibacy was introduced and gradually enforced during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Jo Ann 
McNamara, “The Herrenfrage: The Restructuring of the Gender System, 1050-1150” in Medieval 
Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages, ed. Claire Lee, Thelma Fencer, and Jo Ann McNamara 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 3-31.  
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Church Fathers, the wisdom and self-discipline needed to instruct and punish one’s wife 
exceeded the capacity of those outside the priesthood. He goes on to say that a husband “is 
not to strike her with rod, or by blows since blows are alien to free-born people.” Yet in the 
same passage, he acknowledges that a wife can be “corrected and beaten for minor 
misdeeds” but that all serious offenses should be heard before a court and overseen by a 
judge.99 The seeming conflicting admonitions, combined with a failure to expound on more 
detailed descriptions of how blows and beatings differed left much ambiguity in the law, one 
that the fathers themselves seemed to acknowledge.   
 Teutonicus’ entry in Dectrum (ca. 1211-1215) ultimately brings the issue to it firmest 
ground, seeking to reconcile the contradictory dictums related by other canonists.100 He 
concludes that “A husband can judge his wife by correcting her, but not by beating her, 
because beatings are alien to free-born persons, as it is stated there in the law. But he can 
chastise her temperately because she is part of his family.”101 Ultimately, beating was not 
permitted by canon law, though fathers deemed chastising within the realm of husbandly 
authority. The hierarchal structure of marriage clearly placed men at the top; they were given 
charge of their wives. But the Church placed limits, however unclear, on the ways husbands 
could enforce their authority. The cases in Lima suggest that many men disregarded such 
admonitions.   
 Accusations of violence in divorcio proceedings share several common aspects that 
further highlighted the shortcomings of husbands: 1) excessive force, namely the use of 
                                                 
99 Laurence Hispanum, Glossa Palatina to Gratian, cited in Kelly, “Rule of Thumb,” 358.  
100 For more on the shift by Teutonicus, see Hannah Skoda, Medieval Violence: Physical Brutality in Northern 
France, 1270-1330 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 201. 
101 Ordinary Gloss to Gratian 2.7.1.39, 836, as cited in Kelly, “Rule of Thumb,” 359. 
  
44 
 
weapons; 2) repeated actions; and 3) the intention of death or the result in near-death. In the 
descriptions in divorcio cases, wives sought to place their experiences clearly beyond the 
pale of physical instruction and correction. In her first affidavit, Francisca recounted 
receiving “blows, kicks, and punches” and being dragged by the hair, all endured at the hands 
of her husband, Juan. The punch was likely the least important to the judge in this case. 
Although Juan could have inflicted great damage with his fists, beating his wife with his 
hands could have been explained away as corrective measures. Even if she had received 
major injuries, he could have claimed his intentions had been noble, but that he had 
accidentally been too harsh.  
 The pulling of the hair was a more egregious act. In her study of violence and insults 
in late colonial Mexico, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera has shown the symbolic importance of the 
head and the hair for Hispanic societies.102 In particular the pulling of the hair mimicked the 
intentional public shaming initiated by local officials when punishing criminals. This 
precursor to the actual punishment/abuse served as a parade of communal scorn for the 
accused. The hair in colonial Spanish American societies also served as a symbol of 
chasteness and a means to represent one’s racial identity (and therefore, their social status). 
Andean chronicler Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, in his 1615 Nueva corónica, represented 
the excessive physical abuse by colonial and religious officials through depictions of hair-
grabbing and hair-pulling (see figures 1 and 2). The pulling of the hair was also a more 
violent, and yet less extreme, method of hair modification; hair cutting was reserved as the 
most humiliating physical insult a woman could experience. This hair-pulling by Juan 
                                                 
102 Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, “De obra y palabra: Patterns of Insult in Mexico, 1750-1856” The Americas 54, no. 4 
(1998): 515-518. 
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crossed two important boundaries. First, though he was meant to the protector of his wife’s 
honor, his actions served to shame and humiliate her. Second, his acts diverted from 
instruction and functioned as state justice, far outside the bounds of his prerogative.  
  
  
Figure 1. The forced marriage of native parishioners by a parish priest. Guaman Poma, 
Nueva Corónica, 573 [587].103 
                                                 
103 The figure titles and page numbers are drawn from the The Guaman Poma Project hosted by Det Kongelige 
Bibliotek and found at http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm (accessed on 2/25/2015).  
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Figure 2. The royal administrator orders an African slave to flog an Indian magistrate for 
collecting a tribute that falls two eggs short. Guaman Poma, Nueva Corónica, 499 [503]. 
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Figure 3. “Bad confession”: a priest abuses his pregnant parishioner during confession, 
Guaman Poma, Nueva Corónica, 576 [590]. 
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 The two other methods of violence, the kick and blow, were the most troubling 
accusations. The kicks would appear extreme, as this would imply that she was already on 
the ground, and thus particularly vulnerable. Guaman Poma invoked the brutality of kicking 
a woman as part of his scathing critique of abusive priests in the viceroyalty. In emphasizing 
the brutality of these deviant fathers, one of his drawings depicts a priest kicking a woman on 
her knees (see figure 3, above). The most appalling abuse, however, involved weapons. Such 
an instance is first referenced in the blows Francisca received. In the transcript, the Spanish 
word used is palos, referencing a strike with a weapon or other object. The severity of Juan’s 
abusive treatment is made clearer as Francisca described the abuse she experienced outside 
the city. By fleeing to the countryside, Juan sought secrecy, in part a concession that his 
actions would not meet the approval of his fellow Limeños.  
 Her most damning accusation is that Juan tried to stab her with his sword.104 The 
sword was a symbol of military conquest, both from the Reconquista of Iberia and the 
conquest of the Americas. Medieval and early modern canonists compared husbands’ roles 
and scope of correction to that of judges and bishops. The appearance of these military 
weapons belied the kind of man, the kind of governor, he was intended to be. Furthermore, 
La Destreza, the Spanish school of fencing, made the sword a mediator between men.105 
Turning the sword on his wife violated the cultural meanings behind the weapon and 
perpetrated a wholly unconscionable act. This use of weaponry was a common critique by 
divorciadas, and swords, daggers, and knives appear repeatedly in the demandas of these 
                                                 
104 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. 
105 Hugh Long, “At a Sword’s Length: Theatrical Dueling in Early Modern Spanish Drama,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Tufts University, 2010).  
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women. These weapons were either used to harm or as threats to a woman’s life. What made 
threats so intimidating was the way the weapons allegedly were wielded. In their statements, 
wives often noted, like Francisca, that the weapons were unsheathed (desnuda; literally, 
“naked”). Doña María Cino told the court about numerous abuses she suffered at the hands of 
her husband. In particular, she recounted that her husband, Alonso Perez de Guzman, would 
take the sword he kept under his bed, remove it from its sheath, and place it on her chest 
threatening to kill her. She also claimed that he raised his dagger to her chest as well.106 
While instances of actual stabbings are far more seldom in these transcripts, the mere 
brandishing of such weapons constituted a transgression for its potential to cause harm and 
its representation of military, rather than domestic, acts.107   
 In terms of her second charge of repeated abuse, Francisca noted that such violent 
actions were not rare. Instead she informed the court that fifty times her husband had drawn 
his sword on her. At nearly ten altercations per year, Francisca established that Juan’s actions 
represented a frequent pattern of abuse. That pattern made it harder for Juan to explain and 
justify his treatment of his wife. She did not recount the details of all fifty instances and 
perhaps the number was simply meant to represent the regularity with which she suffered. 
But in the end, the actual number is/was beside the point. Francisca established that such 
actions were the norm. This was the way Juan performed as a husband, not with care, but 
with rage and violence.  
                                                 
106 AAL, D 8.2, fol. 1. That he placed the sword and the dagger to her chest likely serve to reinforce the danger 
of the situation and the fear experienced by María.  
107 For all its ambiguities, canon law was clear on the use of weapons. See notes 47 and 48.  
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 Juana Chumbi, the indigenous wife whose case was presented by her lawyer, 
similarly noted frequent abuse and regular threats. She claimed that she was near death not 
once but twice. The consistency of abuse could also be displayed in the length of time over 
which it occurred. For example, Andrea Rodríguez Villaboss [sic] told the court that from the 
first day she had married her husband, Eugenio de la Fuente, eight months earlier, he had 
abused her, “punching me many times.”108 Husbands who resorted repeatedly to violence 
displayed consistent lack of self-control. A single bout of rage or the occasional lapse in 
judgment could be explained away; one offense in itself did not define the character of a 
man. In these testimonies, however, wives painted their husbands as men predisposed to 
violence. Anger and abuse was innate, a deeply ingrained part of their character. Abusers 
they were, loving husbands they were not.  
 Finally, Francisca touched on a vital part of Juan’s actions, the credible threat of 
death. On those fifty occasions, when Juan threatened her with his sword, Francisca stated 
that he had wanted to kill her. She wanted to make clear to the judge that Juan’s abuse not 
only threatened the quality of her life, but her very existence. Citing abuse from their 
husbands along with the fear of death was common in the divorciadas’ demandas in Lima. 
Juana de Chumbi’s petition claimed that “she has been at the point of death two times” and 
that “her life was in grave danger.”109 This most extreme assault, second only to murder, 
made evident the violent behavior of Lorenzo and the true danger that Juana had endured 
every day. In 1614, Elena Garcia also presented her case to the court citing domestic 
                                                 
108 AAL, D 7.4, fol. 2. “dando me muchos golpes.” 
109 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1. “havien estado a dos veces a punto de muerte” and “por lo que [illegible word] su vida 
mucho riesgo.” 
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violence. Like Francisca she provided details of abuse at the hands of her husband, Martín. 
“He dragged me by the hair and beat me and kicked [and] hit me with a stick.”110 But even 
that was not the worst abuse that Elena recounted. She also stated that Martín drew his sword 
on her, and she was “many times at the point of death.”111 In 1622 another woman, Gerónima 
de San Francisco, petitioned for divorce from her husband, Diego Hernandez. She stated 
similarly “he wanted to kill me.”112 And it seems that he may have tried, because the abuse 
that he inflicted on her one day resulted in her hospitalization.  
 Accusations of attempted murder were the most persuasive argument and a vital 
component of divorce rhetoric. As Behrend-Martínez noted in his study of early modern 
Spain, the threat to life was the most compelling reason for divorce and resulted in greater 
success rates.113 To overlook such offenses was often too great a risk for the court. For 
judges, attempted murder was irreconcilable with the expectations of husbands. Appropriate 
treatment of one’s wife served as a vital aspect of marital masculinity. Self-control was an 
essential characteristic for managing a household, a trait that these husbands lacked 
according to their alleged violent conduct. Domestic violence served as a centerpiece for 
divorce cases because it illustrated a failure of marital masculinity. First and foremost, a 
husband in colonial Peru was meant to be the protector of his family. Many histories have 
focused on the burden of protecting the honor of one’s wife, children, and family that fell 
                                                 
110 AAL, D 7.3, fol. 1. “arrastrandome de los cabellos y porreandome y dandome de cozes, palos.” 
111AAL, D 7.3, fol. 1. “a muchas veces a punto de muerte.” 
112 AAL, D 9.SE (sin expediente), Geronima de San Francisco contra Diego Gernandez, fol. 1. “queriendo me 
matar.” 
113 Behrend-Martínez, “An Early Modern Divorce Court.”   
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first to husbands.114 Physical protection, too, was an important manly duty, perhaps his 
ultimate charge. These men had transformed from protectors to perpetrators.     
 Second, appropriate physical treatment mattered to the social hierarchies of colonial 
society. The abuses certainly offended official expectations of husbands as outlined in 
Catholic treatises.115 And these expectations were broadly accepted throughout the Spanish 
Empire, and in the wider Catholic world. Limeño litigants, however, took their petitions a 
step further, placing these actions into a distinctly colonial context taking into account the 
local concerns. Francisca de los Reyes tried to make clear that her husband’s actions, 
especially his abuses, were not noble or instructive, but simply cruel and unjustified. In order 
to sway the judge, she replaced the husband/wife paradigm with a master/slave relationship: 
“[F]rom the point that I entered into the power of my said husband until the present, he has 
inflicted upon me such cruelty and mistreated me like no slave ever experienced.” 116 Even 
with the decidedly inferior position of women in colonial society, treating a wife like a slave 
was unacceptable. The canonists even used references to slavery to outline the boundaries of 
appropriate spousal treatment.117 While a husband had the right and duty to instruct and (in 
certain circumstances) correct his wife, he was equally obligated by the Church to treat his 
                                                 
114 See van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly; Stern, Secret History of Gender. 
115 For example, the sections of Decretum cited above.  
116 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “y desde el punto de entre en poder de suso dicho hasta el presente me ha hecho tan 
cruel y maltratamiento que ninguna esclava expiana.” 
117 See especially Lurentius and Teutonius in Gratian’s Decretum. It is worth pointing out that the institution of 
slavery had been transformed between the twelfth century and the seventeenth century. Despite changes, 
relational differences between slavery and marriage remained, and likely grew further apart with the growth of 
Atlantic slavery. For a long history of the institution of slavery see Phillips, Slavery from Roman Times to the 
Early Transatlantic Trade (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).  
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wife with love and compassion. By failing to do so, he was falling short of his 
responsibilities as a husband.  
 References to slaves were even more charged in the colonial context, where they were 
both marked off as others from Africa and made up a substantial portion of the population 
with whom Limeños would have interacted on a daily basis. The invocation of a slave 
comparison helped Francisca show the judge that her husband’s treatment was not meant to 
teach or correct her, but rather, it was an unjust fit of rage that no one of any status, including 
a slave, should have to endure. Francisca was not the only one who invoked the master/slave 
comparison. Geronima de San Francisco’s case in 1622 also reveals a slave analogy. After 
detailing her abuses, Geronima stated “and much worse, he treats me not like a wife but like 
a slave.”118 One of the aforementioned divorciadas, Elena Garcia, invoked this slave rhetoric 
as well. She said, “Since we married, he has subjected me to the life of a slave.”119 After that 
comparison, Elena proceeded to disclose the numerous abuses she suffered at the hands of 
her husband, Martin. The judge, then, interpreted these experiences with the predetermined 
comparison to slave life. In choosing to act in the cruel manner, Martin took on the role of 
master and abdicated his position as husband.  
 Invocation of treatment corresponding to enslavement became all the more egregious 
when the victim held a notable status within colonial society. The slave treatment rhetoric 
was used in a 1615 case brought by doña Claudia de Mera y Querea against her husband, 
Nicholas de Neira. The couple had been married for thirteen years, but, according to Claudia, 
                                                 
118 AAL, D 9.SE, 1622, Geronima de San Francisca contra Diego Gernandez, fol. 1. “y mucho peor tratandome 
no como a muger sino como a esclava.” 
119 AAL, D 7.3, 1614, fol. 1. “desde que nos casamos meodad [me ha dado] vida de esclava.” 
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“For all of this time… I was enduring these terrible conditions and mistreatments.”120 She, 
too, claimed her husband had abused her and that she feared for her life. Included within 
these general claims of abuse (Claudia does not provide specific examples of any 
incidences), she invoked the slave comparison to depict her mistreatment claiming that 
Nicholas “saw me as if I were his slave.”121 And this claim would have held added weight 
because Claudia was a member of Lima’s elite, as evidenced by her use of the honorific 
“doña.” The title afforded Claudia privileges and respect not attainable for many colonial 
women, which made Nicholas’ treatment all the more deplorable.122   
 The social hierarchy in Lima was divided along gender, racial, and class lines.123 An 
emphasis on treatment appropriate to one’s status was necessary to perpetuate the colonial 
hierarchy. By treating their wives like slaves, the men cited in these cases not only violated 
general marital prescriptions but also undermined the colonial social system. Society did not 
consider wives equal to their husbands, but they were also not the equals of slaves. So while 
these men were sinning against the laws of God, they were also violating the laws of 
                                                 
120 AAL, Divorcio, 1615, Doña Claudia de Mera y Querea contra Nicholas de Neira, fol. 1.  “en todo este 
tiempo…llevandome mala condición y los malos tratamientos.” 
121 Ibid., fol. 1-2.  
122 In at least one instance a free woman of mixed African and mestizo descent, Cuarita Castilla, used the phrase 
in condemning the acts of her husband, Jose Barrenas, who himself was of partial African descent (cuarterón 
natural de Estremadura). This case from AAL, Leg. 2, 1569 is cited in McKinley, “Fractional Freedoms,” 786. 
123 This dynamic intersects with what Albert Hurtado has referred to as the “intimate frontiers,” that place where 
racial ideologies helped to define the structures of colonialism and the modes of governance more broadly. 
Albert Hurtado, Intimate Frontiers: Sex, Gender, and Culture in Old California (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1999).  See also, Laura Ann Stoler’s discussion in “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of 
Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies)” The Journal of American History 88, no. 
3 (2005).  
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society.124 Although the latter transgression did not weigh as heavily as the former for 
ecclesiastical jurists, the slave comparison worked only against the abusive husbands. A good 
husband reinforced the hierarchies of society. The actions by these husbands inverted the 
social structures of colonial Lima.    
 
Verbal Abuse 
The threat of death surely necessitated consideration for divorce. Yet, more subtle offenses 
also figure prominently in the petitions for separation in the ecclesiastical court. In particular, 
verbal abuse was listed nearly as often as physical abuse in affidavits. These accusations fit 
squarely into a colonial setting in which speech and speech acts mattered to residents and the 
courts. As Cheryl English Martin has noted for Mexico, cases of slander, defamation, and 
verbal abuse could be litigated if such offenses were considered “a threat to social or political 
stability.”125 Litigants were willing to spend countless time and money to right wrongs of 
slander, often because of the tangible effects of such slander. Similarly, the courts were 
willing to hear such cases because the appropriate classification of people was key to 
maintaining social order. These transgressions often centered on matters of race, status, 
sexuality, and legitimacy, characteristics that were all interrelated. Challenging one’s racial 
designation was tantamount to refuting his or her identity, honor, and social capital, no 
matter how limited. The verbal abuse found in the divorcio petitions centered on either 
calidad or sexual reputation, and often both.  
                                                 
124 Treatment that violated status was seen in other cases as well. Doña María Vino accused her husband, don 
Alonso Perez Guzman, of treating her as a “public woman,” or prostitute. AAL, D 8.2. “crueldad como a muger 
soltera publicamente.”  
125 Cheryl English Martin, “Popular Speech and Social Order in Northern Mexico, 1650-1830,” The Americas 
54, no. 4 (1994): 305-324.  
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 Francisca testified to the verbal abuse shortly after detailing the physical abuse she 
suffered. According to her demanda, her husband called her “a mulata whore” and demanded 
she earn her own money rather than benefit from his earnings.126 In addition to the sexualized 
insult, there was a racial dimension to the verbal abuse, as he referred to her as a mulatta 
while the court treats her as a Spaniard. In the divorcio case between Ana Colon and Antonio 
de Arratia, the latter was accused of calling his wife “una puta perra negra,” though she not 
a negra.127 Indeed many divorciadas attributed other derogatory words to their husbands. 
Doña María Cino recalled her husband saying she was “a dirty villainous dike, and other 
words of gravest offense.”128 Doña Leonarda de las Casas likewise included her husband’s 
verbal offenses in her statements to the judge. While the divorce was initially sought by her 
husband, Juan de Arrenillas, Leonarda used her affidavits submitted to the court to highlight 
his shortcomings. Among her other accusations, she stated that her husband publicly shamed 
her regularly, specifically calling her “a proven whore.”129 The words themselves insulted 
Leonarda, and implication that this was public knowledge (“proven”) damaged her honor and 
therefore compromised the social hierarchy. 
 Many women neglected to provide specific examples—either due to not wanting to 
fill official documents with such foul terms or simply because no specific term could be 
representative of the overall language—instead drawing attention more broadly to “verbal 
                                                 
126 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “y cuando se lo he pedido me a respondido que lo gane yo como pudiere que soy una 
puta mulata porque su plata no es para mi.”  
127 AAL, D 3.12, fol. 13. 
128 AAL, D 8.2, fol. 1. “una bujarra vellaca sucia y otras palabras mas raves de ofensa contra su persona.”  
129 AAL, D Leonarda de las Casas contra don Juan de Arenillas, 1604. “diciendo publicamente y avoses que soy 
una puta probada bujarrana.” This case is cited differently because it was read and photographed before the 
reorganization of the archive. 
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mistreatment” or “bad words.”130 Many cases draw a firm association between action and 
words. Such language can be found in numerous cases including that of free mulatta Johana 
de Xeres’s petition for divorce from her husband Felipe, a slave of African descent. She 
claimed that her husband “treated me cruelly (mal) in deed and word.” As part of the legal 
lexicon, maltrato de obra y palabra succinctly laid out the poor conduct of the husbands on 
multiple fronts.131 The phrase was used by divorciadas and their witnesses to paint a 
husband’s conduct in broad strokes. Though some provided the most egregious terms, others 
let the judge imagine what this language might sound like.  
 Regarding specific references, whore was the preferred insult used by husbands, or at 
least the term wives and their lawyers thought would offend the sensibilities of the court 
most. The Church and its courts recognized these women as wives, and by calling them 
whores, husbands showed a failure or refusal to recognize the distinction. Conflating these 
unique—and contradictory—social positions betrayed the clear dividing within the Catholic 
society. The use of such sexualized language for “honorable women,” as the wives described 
themselves, was quite the contradiction. Coinciding with the sexualized obscenity, racial 
denigrations (calling one by a lower racial status) furthered the insults. Conflating their 
wives’ racial status with negras upended the social structures on which ordered society 
depended.132  
                                                 
130 Martin, in her study of cases from Mexico, found litigants who told the courts they did not feel appropriate 
repeating the foul language, claiming it would “scandalize the chaste ears” of those present. Martin, “Popular 
Speech and Social Order,” 310. 
131 For a discussion of the ways that violence and verbal offenses worked in tandem, see Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, 
“De obra y palabra.”  
132 On misidentifying racial status as insult in colonial Spanish America, see Aaron Althouse, “Contested 
Mestizos, Alleged Mulattos: Racial Identity and Caste Hierarchy in Eighteenth-Century Pátzcuaro, Mexico,” 
The Americas 62, no. 2 (2005): 151-175.  
  
58 
 
    
Infidelity 
While abuse was one of the primary complaints of women seeking divorce in Lima during 
the early seventeenth century, it was never the only one. Divorciadas often coupled abuse 
with various transgressions or other ways in which their spouses failed to fulfill their duties 
and obligations as husbands. One of the more frequent vices that appears in the records is 
infidelity. A husband’s affair constituted a moral transgression and violation of his marital 
contract, and hence weakened his reputation in the eyes of the judge. The Church was clear 
that adultery by either party violated the marital contract. Though the Church and Spanish 
society had an obsession with female sexuality, the post-Trent climate brought increasing 
scrutiny to the sexual lives of men.133 In this setting, the divorciadas of Lima presented their 
husbands’ infidelity as further cause for separation, and even provided additional context to 
worsen the sexual offense.  
 The conjugal contract between a husband and wife ensured that the sexual “needs” 
(as perceived by the Church) of each party would be met. Like many other colonial codes, 
this contract was not equal but did entail reciprocity: the Church required that spouses have 
sexual relations with each other. If a wife asked her husband for sex, he was required to 
oblige her. The Salamancan Libro sinodal described it this way: “the husband does not have 
power over his body, nor the wife over her body... Moreover the one to the other pays his 
debt.”134 Even one of the three appropriate reasons cited for sex was to prevent one’s wife 
                                                 
133 Behrend-Martínez, “Taming Don Juan,” 333-352.  
134 Gonzalo de Alba, “Libro sinodal,” Salamanca, April 6, 1410, Synodicon Hispanum, ed. García, 2:160, as 
cited in Behrend-Martínez, Unfit for Marriage, 37. 
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from seeking sexual pleasure elsewhere.135 Through infidelity the husband not only 
committed a moral transgression, but tempted his wife to seek sexual pleasure elsewhere; a 
husband could not fulfill the conjugal debt while spending the night with another woman. 
 Many of the wives appealing for divorce claimed that their husbands were being 
unfaithful. Not only were these men having sex with other women, but they were also staying 
overnight with these women. This action was an insult to the wife as well as a mark on her 
honor, as neighbors would be well aware that a husband did not come home for a night. This 
meant women had to endure the feelings from personal betrayal, but also the stares, sneers, 
and judgment from the community. Furthermore, “acting married,” such as eating and 
drinking with a woman who was not a man’s wife, was particularly scandalous in colonial 
society. Eating and drinking at the same table was a central part of the married life. One of 
the standard questions asked of witnesses in divorcio proceedings was “how do you know the 
two parties are married?” In answering this question in a case in 1606, a mulato named Juan 
Martin said that he knew the couple was married because “I know they live together in a 
house and eat together at one/a table.”136 María Emma Mannarelli, in writing about 
adulterous affairs in Lima, notes how witnesses comment on the eating and drinking together 
of unmarried people. In one case of ecclesiastical prosecution, a local shopkeeper claimed he 
had seen two lovers “together in bed many times, as well as eating at the same table...which 
he thought was wrong.”137 Mannarelli, drawing from her research on concubinage, concludes 
that for many colonial residents and ecclesiastical officials, such domestic activities between 
                                                 
135 Ibid. The other appropriate reasons were for reproduction and to fulfill the conjugal debt.  
136 AAL, D 2.8, fol. 56.  
137 María Mannarelli, Public Sins, Private Passions. And this focus on domestic acts continued into the late 
colonial period, Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens, 106-110. 
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unmarried people had to be called out and punished. When Juan and other husbands ate and 
drank with their mistresses, they imitated the marital home. In doing so, they mocked the 
family model and further upended the social structures that held strict expectations of the 
roles of its residents.  
 After detailing the abuse she suffered, Francisca cited Juan’s extramarital relations. 
Claiming that “he [Juan] was not content with such offensive behavior,” 138 referring to the 
verbal and physical abuse that he inflicted, she proceeded to tell the court that there were 
“many days that he was having an affair with an Indian woman.”139 Much like with the 
physical abuse, the accusation referred to a larger pattern of infidelity. Juana de Chumbi also 
criticized her husband’s infidelity within her demanda. Her petition noted that “it is common 
that he spends the night with black and mulatto women.”140 This single sentence makes two 
important designations. First, Lorenzo’s infidelity was habitual. Societal consensus could 
overlook a man’s moment of weakness in giving in to his sexual desires, but consistent 
adultery disrespected his wife and violated canon law that required fidelity. The adultery was 
not merely a mistake made by Lorenzo, but rather, a sinful lifestyle. And to make matters 
worse for Lorenzo, it was not only one woman. A mistress, though not technically acceptable 
in colonial Peru, was at times tolerated. The likely reason for this acceptance was that it did 
not completely upset the social order. A mistress could be viewed as an illicit and flawed 
                                                 
138 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “no contento con tantos offensas.”  
139 AAL, D 1.12, fol. 1. “a mucho tiempo que está amancebado con una india.”  
140 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1. “esta de ordinario amancebado con negras y mulattos.”  
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facsimile of the marital unit. But as the infidelity increased through multiple partners, the 
more deviant the behavior became.141  
  These accusations of infidelity showed husbands as unable to control their sexual 
desires, ironically a concern the Church and colonial society had of women. Yet, there was 
another dimension to the infidelity that further complicated the sexual acts. Identifying 
mistresses from the lower racial order made the infidelity even more contemptible.142 As we 
see in the petitions of Juana and Francisca, they classified these “other women” as inferior 
via their racial designation. This elevated a wife, while also portraying the husband as a 
violator of social status, a man without respect for colonial hierarchies. Juana’s argument is 
particularly fascinating because as a woman of indigenous descent, she was far from the most 
honored women in colonial society. Yet, she still invoked the racial hierarchies of 
seventeenth-century Lima to discredit her husband and further raise the fears of colonial 
authorities about racial mixing. Claiming his indiscretions occurred with negras and mulatas 
put even her limited social capital to work against her husband’s actions. The inability to 
control their lustful desires, or at least direct them towards “appropriate” women cast another 
blow to the marital masculinity of these husbands. Such accusations portrayed husbands as 
inverters of the social and institutional structures that were meant to guide life in Lima.   
 
Provision and Vices 
                                                 
141 Ruth Mazo Karras, Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing unto Others (New York: Routledge, 2005), 120-
128. 
142 Grace Coolidge has noted that many Spanish men took mistresses from the lower social order. She goes on 
to assert that participating in unofficial polygamy could potentially help and harm masculinity. Grace Coolidge, 
“Contested Masculinity.” 
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Paternal provision was a foundational concept in Spanish America, even rooted in the 
expectations of the crown.143 Governance included providing for those under one’s control; 
correspondingly, providing for one’s family formed a central obligation of husbands in Peru 
and throughout the Spanish Empire. Wives appearing before the court made claims of 
poverty, hunger and general lack of sustenance from their husbands. Steve Stern has 
contended that the head of household in colonial Latin American societies combined three 
roles: provider, protector, and authority figure.144 A husband who abused his wife had clearly 
abdicated his role as protector. The men who then also neglected their role as provider lost 
still more standing in their claim to authority.     
 Catalina Diaz, whose case is covered in greater detail in chapter 3, appealed for 
divorce from her husband Antonio de Torreo. Her demanda cited his mistreatment “in word 
and deed” and went on cite his violent behavior, which included trying to kill her with his 
sword. Beyond the physical violence, she also noted that Antonio failed in his role as 
provider stating that “he does not feed, clothe, or provide for my needs.”145 Isabel Belvis, in 
the proceedings from her attempted divorce, had similar complaints about her husband’s 
ability or willingness to provide. She claimed that “He does not provide for me nor does he 
give what is necessary for me and my daughters.”146 This lack of provision was intensified 
due to the presence of children. Diego had failed as both a husband and a father, neglecting 
                                                 
143 See Premo, Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005; Sarah Chambers, “The Paternal Obligation to Provide: Political 
Familialism in Early-Nineteenth-Century Chile,” American Historical Review (2012): 1123-1148. 
144 Stern, The Secret History of Gender, 14.  
145 AAL, D 8.9, fol. 4. “no me sustentado alimentado ni vestido ni a querido.” 
146 AAL, D 9.SE. “no me sustento ni meda lo necesario para ni y amis hijas.”  
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his duties as pater familias. Juana Chumbi also put her husband’s role as provider on trial 
before the ecclesiastical court. In a rhetorical turn, her lawyer equated safety and provision, 
further emphasizing the importance of the husbandly duties. Following her abuse reference 
the petitioned claimed that “She does not feel secure in his presence, he who does not 
provide food or other necessities for her.”147  
 While many wives sought to emphasize only their husbands’ lack of provision and 
their dire state, others offered comments that criticized other behavior that directly or 
indirectly caused the family to lack the most basic of necessities. Juana’s lawyer twice 
mentioned Diego’s drunkenness.148 Isabel Franca also cited the ill-effects of alcohol 
including the poverty it caused in her petition against her husband Sebastian de Telabe.149 
Others including Doña María de la Paz, cited gambling. She petitioned the court for a 
separation from her husband Juan Hurtado. Though she noted his abuse and claimed that her 
life was in danger, her demanda spent significant time on economic matters. Most 
importantly, she claimed that he was gambler, and had lost part of her dowry in the course of 
one of his games. In addition to the separation, she made clear that she expected the court to 
require Juan to repay what were essentially debts to his wife. His actions, first and foremost, 
showed a deviant nature, one that preferred the thrill of games of chance over the more 
responsible manly inclination to work hard for financial gain. Secondly, Juan became the 
opposite of a provider. Instead of securing a stable life for his wife, he needed his wife’s 
funds to finance his vice. In this sense, María served as the familial provider, though clearly 
                                                 
147 AAL, D 9.12. “no tiene seguridad con su compania el qual no la alimenta ni sustenta ni da lo que menester 
antes lo que lla tabaza pa su sustento se lo quita como esta dho a y.”  
148 AAL, D 9.12, fol. 1.  
149 AAL, D 8.1. 
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against her will.150 Ynes de la Serna also lamented the lack of provision from her husband, 
Miguel de Lira, among her many other complaints. According to Ynes, Miguel carried on a 
public affair with a woman named Mariana, and it was this relationship that kept him from 
“sustaining or providing” for his wife.151 No matter the reason, failure to sustain one’s family 
indicated a failure of manhood. Neglecting the role of provider further compromised a 
husband’s claim as ruler and authority over his home.  
 
Patriarchs and their Responses 
What did husbands have to say about marital masculinity in the context of these trials? At 
times, they chose not to reply to the court at all. This occurred most often in shorter cases, 
which hint that some extralegal agreement was reached without extensive litigation or any 
obvious actions by the court. When they did respond, some husbands refused to engage on 
the subject of their shortcomings. Don Sancho Bravo de Laguna chose this route when his 
wife doña Elvira Nino Guzman petitioned the court for divorce. Rather than deign to 
counteract her characterization of his conduct, Sancho, through his lawyer, moved directly to 
stating his preference regarding his wife’s deposit and the future of his children. The lack of 
any semblance of defense can be read as an implicit acceptance of the terms of marital 
masculinity, without admitting to violating these terms. While he did not contend the facts, 
Sancho sought to continue his influence and authority despite his alleged shortcomings.  
                                                 
150 AAL, D 9.SE (1623), fol. 1; 109. And in the final decision, though the judge did not grant the divorce, he 
required Juan to pay back 1000 pesos and 8 reales. Given the focus on the economic matters, this may have 
been María’s goal all along.  
151 AAL, D 7.1, fol. 1R. “sustentado ni alimentada,”  
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 Juan Tejado likewise refused to engage in a debate over his fitness as a husband. His 
wife, Geronima de San Miguel, had petitioned for divorce listing verbal and physical abuse, 
infidelity, and failure to provide for his family among his many offenses. She spent the most 
time detailing how Juan nearly killed her during a beating, one which she says was public 
and well-known in the community. Juan did not address this instance or the numerous other 
bouts of abuse cited by Geronima. Instead, Juan’s defense began not by addressing his own 
behavior, but addressing his wife’s conduct. Perhaps as a way to justify his own infidelity, 
Juan claimed that his wife had been having an affair and even went so far as to state that her 
lover had threatened to kill him.152 Even after calling Geronima’s conduct into question, Juan 
did not attempt to use this as justification for the abuses of which he had been accused.    
 Though they might attempt to dispute whether episodes of violence or infidelity 
occurred, husbands did not dispute that such actions violated the ideals of manhood for 
married men. Most often husbands turned the attention on their wives. Like Juan Tejado, 
they might make accusations of infidelity. In other cases, husbands condemned wives for 
being “absent” from the home, which at the least displayed an abandonment of household 
duties and at most cast doubts about sexual fidelity.153 Men tried to lay claim to being “good 
men” but rarely tried to elaborate on what this meant. Their wives, to the contrary, were 
willing to articulate what it meant to be a good man and state specifically how their husbands 
had fallen short of those ideals.  
   
Before and Beyond Petitions 
                                                 
152 AAL, D 1.5. 
153 See for example, CLM 1.21 and CCM 1.23. 
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While this chapter began its analysis at the initiation of suits, the troubled marriages and 
attempts to remedy the issues often began long before a visit to a lawyer or judge.154 While 
evidence for such extralegal negotiations rarely endure for the historian’s analysis, several 
litigants and witnesses do recount cases in which wives reached out to parish priests or 
friends to help bring some peace and stability to these marriages. Yet, as the historical record 
documented with great frequency, personal and communal attempts did not succeed for all 
troubled couples.  
 Because of their actions and inactions, endowing these husbands with authority no 
longer followed colonial logic; moreover, the power of husbands was harmful, to both their 
wives and to society as a whole. To address this threat, women reached outside the confines 
of the household. As the patriarchal power of husbands proved problematic, divorciadas 
(women appealing for divorce) began to pursue justice through the avenues available, which 
for marriage meant the ecclesiastic courts. In appealing to the Church, wives sought out the 
intervention and protection of the ultimate authority over their marriage. Recall that at Trent 
the Church (re)declared itself the gatekeeper and governor of marital matters.  
 Simply by engaging the courts, women brought public scrutiny on their husbands. 
Such litigation was not a closely held secret, especially as the court and lawyers began 
rounding up witnesses. Furthermore, acts of violence and infidelity from months and years 
past became renewed fodder for public gossip as a result of the litigation, further damaging a 
husband’s reputation. Husbands on occasion would express to the court their worry that their 
wives were discussing their shortcomings. One husband embroiled in a divorce suit, 
                                                 
154 Cases from chapters 2 and 3 expose some of these earlier attempts. Bianca Premo has also documented 
tactics for conflict resolution before resorting to litigation. Premo, “Before the Law,” 268-280. 
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Geronimo Hernandez, begged the court to move his wife to a recogimiento because at the 
casa honrada where she was residing she was able to “speak with many people.”155 
Apparently what she had to say worried Geronimo very much. The ability to manage one’s 
household was an essential aspect of husbandry.156 That Francisca and other wives felt forced 
to reach outside of the marriage for redress demonstrated the clear failure to govern the home 
successfully.    
 These petitions for divorce developed elaborate, wide-reaching critiques of husbands 
that simultaneously contributed to solidifying exactly what it meant to be a married man in 
the Spanish Empire. Along with their lawyers, these women crafted statements that sought to 
discredit their husbands. These failures would in turn, erode the rights of those husbands to 
govern their wives. In essence, the standards of manhood in colonial society served as a 
means to limit patriarchal authority. These limits, at least at the level of individual marriages, 
came swiftly. In every divorcio case consulted during this research, judges agreed to hear the 
case brought before them, demonstrating the legal rights women possessed in the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.157 Judges also made important initial judgments in their first 
statements, the most significant of which privileged the safety of the petitioning wives. The 
initial court response, which had little to say about the details of the case, ordered that the 
wife be “deposited” in a recogimiento or casa del divorcio.158 These Church-run institutions, 
                                                 
155 AAL, D 7.6, sf (3 folios from the end). “hablando con todas las personas.” 
156 Again, a good discussion can be found in Neal, The Masculine Self. 
157 While the secular courts provided more barriers for women, their legal activity still trumped those of most 
other early modern locales. See, Gauderman, Women’s Lives.  
158 For the full treatment on the complexity of concept of “recogimiento” in the early modern world, see van 
Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly.  
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akin to convents, were staffed by nuns and housed and protected these women as the cases 
proceeded.  
 The reason for this decision was two-fold. First, the new accommodations offered 
physical protection from suspected violent husbands. The cohabitation normally promoted, 
even forced, by the Church proved too dangerous. The recogimiento provided a haven from 
the violence and from any retribution for bringing the suit. The second purpose of the 
recogimiento was to protect the honor of these women.159 The extent of surveillance of 
women in the Spanish Empire is well known.160 Though removing wives from abusive 
husbands prevented physical abuse, moral danger remained, especially to her sexual 
reputation. Within the recogimiento, the Church—in the form of nuns and priests—would 
watch over her. With the initial judgment, the wife was given safety and security, or at least 
that was the intention. 
  
Conclusion 
With the opening of the case and the deposit into a recogimiento, the path to marital 
separation began. The ecclesiastical legal system and the Church’s dominion over marriage 
gave disillusioned wives a venue in which to seek justice. Their stated goal was divorce. For 
some, this was likely their central focus; for others, perhaps the involvement of the Church 
could help tame unruly husbands and bring about a much sought after reconciliation.161 No 
                                                 
159 For additional commentary on the colonial officials’ hopes for the recogimiento, see Arrom, Women of 
Mexico City, 212-217 
160 See van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly, for the most thorough discussion. 
161 Bianca Premo has urged historians to look deeper into motivations, especially of actions taken within the 
courts. While it is difficult to ascertain motivations from these proceedings, my goal here is to highlight the 
range of possibilities in the aims of divorciadas. Premo, “Before the Law.” 
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matter their ultimate goals, these women used similar tactics. They placed their husbands’ 
manhood on trial by outlining the specific ways that these men failed to live up to the 
standards of marital masculinity grounded in both canon law and the social norms that 
governed colonial society. Correspondingly, the failure to fulfill the duties and 
responsibilities of a husband raised serious doubts about the validity of one’s husbandly 
authority, giving way to the governance of the Church. In the following chapters, we will see 
how this trend continued throughout the court case, as others weighed in on these marital 
conflicts. The cases will also demonstrate, however, that such resistance to patriarchal 
authority did not always result in truly liberating victories for divorciadas.  
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Chapter Two: Overlapping Families and the Marital Household 
 
Introduction 
Patricia Seed’s study of marriage choice in colonial Mexico published in 1988 provoked 
debate among Latin American scholars about the power of parents and the autonomy of 
children, as well as more theoretical arguments over patriarchy, love, sentiment, honor, 
capitalism, and modernity. Seed argued that parents of early colonial Mexico held little sway 
over their children’s marriage choices allowing for matrimonial bonds based on personal 
choice and, in some cases, love. But because of Bourbon legal reforms and burgeoning 
capitalist ideals, according to Seed, parental control was strengthened and marital choice all 
but eliminated.162 This narrative has its detractors and proponents, but more importantly it 
opened (or reopened) scholarly discussions of the role of the natal family in the creation of 
new households.163 The story of family activity/intervention, however, rarely pushes past the 
exchanging of vows. While there has been extensive work on the complicated negotiations 
over betrothals between elite families, little has been written in Latin American 
historiography to probe the role of parents and siblings after betrothal. This chapter seeks to 
extend our conversation by probing the ways that the natal family, and its corresponding 
authoritative structures, functioned outside or alongside new family units.  
                                                 
162 Seed, To Love, Honor and Obey in Colonial Mexico.  
163 For a critical assessment of Seed, Eileen Findlay, “Gender, Generation, and Honor in Colonial Mexican 
History,” Radical History Review 53 (1992): 81-89. Many works on marriage have addressed varying sides of 
this discussion including, Robert McCaa, “Marriageways in Mexico and Spain, 1500-1900,” Continuity and 
Change 9, no. 1 (1994): 11-43; Steinar Saether, “Bourbon Absolutism and Marriage Reform in Late Colonial 
Spanish America” The Americas 59, no. 4 (2003): 475-509. Much of this research tended to focus on the 
Bourbon and early national periods. See, for example, Kathryn Sloan, “Disobedient Daughters and the Liberal 
State: Generational Conflicts Over Marriage Choice in Working Class Families in Nineteenth-Century Oaxaca, 
Mexico” The Americas 63, no. 4 (2007): 615-648.  
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The frequency of intervention by relatives into the lives of married couples in Lima is 
impossible to quantify, and this study will not make such a vain attempt. The historian is 
reliant on the archival documents to expose these interlopers, but certainly not all couples 
found their way to the pens of notaries or to the courts of the Church or state. Similarly, the 
full story of a couple is never contained within the extant transcripts, leaving possible 
conflicts out of the historian’s purview. Instead, this chapter will undertake a qualitative 
analysis of court cases that feature some form of familial intervention. Of more than 200 
ecclesiastical court cases of marital conflict consulted, close to 10% include some form of 
parental involvement.164 Rather than trying to build arguments upon or assess the frequency 
of such interventions (many of which likely were not recorded by the courts), I will analyze 
how all parties—husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, and judges—conceived of such 
intervention through their testimonies and judgments. 
The previous chapter featured petitions to break the marital household. In those cases 
wives argued that husbands failed to live up to an ideal manhood to the extent that a divorce 
was permitted; because of their failures, they no longer “deserved” to govern their 
households, which included their wives. This chapter turns its attention to those marital 
households that were already fractured, to those couples who were no longer cohabitating. 
These cases expose spouses that did not request the permission from the Church before 
ceasing to maintain the vida maridable, a scenario in which husbands were no longer 
governing their families. In some cases, they simply abandoned the post. In others, they were 
the ones seeking a reunion (even if their culpability in the original separation remained 
                                                 
164 See the Introduction for a discussion of the scope of cases.   
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suspect). In either scenario, the husband had failed in his duty as governor over the 
household.  
From these cases we begin to see the role that the natal family could and did play in 
the lives of married couples. The natal bonds of the family could remain strong and 
influential even after new families were created through marriage, showing that the kin were 
willing to work within and outside of the legal system. At times family members were the 
ones seeking to restore a marital household, to reunite the couple. At other junctures, they 
were party to the conflict, implicitly or explicitly aiding the separation. These cases will 
demonstrate that the Church’s perception of the natal family often depended on their 
perceived goal. Attempts to keep a couple together were welcomed, while abetting a 
separation, regardless of the reasoning drew condemnation. This chapter also highlights how 
this familial intervention served to challenge husbands and analyzes its effect on their marital 
masculinity.  
 
The Natal Family and the Church  
There is a voluminous literature on the influence of parents on marriage choice for their 
children and its impact on the family unit, patriarchy, and the orthodox practice of the 
sacrament of matrimony in early Latin America, specifically, and in the early modern 
Catholic world, more broadly.165 Yet, the extent to which families retained or relinquished 
                                                 
165 This literature first gained momentum in the field of Early Modern Europe. See Lawrence Stone, The 
Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Jean-Louis Flandrin, 
Families in Former Times (Cambridge: CUP, 1979); Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and 
the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998); Phillipe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York: 
Vintage Press, 1965); Jeffrey Watt, The Making of Modern Marriage: Matrimonial Control and the Rise of 
Sentiment in Neuchâtel, 1550-1800 (Cornell University Press, 1992). For Latin America and Iberia, see Seed, 
To Love, Honor and Obey; Socolow, “Acceptable Partners: Marriage Choice in Colonial Argentina, 1778-
1810,” in Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America, ed. Asunción Lavrin (Lincoln: University of 
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influence in marriages after they became official has received cursory attention.166 Certainly, 
historians, literary critics, and other scholars are well aware of the principles set to guide 
families after their offspring partook of the sacrament, and a few works have specifically 
noted these prescriptions.167 The Church and state both saw marriage as the beginning of a 
new household and in many respects a new family.168 For the state, marriage provided a new 
site to reproduce the imperial hierarchy.169 For the Church, the theological foundations of the 
sacrament shaped their policy.  
The Council of Trent, as noted earlier, addressed the parameters of marriage, making 
clear its position on the sacrament. The opening to the section on marriage looked to 
Scripture to outline orthodox marital practice and also indirectly addressed what might be 
termed as the “end of parenting”:  
The first parent of the human race, under the influence of the divine Spirit, 
pronounced the bond of matrimony perpetual and indissoluble, when he said; This 
now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father 
                                                 
Nebraska Press, 1990)”; Rebecca Earle, “Letters and Love in Colonial Spanish America,” The Americas 62, no. 
1 (2005): 17-46.   
166 The research that does address these questions uses approaches from earlier generations of family history 
that privileged demographics and residency patterns. For example, Alison Poska touches on natal families and 
matrilocal residence in her study of gender and authority in Galicia, Women and Authority in Early Modern 
Spain: The Peasants of Galicia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); see also McCaa, “Marriageways.” 
167 See, for example, Louise Mirrer, “The ‘Unfaithful Wife’ in Medieval Spanish Literature and Law” in 
Medieval Crime and Social Control, ed. Barbara Hannawalt and David Wallace (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 146. 
168 This is especially true in “frontier” regions of the empire. Heath Dillard, regarding Reconquest Iberia during 
the eleventh through fourteenth centuries, uses “frontier” to describe the growing, unstable communal 
environments being established further and further south as Castile incrementally overtook Muslim control. 
Military differences aside, many parallels can be drawn alongside the establishment of societies in Latin 
America, at least until 1600 in Peru, and even later in the regions outside the urban centers of Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies. Dillard, Daughters of the Reconquest.  
169 This line of research was first studied in the early modern French historiography. See for example, Jeffrey 
Merrick, “Fathers and Kings: Patriarchalism and Absolutism in 18th Century French Politics,” Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 308 (1993): 281-303; for Latin America, see Premo, Children of the Father 
King. 
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and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. But, that 
by this bond two only are united and joined together, our Lord taught more plainly, 
when rehearsing those last words as having been uttered by God, He said, therefore 
now they are not two, but one flesh; and straightway confirmed the firmness of that 
tie, proclaimed so long before by Adam, by these words; What therefore God hath 
joined together, let no man put asunder.170  
The proceedings of Trent begin with Moses and his retelling of the Creation story. He first 
cites Adam, who upon seeing Eve, stated “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my 
flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man."171 Moses then departs 
from the story to provide commentary and directives; “Wherefore a man shall leave father 
and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.”172 The reference 
returned in the Gospel of Mark when Jesus found Moses’ words useful in discussing the 
morality of divorce. The Pharisees made reference to Moses’ endorsement of divorce (or of 
“putting away” one’s wife), yet Jesus rejected their interpretation of the Old Testament 
teachings. Instead he replied, “But from the beginning of the creation, God made them male 
and female. For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother; and shall cleave to his 
wife. And they two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What 
therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.”173 Drawing from the Old and 
New Testaments, Trent presented a long line of orthodox teaching on marriage.174 The 
                                                 
170 The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent, ed. and trans. J. Waterworth 
(London: Dolman, 1848), 193. 
171 Genesis 2:23. 
172 Genesis 2:24.  
173 Mark 10:6-9. 
174 Similarly, in Proverbs King Solomon urged parents to “Train up a child in the way that he should go; and 
when he is old, he will not depart from it,” implying that when a child is old, the training should be completed. 
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joining of the couple at the moment of the sacrament represented a change. Marriage meant 
the departure from parents and the creation of a new union.175  
 Theologians from the early Church into the early modern era found guiding principles 
within these same scriptures. The Leyes de Toro, one of the most important law codes 
governing the family in the early modern Spanish world, marked a clear end of parental 
authority asserting that “The son or daughter, being married (and) joined, has been 
emancipated in all things forever.”176 This emancipation, in theory, relieved them from the 
power of their parents. Law codes were not the only place where this idea was articulated. 
Juan Anunciación, a priest in Mexico, addressed the issue in his Doctrina cristiana muy 
cumplida, proclaiming “We advise fathers and mothers that once they have married their 
children, not to be concerned with them and therefore stop meddling with them or talking to 
them about each other because they may break the marriage with hatred and ill-will.”177 
While some earlier law codes made some concessions in terms of the continuation of parental 
                                                 
175 Though it is worth noting that the two becoming one was not an equal process in practice. As Neal’s work on 
medieval masculinity has argued, “in law and in custom” the joining of the couple “mostly happens by 
absorption: the wife becomes part of the husband, not the other way around.” Neal, The Masculine Self, 69. 
176 Leyes de Toro, Ley XLVII. 
177 Juan de la Anunciación, Doctrina christiana muy complida…, as cited in Serge Gruzinski, “Individualization 
and Acculturation: Confession among the Nahuas of Mexico from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,” in 
Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America, ed. Asunción Lavrín (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1989), 101-102.  
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intervention,178 the Council of Trent declared parenting ended at the time of the new 
marriage.179 
  Given early modern consensus on marriage, the Church’s position seemed well 
established. However, this dogma did not go unchallenged by the parishioners in the 
Archbishopric in Lima. Cases from Peru’s capital include examples of deviation from 
orthodox practice on the issue of natal family involvement in a new marriage unit. My 
analysis of these cases does not try to paint in-laws in colonial Latin America as particularly 
inclined to interventions. As stated above, any attempt at a quantitative assessment would be 
mere guesswork. I also lay out reasons why the modern reader should be skeptical of the 
characterization of intervention presented herein. However, the accusations by husbands and 
declarations by judges indicate early modern assumptions about how children (specifically 
daughters) might continue obeying their parents (and especially mothers) even after marriage 
and illustrate more broadly the endurance of the bonds of the natal family. I also examine the 
accusations by husbands against their in-laws, and consider both their validity and motivation 
                                                 
178 We do find legal precedent for a continuation of some form of parenting after a child had married. Looking 
far back into the classical foundations of the early modern Spanish legal corpus, Justinian’s Code made some 
exceptions for a father’s role after his daughter married. Most importantly, the Corpus Iuris Civilis allowed for 
the father to kill his daughter, were she found guilty of adultery. Contributing to the Code, Papinianus posited 
that “Hence the father, and not the husband, has the right to kill the woman and every adulterer; for the reason 
that, in general, paternal affection is solicitous for the interests of the children, but the heat and impetuosity of 
the husband, who decides too quickly, should be restrained” 
(http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/his381/MarriageDigestCode.htm). The logic of Papinianus reflects an assumed 
wisdom within the father and a youthful passion of the husband, an emotion that could lead to poor judgment. 
The 654 Fuero Juzgo likewise upheld the punishment of death for women guilty of adultery. However, the 
seventh-century law code empowered both husband and father to carry out the penalty (Fuero Juzgo, lib. 2, tit. 
4, ley 9. This law is briefly discussed in Mirrer, “The ‘Unfaithful Wife’ in Medieval Spanish Literature and 
Law,” 146.) Following this legal precedent, medieval and early modern Spanish literature often represented 
fathers involved in the punishment of their married daughters who committed adultery (Louise Mirrer, “The 
‘Unfaithful Wife,’” 145; Teresa Catarella, “Feminine Historicizing in the romancero novelsco,” Bulletin of 
Hispanic Studies 67 (1990): 331-43.)  
179 Furthermore, in fifteenth-century Spain a number of “pardons” for adultery show what seems to be an 
increasing willingness to forgive adultery and absolve adulteresses. Mirrer, “The ‘Unfaithful Wife,’” 148.  
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for making such critiques. Though sermons and canon law were clear in their prescriptions 
on parenting post-marriage—essentially that the constitution of a new nuclear family ipso 
facto precluded members of the natal family from exercising any kind of official or legal 
influence on it—we see quite a different dynamic manifested in practice in colonial society. 
 
Assuming Authority 
Let us first look at the case of Alexandre de Almeida and his wife Isabel Galindo. The trial 
began in June of 1629 as Alexandre went before the ecclesiastical court, lamenting his wife’s 
absence from their home appealing for a restoration of the married life. In more than a dozen 
folios, very little is said about the couples’ past—how long they had been married, whether 
they had children, and what issues, if any, may have plagued the couple. Alexandre did note 
that this was not the first time he had sought the Church’s help with the absence of his wife. 
He recalled that other Church officials, “los senores dean y cabildo desta santa madre 
yglesia,” had presented letters of censure for anyone who was found to be hiding Isabel. 
Apparently, this separation was not a new development, and Alexandre’s attempts at 
restoring the marital household had been an ongoing project.180  
 The issue was brought back to the Church’s attention after an encounter at a local 
festival. According to the initial demanda presented by Alexandre—and prepared by his 
lawyer, Alonso Cabrera—Isabel’s mother, Beatriz, had attended the religious festival in 
Lima.181 During this festival, Beatriz had allegedly shown up at the church and brought her 
                                                 
180 AAL, CCM 1.23, fol. 1. 
181 The participants in the case differ on what the festival was celebrating. Alexandre stated that it was the 
celebration of the canonization of San Pedro Bautista while another witness said it was the celebration of two 
saints, San Martínez [sic] and another saint whose name he could not remember. AAL, CCM 1.23, fol. 1 and 
fol. 3.  
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daughter along. Alexandre had been unaware of his wife’s whereabouts prior to the festival, 
though he may have suspected that his mother-in-law had something to do with the couple’s 
separation. At some point during the celebration, word spread to Alexandre that his wife was 
in attendance, and he set out to locate her amidst the crowds. When he reached the location 
where witnesses had seen Isabel, she had already disappeared again. Coming so close yet still 
falling short of finding his wife led Alexandre back to the Church to enlist its help in 
achieving reunification.182 
 Alexandre called six witnesses to substantiate his claims and affix blame to his 
mother-in-law. Each witness attested to the fact that Isabel was living with her mother, 
though it is worth noting that not all of them had firsthand knowledge of this. Their 
testimonies contained no startling revelations about how the living situation came to be but 
did add to Alexandre’s argument that Isabel was living with her mother. Furthering his case, 
he also submitted the original censure decision from his first court visit in April of 1629. In 
this first decision, the court noted that according to the Council of Trent, the couple could not 
live apart without first a divorce hearing before the ecclesiastical tribunal. Isabel could either 
return to her husband or be placed in a recogimiento to await a divorce hearing. The censure 
also threatened “major excommunication” against anyone found to be hiding Isabel or even 
those who knew but failed to report her whereabouts. Months passed, however, and Isabel 
remained living apart from her husband even after the presentation of witnesses and the 
resubmission of the censure documents.  
                                                 
182 AAL, CCM 1.23, fol. 1. 
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 In October, Alexandre returned to continue “the proceedings against Beatriz María as 
the mother of Isabel Galindo, my wife.”183 After more than six months of legal fighting, not 
including the time spent attempting to remedy the situation privately without litigation (a 
period of time which is never disclosed), Alexandre continued his accusations against his 
mother-in-law. He did not ask his wife to return to him, at least not within his statements 
before the courts. The attention remained on Beatriz. By framing the conflict in this way, 
Alexandre could present the appearance of domestic tranquility interrupted by outside forces.  
 While the stated objective of Alexandre’s litigation was restoring the couple’s 
married life, this was in fact a criminal case. Yet, despite her absence from the marital home, 
Isabel was not the fugitive. Instead, Alexandre was adamant about the culpability of his 
mother-in-law. In bringing the criminal charges, he claimed that his mother-in-law had been 
housing his wife, preventing the couple from living out their married life. Her actions 
represented a violation against the laws of marriage. These same actions also disrupted the 
Alexandre’s marital authority. With Isabel outside the house, his power as a husband was 
greatly diminished.  
Interestingly, Isabel remained free of blame throughout the entire proceeding. It is 
certainly surprising that a wife could avoid the Church’s condemnation for living outside the 
marital home. The reason for this apparent innocence seems contradictory to the Church’s 
expectations of wives. Indeed, in numerous cases from Lima’s ecclesiastical courts, judges 
chastised wives for failing to fulfill the duties of a wife and/or refusing to cohabitate with 
their husbands.184 But Isabel’s case diverges from these others most obviously in the site of 
                                                 
183 AAL, CCM 1.23, fol. 11. “los autos con Beatriz Maria como madre de Ysabel Galindo mi muger.” 
184 See chapter 1.   
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her relocation. Rather than a friend’s home or in an unknown location, the provisor was 
aware of her residing with her mother. Given the living situation, the judge identifies her first 
and foremost as a daughter. And in that scenario, her mother is the party at fault. In the 
earliest substantive reply from the court, judge Feliciano de Vega declared that “Beatriz 
Maria, mother of Isabel be made known of the censuras generales,” referring to the demands 
to return her daughter on threat of excommunication.”185 The court did not at any point 
entertain the idea that Isabel could be living with her mother of her own volition: Alexandre 
and the judge each presented arguments and rulings under the assumption that Beatriz was 
the primary guilty party—that Beatriz was refusing and preventing justice. In this way, they 
acknowledged a continuation of her parental power, even if such influence was illicit.  
Ultimately, Beatriz responded to the accusations, but her testimony only tangentially 
addressed the focus of the case. Instead, she simply took aim at the handful of witnesses that 
Alexandre had called. Beatriz claimed that the witnesses, and their families, were enemies of 
hers and therefore, their testimonies should be disregarded. She never acknowledged the 
location of her daughter, instead focusing on calling into question Alexandre’s legal tactics.  
The judge’s orders in the case reaffirmed the approved roles of parents in the lives of 
their married children, but this conflict also provides anecdotal evidence on the potential for 
parental influence, and even control, over married children. It seemed not only plausible, but 
probable to the judge and to Alexandre that Beatriz led Isabel astray and out of the marital 
house. This perception of parents and their children was built on the idea of “reverential 
fear.” Though originally conceived by the Church as that fearful respect instilled in children 
by and for their fathers, the practices of child-rearing in Lima increasingly transferred this 
                                                 
185 AAL, CCM 1.23, 10r. 
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relationship to mothers and their children. In her study of Limeño litigants who claimed they 
were forced into taking vows of the priesthood or marriage, Bianca Premo found the majority 
cited their reverential fear of mothers or other female guardians.186 Through this perceived 
reverential fear, Beatriz retained influence over her married daughter. In this way, Isabel 
remained like a child. She was subject to the commands of her mother and continued in her 
obedience. Correspondingly, Beatriz retained her parental influence, even if this power was 
illicit in the eyes of the Church. Such a case, as well as the ones below, speak to the 
durability of the bonds of the natal family which could limit the control a husband had over 
his wife. The ecclesiastical court condemned such influence when it was used against the 
principles of the Church, in this case separating a married couple.  
 Even in cases in which the wife received some blame for a lack of cohabitation, the 
role of the parent was greatly emphasized by both the husband and the court, as seen in the 
case of Cosme and Luisa. Cosme de Uria, a migrant laborer in the viceroyalty, and his wife, 
Luisa, lived around the port of Callao. The couple had been struggling financially, because 
Cosme had had trouble finding consistent work. In late 1625 he found a job in the Valley of 
Sucre, some 1,300 miles from their home in Callao, that offered the prospect of long-term 
employment. When Cosme first departed for his new job in Sucre, Luisa stayed behind. 
While it was not terribly uncommon for migrant workers to live separate from their wives, 
                                                 
186 Premo, Children of the Father King, 61-62. 
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this was not the future envisioned by Cosme.187 He had tried in vain to persuade his wife to 
move with him, but instead, she insisted on remaining in Callao.188   
 After nine months of arguing, persuading, and even notifying Church officials, 
Cosme filed an official petition before the ecclesiastical tribunal in July of 1626. Recounting 
the last year of their lives, he laid out his case for a reunification with his wife. After giving 
the timeline of events, this distraught husband provided his argument on what kept the couple 
apart. According to Cosme, his wife was living with her mother Isabel Ortiz. He reminded 
the court that such a living situation “does not conform to the mandate of the Holy Roman 
Church.”189 As a result of this unorthodox living accommodation, Cosme requested that the 
court “send notice to my aforementioned wife, Luisa de Vega, that she live the married life 
with me where I will be working, and that she give me the sustenance necessary for a person 
and what is necessary to outfit [me].”190 In resorting to litigation, Cosme admitted to a 
vulnerability and an inability to resolve this family conflict.  
 The court, swayed by Cosme’s original petition, ordered Luisa to move from Callao 
to Sucre and resume a proper married life of cohabitation with her husband. Judge Garcia 
Muñoz Cavecas also decided to take an additional step to remedy this quarrel in the hope of 
preventing any future conflict. In labeling her “the aforementioned impediment to the 
                                                 
187 For scholarship on the intersection of labor migration and gender in colonial Latin America, see Premo, 
“From the Pockets of Women: The Gendering of the Mita, Migration and Tribute in Colonial Chucuito, Peru” 
The Americas 5, no. 1 (2000): 63-94; For broader work on gender and labor see Jane Mangan, Trading Roles: 
Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy, Potosí, 1545-1700 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and 
Karen Graubart, With Our Labor and Sweat: Indigenous Women and the Formation of Colonial Society, 1550-
1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
188 AAL, CCM 1.18, fol. 1. 
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid. “se le notifique a la dicha Luisa de Vega para que aga vida maridable conmigo a donde you [sic] 
estuviere travajando y le de el sustento necessario a su persona y lo de mas necessario para su atavio [sic].”   
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married life,” he declared that a notification be sent to Luisa’s mother ordering her to “stop 
impeding [the marriage] in any way.” 191 Naming Isabel as an impediment was an intentional 
use of liturgical lexicon. The Church used impediments in its declarations on the sacrament 
of matrimony, most notably at the Council of Trent, to identify those things that prevented an 
orthodox marriage. Whereas the decrees of the Council listed a previous marriage or levels of 
consanguinity as impediments, the judge in this case used the same language to label the 
actions taken by Luisa’s mother.  
 While the judge addressed Luisa directly in the hopes of resolving this conflict, as 
with other cases throughout this period, he also cited her mother as culpable. While Isabel 
was no doubt aiding the violation of Church doctrine, the way in which the ecclesiastical 
judge addresses her guilt, not unlike other judges, diminishes the agency of Luisa. Though 
Luisa was not shielded from complete guilt, her mother was still seen as the primary culprit. 
In this family quarrel, we again see the continuation of influence by the natal family, and this 
intervention’s impact on the husband’s role as the sole authority over his wife under the law. 
Clearly, the laws instituted by the Church could not fully sever the familial bond between 
parents and their children.  
 Luisa and her mother apparently were in no hurry to abide by the judge’s initial ruling 
that she follow her husband to Sucre. In September, two months after Cosme’s initial petition 
and approaching a year without his wife, Judge Muños Cabecos issued another auto citing a 
“failure to comply” with his order by Luisa and Isabel. Neither woman responded to the 
court; they simply disregarded the order. In his auto, the judge again ordered that Luisa and 
                                                 
191 AAL, CCM 1.18, fol. 1R.  “la dio impedimente a hazer vida con el dicho su marido...no se la impida en 
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Isabel be notified of his decision and that they comply or risk the threat of excommunication, 
the harshest punishment available. This is the last page of the trial, and whether this second 
command was more effective than the first, we simply do not know. It seems even the threat 
of excommunication was not always enough to break the bonds of the natal family.  
We should rightly consider the duration of time couples were married and the age of 
the spouses when investigating parental intervention. However, this detail that seems most 
important to modern readers has been omitted in many marital cases. The two cases 
discussed above provide very little information to even help aid a guess. In the case of 
Alexandre and Isabel, the transcript hints that the issue had troubled the couple for more than 
just a few weeks, as seen by Alexandre’s reference to a previous solicitation of the Church’s 
help. We know that Cosme and Luisa had been quarreling for some nine months. While 
claims to “resume” a married life in both cases suggest the couples were not newlyweds, we 
cannot be wholly certain 
In some instances we know that the couple was only recently married, which was the 
case for Miguel de Campos and María Llacan. This indigenous couple had both grown up in 
the small pueblo of Surquillo in the Valley of Surco and had been married only four months 
before their marital conflict entered the court of the Archbishop. While we do not know the 
exact ages of the couple, it would be rare for newlyweds to be much older than twenty-
five.192 Furthermore, witnesses for cases were normally drawn from the inner circle of the 
                                                 
192 Though we do not have concrete numbers for this period, Robert McCaa has shown that by the end of the 
seventeenth century mean ages for marriage in Mexico varied from 15-25 for women and 17-27 for men, 
depending on region. Robert McCaa, “Marriageways in Mexico and Spain, 1500-1900” Continuity and Change 
9, no. 1 (1994).     
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litigants, and the two witnesses in this case (discussed further below) were between the ages 
of twenty and twenty-three.  
In his initial petition, Miguel made clear to the judge that they were not simply living 
together according to local customs but were “married according to the order of the Holy 
Mother Church.”193 Such a claim helped to assert his orthodoxy and reaffirm the Church’s 
interest in the conflict.194 Miguel lamented that despite his attempts to live out the married 
life with his wife, she was “ausento” (absent) from him “as ordered by her mother Isabel 
Yacan.”195 The assumption at the heart of Miguel’s statement is that his wife could, in fact, 
still be ordered around by her mother, and that she was beholden to obey her mother’s 
wishes. Such an assumption becomes all the more significant when the command is a 
relocation outside the marital home, which would put her in violation of the expectations of 
cohabitation. In this instance, it seems perhaps less surprising that the husband would place 
fault on the mother. After all, the marriage had taken place only four months prior. 
Moreover, given that conflicts rarely went directly to Church officials, the issue had likely 
been stewing even longer.    
As was seen in previous cases, references to the will of the married daughter is 
noticeably absent. Maria’s intentions to leave her husband, or to stay with him, are not 
documented by the court. Instead, we find only the conflicting wishes of her husband and 
mother. The statements by Miguel and the judge suggest that María gave in to the will of her 
mother. To further validate his argument, Miguel called two witnesses. Both men were 
                                                 
193 AAL, CCM 1.19, fol. 1. “yo me casse segun horden de la santa madre yglesia.” 
194 We see similar claims among the slaves in Lima hoping to assert their faith before the Catholic judges, as 
addressed in Chapter 4.  
195 AAL, CCM 1.19, fol. 1. “aussento por horden de su madre Ysable Yalcan.” 
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“indios,” locals from Surco. Likewise, both were “ladinos en la lengua castellana” 
(essentially, indigenous peoples who spoke Spanish and had acculturated to Spanish 
customs), a clarification that assured the court that their statements would not be 
compromised by language barriers. This description also would have made them more 
trustworthy in the eyes of the court, because of their acculturation.196 The first witness, 
whose name is indistinguishable in the transcript, was a “penador (perhaps jailer?)” while the 
second attester was a “labrador” (farmer). Both parties told the court that about two weeks 
prior, they witnessed María leaving “the house of her husband” and going to “the house of 
her mother.”197 In each testimony, neither party suggests that María was accompanied by 
anyone. These retellings demonstrate that she was not physically forced back to her mother’s. 
This solo journey from her house to her mother’s home would suggest some semblance of 
voluntary action. This indication of Maria’s independence in the matter is never directly 
addressed elsewhere in the case, which abruptly ends after acknowledging receipt of these 
testimonies.  
The cases show that parents were not always swayed by the Church’s insistence that 
they “stop meddling,” but rather, under certain circumstances, would interject themselves, at 
times going so far as to allow (or force) their daughters to return to their home. In such cases, 
husbands, lawyers, and judges placed blame squarely on the offending parent, leaving 
unconsidered or unexamined the intentions or motivations of the daughter. The legal conflict 
                                                 
196 On the various uses and meanings of “ladino” see Rolena Adorno, “Images of Indios Ladinos in Early 
Colonial Peru” in Transatlantic Encounters: Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Kenneth J. 
Andrien and Rolena Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); John Charles, “‘More Ladino 
than Necessary’: Indigenous Litigants and the Language Policy Debate in Mid-Colonial Peru,” Colonial Latin 
American Review 16, no. 1 (2007): 23-47.  
197 AAL, CCM 1.19. 
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pit the wishes of the husband against the wishes of his in-laws. And though the law was clear 
about the hollowness of parental authority at that point, this did not inhibit the perceived 
influence of parents. In fact, even after husbands enlisted the intervention of the courts, 
parents helped wives remain separated from their husbands.  
By “losing” his wife, a husband essentially lost control of his household, meaning he 
had failed as a man. This shortcoming came as a result of the challenge by his in-laws. Often 
these struggles for gendered power fall within the frame of “pluralizing patriarchs,” which 
Steve Stern has put forth as a mode of resistance to gender domination in colonial Mexico.198 
But in these cases, it was the mother of the wife, and not the father, accused of unlawful 
intervention, an important deviation from the male-centered power structures of colonial 
society. Bianca Premo has noted the strong presence of mothers, and absence of fathers, in 
cases involving forced marriages in colonial Lima. To explain this disparity, she notes that 
“(s)ome fathers attempted to disengage from conflicts over marriage altogether.”199 If fathers 
were less likely to take an active role in choosing marriage partners, a passive role after 
children married would certainly seem reasonable. In each of the cases examined here, it is 
not known if fathers were simply disengaged or deceased, leaving the mother as the only 
parental voice. Nevertheless, the cases feature both a strong matriarch, a figure that has been 
much overlooked, and a weak husband. Rather than a battle between patriarchs, husbands 
sought to play on the “meddling” mother-in-law trope, seen in Juan de Anunciacion’s 
writing, among others. And the judges, for the most part, fell in line with this 
characterization. While this focusing of blame perhaps deflected some of the negativity from 
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199 Premo, Children of the Father King, 62. 
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the marital disunion, being embroiled in a competition with one’s mother-in-law, and 
needing the ecclesiastical court for support, did no favors for his masculinity. Indeed, the 
persistence of these mothers forced husbands to pursue higher modes of authority (i.e. The 
Church) in order to restore their marriage, a further admission of their weaknesses and need 
for assistance in managing their households. In doing so, they became reliant on the judges to 
intervene and save their marriages (and masculinity). 
In each of these suits, the motivations and actions of these daughter-wives were 
noticeably absent. This omission illustrates the propensity by husbands and judges to assume 
an influence of mothers over their daughters even after their daughters had married. While 
none of the parties argued for the acceptability of this continuation of parental authority, 
husbands and ecclesiastical judges recognized the hold of parents over children and, in turn, 
the possible challenges this presented to husbands.  
 
Rethinking Divided Homes 
The cases presented above have privileged the voices of the judges and husbands. While 
there was one mother, Beatriz, able to present her perspective to the court, she was the 
exception. What stands out in these examples is the lack of testimony by mothers and their 
daughters. The one-sidedness of the stories leaves too many questions unanswered, and 
provides little evidence with which to challenge the point of view given by the husband. The 
archives of Lima do provide at least one exception to this trend, which allows for some 
further analysis of the narrative presented thus far. 
In early September in 1608, Miguel de Villa Rubio visited the office of Alonso 
Gomez de Montana, a lawyer in the city of Lima. Whether this was his first contact with his 
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lawyer we cannot be sure, but we know that at this point Miguel decided that he would take 
action. With the help of Alonso, he crafted his initial petition and submitted it to the 
ecclesiastical court. While Miguel appears to have penned his demanda in his own hand and 
signed it himself, the form and notarial language make nearly certain that he received 
significant help from his lawyer. Indeed, Alonso himself later wrote to the court on behalf of 
Miguel.200  
 Miguel identified himself and his wife, Beatriz, to the court before stating his 
intention to restore the married life “as ordered by the Church of Saint Mary in Rome.”201  
He then claimed that “by order of her parents (padres), against my will, they took her from 
my company and they held her in their house.”202 There could be a number of reasons that 
husbands and wives might live apart for short periods of time, mobility for work being chief 
among them.203 But this non-cohabitation would need to be agreed upon by the couple, 
otherwise, such a living arrangement violated the proper married life. 
Miguel also noted that the order came from her parents. Rather than a revolt from his 
wife, his in-laws had invaded the marriage. Miguel, in coming to the court, had found 
himself in a difficult social predicament. His claim to authority was rooted in his status as the 
husband of Beatriz. Society and the Church viewed him as the protector and provider of his 
family. He had failed in his duty as a husband to maintain and govern the household. Having 
                                                 
200 AAL, CLM 1.6, fol. 1. 
201 Ibid.  
202 AAL, CLM 1.6, fol. 1. “segun orden de la santa Maria iglesia de Roma); (por orden de sus padres contra mi 
voluntad mela sacaron de mi compania y los de los[sic] sus padres la tienen en su casa.” 
203 Migration to the mines of Potosi provides the greatest example of this separation of household. Premo, 
“From the Pockets of Women.”    
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to appeal to the ecclesiastical courts to remedy a marital dispute demonstrated a husband’s 
lack of control over his household. To partially deflect this social stigma, Miguel placed 
himself in conflict with his parents-in-law, who occupied a liminal position as the parents of 
a married woman, relieved of their parental authority. In the scenario laid out by Miguel, 
Beatriz’s parents challenged his patriarchal authority, through their housing of their daughter. 
By providing shelter, they coopted the husband’s role. Although any failure of a man to 
“maintain” his household reflected poorly on him, the fact that this challenge did not come 
from his wife tempered the extent of the insubordination.204  
 If we proceed past Miguel’s account of the separation, Beatriz’s response further 
damages the manhood of her husband. Like her husband, she also enlisted the help of a 
lawyer to help her navigate the ecclesiastical legal system.205 Though she personally signed 
her petition to the court, an examination of the handwriting makes clear that Ricardo del 
Cate, her lawyer, penned the affidavit. Within three weeks their rebuttal had been submitted 
to the court. In an era when many avoided court requests for response, either to seek 
extralegal solutions, avoid attorney costs, or to put off certain guilt as long as possible, three 
weeks was a relatively rapid response. This quick reply suggests that she was eager to tell her 
side of the story and reject the assertions made by her husband.  
 In her response to the court, and to Miguel’s characterization of the situation, Beatriz 
provided a different account of her exodus from their house. First, she acknowledged that she 
                                                 
204 It is also interesting that, given the prominence of mothers in the other cases, Miguel does not single out one 
parent or the other. Throughout the case Beatriz’s parents never submitted a statement to the court. In fact, their 
names are never even given. Their absence from the case further attenuates the validity of Miguel’s assertion of 
their interference.  
205 For more on the use of legal professionals in marital conflicts, see Behrend-Martínez, “An Early Modern 
Spanish ‘Divorce Court.’”  
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was aware of Miguel’s initiation of the court proceeding. “I say that I was served a certain 
request from my husband that requests that I make the married life with him or go the 
recogimiento of Santa Clara.”206 In responding to Miguel’s demanda that she received, 
Beatriz went on to blame Miguel’s behavior for their current situation. “I send word by 
affidavit, and give an explanation regarding the making (of) the married life with my 
husband. I have no guilt whatsoever and it is he who has it, my husband, because of his 
rough and terrible temper and his mistreatments.”207  
  Beatriz criticized Miguel’s role as protector by highlighting what she believed to be 
the cause of the lack of vida maridable, Miguel’s mistreatment. Beatriz told the court of the 
cruelty of her husband, but because of the limits of the case, she never expanded on these 
conditions. As shown in the divorce cases discussed in Chapter 1, malos tratamientos and its 
variations became synonymous with domestic violence. By invoking malos tratamientos, 
Beatriz showed Miguel to be a cruel husband, the antithesis of the idyllic familial protector. 
He not only failed to protect her, he was the source of her harm.  
 In addition to challenging her husband’s role as protector, Beatriz also disputed his 
ability to provide for her. Closing her petition, Beatriz asks the court to force Miguel to 
provide for her while in the recogimiento. In the final section of her statement to the court, 
which was usually used to summarize one’s ultimate request of the judge, Beatriz says 
nothing specifically about her wants in regards to the married life. She treats her stay in the 
                                                 
206 AAL, CLM 1.6, fol. 2. “digo que a mi se me dio traslado de cierta petición de la dicho mi marido pide haga 
vida maridable con el o me vaía de recojimiento de Santa Clara.” 
207 Ibid. “lo mando asi por su auto, o diese razon y es asi que en quanto al hacer vida maridable con el dicho mi 
marido que no tengo culpa alguna y el que la tiene sus el dicho mi marido por que por su áspera y terible 
condicion y malos tratamientos.” 
  
92 
 
convent as a given. Instead, she used this section to request “necessary sustenance.”208 By 
placing emphasis on her needs while in the recogimiento, Beatriz moved the focus of the trial 
onto Miguel’s role as provider. Beatriz pointed to her need for a servant and for food and 
Miguel’s duty to provide these: “Your Majesty I ask and plead … that you command my 
husband to provide me with a black servant and the necessary sustenance that I need for 
support in the aforementioned recogimiento.”209 She implied that without her servant and 
sustenance she will not be provided for, again a poor reflection on her husband who is 
responsible for her provisions.   
 Miguel initiated the case on the basis of restoring the married life, but Beatriz avoided 
that subject all together. She did not state that she wanted to return to the married life nor did 
she suggest a preference for a divorce. Legally these were her only two options, yet she 
moved the emphasis from the married life to Miguel’s manhood. By challenging his 
masculinity, Beatriz changed the focus of the court proceedings. While Miguel hoped to 
make it about outside meddling into a happy marriage, Beatriz demonstrated how Miguel’s 
actions violated the married life. She continued to impugn his manhood by requesting that 
the court force him to provide for her needs in the recogimiento, demonstrating her 
awareness of the expectations of Miguel and further emphasizing his failure to do so. This 
new perspective also depicts her parents as loving and willing to fill the familial void left by 
Miguel’s injustices, and not at all the nosy, intrusive in-laws he labeled them.  
                                                 
208 AAL, CLM 1.6, fol. 2.  
209 Ibid. “A V.m. pido y supplico… y mande al dicho mi marido mide una negra y los alimentos necesarios y 
con esto estoy presta estar en el dicho recogimiento.”  
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This last case showed an explicit challenge to manhood. In the midst of the trial, each 
side homed in on the strategy that provided the best possibility for a positive outcome, but 
also provided the least social vulnerability. For Miguel, this meant defending his manhood by 
providing the appearance of a cohesive family under attack from the outside. This outside 
intervention helped to present a façade of control within the marriage: Miguel was doing his 
job as a husband, and the problems sprung from an intrusion, rather than an internal rift. His 
argument also presented Beatriz as a helpless pawn in this power struggle. In his accounts, 
she remains an object—taken by her parents, to be returned by the court.   
 Yet, just as Miguel attempted to retain his masculinity, and the corresponding claims 
to authority, Beatriz was intent on consistently challenging it. Simply through her response to 
a case that was, by most accounts, brought against her parents, Beatriz became the central 
player. Her voice echoes in sharp contrast to Miguel’s representation of her passivity. She 
defied the authority of her husband by not appearing with him. Her statements to the court 
demonstrated her refusal to submit to her husband, based on his inability to be a good 
husband. And it was this failure that brought about the need for the (possible) parental 
intervention.  
 Recent studies have demonstrated how women involved in marital conflicts had to 
prove their virtue and honor when appearing before the ecclesiastical courts.210 The present 
case, however, suggests that though woman’s reputation mattered during these conflicts, a 
husband’s manhood was also at stake. Miguel’s masculinity became the center of attention 
during his endeavor for the restoration of the vida maridable. The actions and testimony of 
                                                 
210 van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly, 81-91; Behrend-Martínez, “An Early Modern Spanish 
Divorce Court.” 
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Beatriz and even the purported role that her parents played highlight the shortcomings of 
Miguel. However, the full extent of his failure as a husband is unknown. The case ends with 
Beatriz in the recogimiento. Whether the two reconciled or divorced was not recorded. 
Regardless of the outcome, significant damage to Miguel’s marital masculinity had already 
been done. 
  
Brotherly Love/Brotherly Litigation 
In September of 1618, Tomás Efan, indio, presented a petition to the ecclesiastical tribunal in 
Lima protesting the lack of the married life. But unlike the number of other cases presenting 
similar arguments, Tomás was not critiquing the actions of his spouse. Instead, his demanda 
contended that his brother-in-law, Diego Emoran, indio ladino, had illicitly abandoned Isabel 
Ynural, Diego’s wife and Tomás’ sister. Tomás took on the position of litigator—though 
without an official power-of-attorney on record, a form commonly found within 
ecclesiastical transcripts—on behalf of his sister to protest the fact that Diego and Isabel were 
no longer cohabitating.211 By living apart from his wife, the petition stated, Diego was failing 
to provide for her and also bringing her honor into question within the community. In doing 
so, Tomás brought into question Diego’s marital masculinity by neglecting the expectations 
of a husband in colonial Limeño society. That Tomás took on the role of litigator, and 
without official documentation of the transfer of power of attorney, is intriguing in light of 
the abundant evidence of wives who litigated on their own behalf, as discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
211 It is entirely possible that such official transference of legal representation existed, yet is not included with 
this case due to record keeping issues. AAL, CCM 1.12.  
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1.212 Furthermore, Isabel does not appear before the court herself for reasons never revealed. 
One possibility is that Tomás was better equipped to make the journey to Lima, as Isabel and 
Diego lived in the pueblo of Santiago in the northern coastal region of Peru near Trujillo. 
Perhaps Tomás had other reasons to go to Lima or the siblings agreed that Isabel was risking 
safety and honor by traveling alone to the capital. Regardless of the reasoning, Tomás took 
up the cause of his sister’s marriage.213  
 In addition to the initial demanda, Tomás continued to litigate for Isabel calling 
witnesses to attest to Diego’s abandonment of the marital home. Apparently, these 
testimonies, coupled with the arguments presented by Tomás, proved at least somewhat 
effective because, after several weeks of testimony, the judge ordered Diego incarcerated in 
the ecclesiastical jail. This was not a final sentence, however, but rather a temporary 
arrangement while the court collected more information. Tomás was likely happy to see his 
brother-in-law punished for his abandonment of Isabel, but he continued to push for a more 
definitive resolution. In his subsequent petition, he asked the judge to “punish the 
aforementioned Diego Enmoran with total rigor.”214 The persistence of Tomás displays his 
dedication to avenge the wrongdoing done to his sister. He was not simply a messenger of 
the abandonment, but through his legal action, he served as an active participant in the 
conflict. The court record ends abruptly after a witness testimony and provides no clear 
conclusion. It is possible that Diego finally agreed to return to his wife and his husbandly 
                                                 
212 Chapter 1 presents a number of wives who petitioned the court to protest abusive and neglectful husbands as 
well as those who abandoned their spouses.  
213 AAL, CCM 1.12.  
214 AAL, CCM 1.12, fol. 7. “a Vmd. Pido y supplico mande castigar al dicho Diego Enmoran con todo rigor.” 
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duties, however, we can only speculate. But the brief transcript clearly reveals Tomás’ 
dedication to litigating on his sister’s behalf and the court’s acceptance of his right to do so.  
 Taking on a similar legal-familial persona was don Diego Ordonez e Villa Quiran. On 
6 February 1630, Diego presented himself to the court in the name of his brother don Andres 
Ordonez de Villa Quiran, an alcalde ordinario. According to don Diego’s initial petitions, 
Andres had moved out of Lima, apparently relocating to take a new post (likely a promotion) 
in Nicaragua. Evidently, he had to leave his wife, Maria, behind at the time of his initial 
departure. After nearly five months he was still in Nicaragua, but his wife remained in Lima. 
According to Diego, María refused to follow her husband to live the married life.215  
We find Diego’s signature at the end of the affidavit, a sign of his literacy and 
therefore his elite status. Neither when he first identified himself nor when he signed did he 
establish any legal title for himself. He held no legal experience (that we can tell) to represent 
his brother, but yet, his family ties along with the consent of his brother, by way of a power-
of-attorney submitted to the court several days later, entitled him to appear in the 
ecclesiastical court. Diego continued to act as the attorney-in-fact,216 to use the modern legal 
term, for the entire length of this enduring trial over a year and more than 100 folios. From 
the beginning, the court acknowledged his position and ability to serve as the de facto 
attorney. Judge Feliciano de Vega not only admitted Diego’s demanda into the record but 
also accepted his account in the initial decision. Judge de Vega ordered that María be placed 
                                                 
215 AAL, CLM 1.20, fol. 1.  
216 I use the term in its modern legal context to identify the party appearing before the court with the power of 
attorney.  
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in the “recogimiento del divorcio” to await further testimony and prevent her from fleeing the 
area or hiding if the judge decided she must move to Nicaragua.217  
But María was not willing to simply concede to the wishes of her husband and his 
brother, so she enlisted the help of her own lawyer to argue against her relocation. And as the 
case continued to be contested after three months of litigation, the Ordonez brothers hired a 
lawyer to improve their chances of legal victory. In doing so, we see further evidence of the 
brother’s place in the trial. Their trial lawyer, Alonso de Castro, appeared “in the name of 
Don Diego Ordonez de Villa Quiran in the case of doña María de Arroyo, legitimate wife of 
don Andrez Ordonez, his brother.”218 Even after the lawyer became the official representative 
in the case, Diego remained a player in this marital dispute. The legal identity of Diego at 
this point was somewhat ambiguous. In the beginning of the case, Diego served as the legal 
representative based on the power-of-attorney. However, at the appointment of a lawyer, this 
role would seem to have been nullified. Yet Diego’s presence continued through the end of 
the case. 
Andres’ absence from Lima provided barriers to his litigation against his wife, but 
Diego’s assistance helped to mitigate this obstacle. The latter’s selection as the attorney-in-
fact speaks both to his bond with his brother and the belief that he would represent his 
brother’s interests. Diego was engaged in this marital conflict for months. This particular 
case was one of the longest, in both time and pages. And in the end, the brothers appear to 
have proved successful because the final folio addressed some of the logistical aspects of 
                                                 
217 AAL, CLM 1.20, fol. 3. 
218 AAL, CLM 1.20, fol. 59. 
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moving María to Nicaragua. Though we cannot be certain, María was either headed to 
Nicaragua or for more battles in court. 
Though this sort of brotherly representation and intervention occurred only twice in 
the cases under review, their appearance in the court raised no concerns; this familial 
representation was fully accepted by ecclesiastical judges. At least in terms of getting the 
courts to hear their cases, these brothers were successful, even if we cannot tell if they 
achieved their ultimate victory in reuniting the couples. To an extent, however, that is beside 
the point. The acceptance of this legal action demonstrates how the courts conceived of 
familial intervention as it concerned reunification of couples and the upholding of marriages. 
Activity within the court could be tolerated or even approved of by ecclesiastical judges (and 
perhaps society more broadly) if seeking to uphold Church prescription. Likewise, the court’s 
acceptance of this brotherly litigation concedes the validity of involvement of natal families, 
at least involvement within the legal structures.  
The Ordonez case provides us one more glimpse into the role of families in disputes 
between husbands and wives. In defending her refusal to follow her husband to Nicaragua, 
María rooted her position in her natal family and heritage rather than her new marital family. 
She was adamant that her husband’s decision to move to Nicaragua did not necessitate her 
own relocation. She claimed to base her reasoning in “the law” though no legal corpus was 
specifically cited.219 María argued that she could not be compelled to leave the place she was 
born, the place she had always lived, and the place where her parents lived. Such a 
                                                 
219 The actual word she used was “ley” rather than the more ambiguous “derecho.” Such vague references to the 
law was not uncommon. Even if a litigant did go so far as to name a law code, they rarely made clear which 
precept they were citing. Instead, these invocations seem more about social conceptions about what is “legal” 
or, more accurately, what is “just.” 
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compulsion would, as she put it, contradict the law, although it is unclear what legal statute 
might have been the object of her argument, for no such law is known to this author. More 
than likely, María was referring to a social, even moral or natural, law. To leave her parents 
and her home would be to upset the order of family, personal history, and homeland. This 
argument essentially placed Maria’s natal family and its role in her life above her husband’s 
wishes.  
In each of these two cases, the natal family played an active and accepted role. Each 
of these brothers set out to help restore the married life for their kin. The court permitted this 
intervention without prejudice, displaying that the natal familial ties remained strong despite 
the creation of the new marital family. But where the intervention by these siblings sought to 
privilege the married life, Maria’s justification for refusing to move touches on the other side 
of the coin. For her, the natal family, her home, and her past are things to which her husband 
should adapt. While these siblings acted within the legal institutions of Lima, ecclesiastical 
litigation also includes examples in which the natal family engaged in extralegal activity on 
behalf of their kin. Whereas these interventions sought to reunite couples, the family could 
also help come between husband and wife.    
 
Conclusion 
In probing the nature of the masculine self in late medieval England, Derek Neal examined a 
dimension of masculinity that he termed “husbandry.” For Neal, husbandry proved useful in 
understanding social expectations of husbands as men and men as husbands. In particular, 
Neal centers on husbandry for its evocations of the manager “who both orders and sustains,” 
noting that “[t]he prudent and honorable management of property and household dependents 
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was central to husbandry.”220 These cases mark a distinct breakdown in the “governance” of 
the household.221 These marriages were not simply troubled. They had fractured in a very 
real way. The spouses were no longer cohabitating. This fissure of the marital household 
alone reflected poorly on husbands. Their fundamental role as managers of the home had 
been compromised. Whereas the previous chapter showed how marital masculinity could be 
challenged through petitions, the half empty beds proved fatal to the manhood of husbands in 
Lima.  
At times the wives had joined (or rather rejoined) another household, that of their 
natal family. Whether pushing their daughters to flee abusive husbands or simply accepting a 
tearful daughter at their door, the actions of these parents served to undermine the marital 
masculinity of their sons-in-law. Such housing arrangements placed parents as competitors 
for authority. Likewise, these wives also played considerable roles in challenging their 
husbands, even if their role was mostly overlooked in the cases. As we will see in the next 
chapter, this direct intervention gave way to challenges within, rather than outside, the 
courtroom.  
 
                                                 
220 Neal, The Masculine Self, 58.  
221 Neal notes that governance has “modern” baggage. Despite this baggage, I think the term is useful for 
understanding husbandry and masculinity in the colonial period.  
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Chapter Three: Witnessing Marital Masculinity in Colonial Lima 
 
Introduction 
El juez de los divorcios provides one of the few glimpses of ecclesiastical divorce 
proceedings within early modern literature.
222 Despite its relatively low standing within the pantheon of Cervantes, this short farcical 
story brings the trouble of marriage to its official end point before the ecclesiastical judges. 
Within this setting, the humorous interlude brings attention to the breakdown of marriage and 
the role of the ecclesiastical courts in the negotiation of such conflicts.223 Rather than a 
fantastical story of violence, honor, betrayal, and the like, Cervantes brings to life the stories 
of four couples and their disappointment with their spouses and unending marital fate. 
Exaggeration abounds, but the frustrations vented by each character resonate on various 
levels with those of the litigants found in trials from early modern Spain and Spanish 
America. The script opens in the courtroom as the judge, attorney, and notary enter followed 
shortly by the first couple seeking divorce. Despite the couple reaching consensus of the need 
for separation and appealing to the court for a divorce, the judge finds no reason to grant the 
request. The second couple is likewise rebuffed, as is the third. Last, a husband comes to the 
court without his wife, who happens to be a prostitute, and he too was denied a separation. 
Accusations of bad breath, old age, and just being downright annoying were not persuasive to 
                                                 
222 Miguel de Cervantes, El juez de divorcios [1615]. Cervantes’ interludes have been translated many times 
into English, see for example The Interludes of Cervantes, trans. and ed. S. Griswald Morley (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948); Eight Interludes, trans. and ed. Dawn Smith (London: Orion, 1996).  
223 For recent scholarship on El juez de los divorcios, see Carrión, Staging Marriage in Early Modern Spain: 
Conjugal Doctrine in Lope, Cervantes, and Calderón (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2011), 55-70.  
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the judge. Even one litigant’s attempt to list her husband’s 400 faults could not convince the 
court of a divorce.  
The brief production brings us four divorce cases, featuring seven litigants and the 
court officials, all of whom we have seen involved in the trials from early colonial Lima. The 
cast of characters in early modern divorcio cases, however, was much larger. While El juez 
de los divorcios relies solely on the back-and-forth of the disgruntled spouses and court 
officials, divorce proceedings in the Spanish Empire frequently included witness testimony, 
broadening and (perhaps) clarifying stories of these troubled marriages and permitting the 
voicing of public opinion on appropriate marital conduct. And though Cervantes left out such 
voices, this chapter places these historical actors center stage.  
In the following pages, I take a closer look at who these witnesses were and what role 
they played in these cases and in the negotiation of marital norms and conduct. Through their 
testimonies, we find that marital conflict was not kept within the confines of the home. The 
community members that appear as witnesses knew about many of the troubles plaguing 
these marriages. From infidelity to domestic violence, from drunkenness to gambling habits, 
flaws that caused friction in the home were often well-known to at least a portion of the 
community.  
This logically leads us to question the extent of “private life” in colonial Latin 
America. The public-private dichotomy has received abundant attention from historians, 
philosophers, and anthropologists, though in recent years more scholars have urged a critical 
approach to the extent and pervasiveness of such divisions.224 In joining this conversation, I 
                                                 
224 For scholarship on Lima, see for example, María Emma Mannirelli, Pecados Publicos; For broader 
perspectives see Leonor Davidoff, Worlds Between: Historical Perspectives on Gender and Class (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), and Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). Twinam, Public 
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move away from conceptualizations of “public” that focus exclusively on its political and 
institutional manifestations. In particular, the gendered division of this divide—public men, 
private women—has shown to have numerous exceptions, especially within the Hispanic 
world. Instead, I define this divide as that which is intimate and insulated versus the 
communal and social. The domestic realm, for many scholars, was the private realm. In her 
study of late colonial and early republican Mexico, Deborah Kanter argues that “Mexicans 
idealized the house…as a protected space where patriarchs ruled, thus limiting relationships 
that went beyond their door, especially for women.”225 The walls themselves served as the a 
priori dividing line of what was public and private. Whereas Kanter looks to the architectural 
character of the colonial world for this distinction, Ann Twinam approaches the private-
public spectrum from a relational perspective. She argues that “Although the Hispanic 
version of private and public included components of gender and geography, it was 
sociology—family, kinship, friendship—that set the decisive parameters.” Furthermore she 
contends that “colonial elites divided their private and public worlds by degrees of intimacy,” 
with family, kin, and intimate friends constituting the private world, and everyone else 
making up the public realm.226 Both interpretations speak to inclinations of the colonial 
Spanish Empire’s private-public divide but do not fully reflect the realities of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Lima.  
                                                 
Lives, Private Secrets: Gender, Honor, Sexuality, and Illegitimacy in Colonial Spanish America (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 26-32, provides a preliminary discussion of the utility of these more general 
studies for colonial Latin American history. See also, Merry E. Weisner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early 
Modern Europe 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 290-292.  
225 Kanter, Deoborah. Hijos del Pueblo: Gender, Family, and Community in Rural Mexico, 1730-1850 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2009), 52.  
226 Twinam, Public Lives, Private Secrets, 28.  
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In the first case, the home as a truly private space did not exist for many in Lima. 
Residential structures were small and crammed together. In these buildings, simple mud or 
stone walls could not serve as barriers to shouting voices, even if they marked the borders of 
authority and power. Similarly, the comings and goings of neighbors, even at night, rarely 
went unnoticed. Secondly, lines of privacy could not be drawn around one’s kin (fictive or 
not) due to the living accommodations related above. A neighbor knew about a woman’s 
abusive husband as the abuse happened, and thus before the non-resident family members, if 
those relatives were told at all. My point here is not to disprove Kanter and Twinam’s 
contentions that intimacy and relationships were affected by the walls of the home and/or kin 
relations, respectively; these factors certainly affected daily life in the capital. But the 
private-public divide was even more complicated. Lima’s geographic and demographic 
character limited the impact of these characteristics and created a more communal “private 
life” than is often acknowledged.       
To be clear, this knowledge wielded by the community appeared most potent within 
the legal system. Within the testimonies recounted here, there is hardly a mention of 
witnesses taking extralegal action. Many of them admit to observing the most gruesome and 
severe forms of domestic violence without intervening physically to stop or lessen the harm. 
These witnesses saw husbands cavorting with mistresses, but efforts to stop such liaisons go 
unmentioned, if they existed at all. It seems that in the houses, tiendas, streets, and churches, 
the power of a husband often went unchallenged, even as he abused and manipulated this 
power. But within the courts, witnesses wielded this information with great force. Neighbors 
called out inappropriate action and condemned husbands according to their standards of 
loving and acceptable treatment. The testimonies of all witnesses normally focused on two 
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separate but related themes: the relating of events and the judging of the character and 
actions of the parties. In doing so, witnesses helped to solidify exactly what treatment was 
and was not acceptable. In the following pages, I will present a few of the testimonies 
themselves, which gives a sampling of how these witnesses conceived of “marital 
masculinity.” I will also demonstrate the extent to which the community was involved in 
policing marital matters and expand on how this influenced the courts. When witnesses 
testified, they demonstrated their knowledge of illicit activity of spouses. Making such 
actions “público y notorio,” the phrase used within the documents themselves, pushed the 
court into action, bound by its own commitment to “justicia” based on social peace.227 
Transgressions committed in private were bad enough, but when such transgressions were 
public, they threatened social stability more broadly.  
This chapter draws on a new methodology for legal sources put forth by Bianca 
Premo. In her comparative study on women in early modern Spanish courts, she seeks “to 
focus on the literal context—or praxis accompanying the text—of the initiation of a suit, 
rather than only on the legitimating narrative that the suit contains.”228 Within this novel 
approach, she concentrates “less on what women’s opening petitions said, and more on what 
they did.”229 But just as Premo has noted historians’ inclination to use women’s legal 
petitions as windows into the everyday life, so too have scholars found witness testimonies to 
be most useful for what they say about life outside the court, well before their experiences (or 
memories, or stories) were put to paper. This is an understandable approach, as the accounts 
                                                 
227 For a discussion of justicia in the Spanish Empire, see Herzog, Upholding Justice.  
228 Premo, “Before the Law,” 263 
229 Premo, “Before the Law,” 288.  
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from witnesses often bring to life, in great detail, a past world. These events and the 
commentaries about them hardly can be found anywhere else in the archive. Such approaches 
have led to important revelations about colonial society.230 This chapter will give ample 
space to what witnesses said—mainly for what their statements have to say about their 
knowledge of matrimonial matters—but I place an emphasis on what these testimonies did. 
Witnesses’ appearance before the judge provided a check on husbands; these community 
members served in some ways as the overseers of marriage by policing marital conduct. 
When brought before the court, they recounted their observations and added their own 
assessments and judgments of this conduct; in a sense they were both communal and legal 
representatives. 
This chapter also gives new attention to the identities of witnesses. As the witness 
logs will illustrate, there existed no social or racial limitations on who could testify. And 
indeed, testimonies by Limeños from the highest and lowest ends of the city’s hierarchy, 
those of African descent including slaves and elite dons serving in colonial administrative 
roles, appear side by side. This diversity is important for how it demonstrates the ability for 
subaltern groups to gain a voice in ecclesiastical justice and negotiations of marital 
masculinity. Despite their lack of social capital, these figures served integral roles in the 
policing of patriarchal authority and marital norms. 
Here I argue that by the very act of giving testimonies in the ecclesiastical courts 
witnesses challenged the manhood of husbands. This chapter shows how peoples of varying 
degrees of social and racial status helped to define marital masculinity and judged husbands 
                                                 
230 See, for example, the contributions in Johnson and Lypsett-Rivera, Faces of Honor.  
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based on these criteria. Within the colonial systems, namely the ecclesiastical court, the 
community played an important role in mediating masculinity and marital norms.    
 
Witnessing in Spanish Courts 
Though witnesses were not a necessary component of the legal process, many litigants found 
them helpful in strengthening their cases. There were occasionally cases that followed 
Cervantes’ model in which only spouses themselves (and their lawyers) presented cases to 
the court, but nearly all litigation that lasted longer than a few days included at least one or 
two witnesses.231 Standard protocol dictated that the litigant request permission from the 
court to call witnesses in order to “present other information.”232 This request seems to have 
been but a formality, because not once in the cases under study did the provisor refuse to 
hear witnesses. After the request, litigants often (but not always) drew up a set of questions 
(interrogatorio) to ask of each witness, which might also be accompanied by an affidavit to 
the court naming the testigos they planned to call. In many cases this list of inquiries has 
survived in the record. These questions were then submitted to the court, where they could be 
copied and supplied to the opposing party.233  
The first questions would normally establish that the witness knew the couple, knew 
they were married, and were aware of the court proceedings in progress. The answer to these 
initial questions almost always addressed the length of time the testigo knew the couple and, 
                                                 
231 Examples of these shorter witness-less cases can be seen in AAL D 4.1 and D 4.1-A. 
232 However, this request is not always included in the record.  
233 For the most thorough discussion of the intricacies of legal practice in the Spanish world, see Premo, 
Enlightenment on Trial: Colonialism and Ordinary Litigants in the Spanish Empire (forthcoming), used with 
the author’s permission.  
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less often, how they knew the couple. The subsequent questions—that could range from a 
couple to more than ten—would inquire about the witnesses’ knowledge of specific events, 
as well their general impression of the character of one or both of the spouses. The elaborate 
list of questions, however, only served as a guide for those testifying. It was not uncommon 
for witnesses to answer only those questions which seemed most important to them or which 
they could answer with great certainty. Take for example, María Balbe, a free mulatta, who 
testified at the divorce hearing between Miguel de Sereseda and doña Graviela Hordoñez. 
The record of her testimony included responses only to questions 1, 6, and 9 from the 
interrogatorio. She noted in her answers the question to which she was responding, “to the 
first question I say...” with no acknowledgement as to why she disregarded the others.234  
 What might be referred to in modern courts as the “leading” of witnesses was quite 
common within the interrogatorio. Questions were posed in such a way that witnesses had to 
accept the premise presented by the litigant. Let us take as an example the questions found in 
the divorcio case of Ana de Barrio Nuevo and her husband Alonso Ruiz in the summer of 
1616. As the initiator of this case, Ana had leveled charges of extreme physical and verbal 
abuse at Alonso and had also accused him of amancebamiento (concubinage). Several weeks 
into the case, Ana called witnesses to help affirm these accusations against her husband. Her 
first question, as was standard, asked of their “knowledge of the parties and the notice of this 
case.”235 In her second question, she set out to assert the violent image of her husband that 
she had attempted to establish in her initial demanda: “If they know that the aforementioned 
                                                 
234 AAL, D 3.10, fols. 96v-97v. 
235 AAL, D 7.7, 1616. 
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Alonso Ruiz is man of bad condition and one that mistreats his aforementioned wife.”236 
Additionally, in this rambling question (a single “question” could continue for more than half 
a page), she explained in detail an incident in which her husband attempted to kill her with 
his knife, asking the witness to also verify this horrendous episode. The argument and details 
were laid out in the question. The witness, rather than present information, was merely called 
to confirm Ana’s version of events. Her next question took the extramarital affair of her 
husband as the subject. She asked the witnesses “If it is true that he, the aforementioned, is in 
a state of public concubinage with Catalina de Caceres in this city, eating and drinking at the 
same table, sleeping in the same bed, and doing all other acts of public concubinage.”237 With 
her penultimate question, Ana turned the attention to herself, setting up a distinct contrast 
between the couple. In establishing her own honor, witnesses were asked “If they know that 
the aforementioned Ana de Barrio Nueva is a virtuous woman of good life and habits that 
remained faithful to her aforementioned husband.”238 
Ana’s questions to the witnesses, like many others found in the ecclesiastical 
transcripts, present information that she expected the witnesses to affirm. These inquiries 
seem less about what was true, and more about the witnesses’ knowledge of these truths, as 
already put forward by the litigants. As stated above, litigants could call an array of 
                                                 
236 AAL, D 7.7, 1616, “si saben q el dho Alonso Ruis es hombre  mala condicionado y que trata mala dha su 
muger” 
237 Ibid. “si es verdad q el suso dho esta amancebado publicamente con Catalina de Caceres en esta ciudad 
comiendo y bebiendo en una mesa dormiendo  en una cama y haciendo todos lo demas actos de publico 
amancebado.” The elaboration of the infidelity to “eating at the same table” served two purposes. First, this 
mimicking the married life mocked the familial structures foundational to society. Secondly, these non-intimate 
actions pointed to the public nature of the affair. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the public act made 
the offense all the more illicit and condemned by the court.  
238 Ibid. “si saven q la dha Ana de Barrio Nuevo es muger virtuosa de buena vida y costumbres que guarda 
llaltad al dho su marido.” 
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witnesses. From these records, it seems quite clear, and not at all shocking, that litigants 
chose those who could most persuasively sway the judge in their favor. Likewise, their line 
of questioning sought to elicit a very distinct version of the truth that coincided with their 
previous statements to the courts. We should not be surprised that the witnesses almost 
always affirmed the assumptions put forth in the questioning, at the very least, and at times 
elaborated with additional information that likely made for an even more persuasive 
argument. Such patterns also speak to why witnesses were such a vital part of litigation.  
When an interrogatorio was not used, witnesses normally gave similar information. 
Following standard legal procedure, they would identify themselves, and usually their 
connection/relationship to the couple. Their testimonies would describe various episodes they 
deemed relevant to the proceedings; these most often included accounts of verbal and 
physical fights, lack of provision, or knowledge of an extramarital affair. They also 
commented on the character of the two parties. Referring to a husband as a “bad man” was 
not uncommon, nor was referring to women as “virtuous” or “honest.” With or without the 
list of questions, witnesses spoke their truths to the court. The contents of these testimonies 
begin to illuminate the extent to which husbands, as patriarchs, were challenged by colonial 
society. 
  
A Diversity of Testigos  
Choosing witnesses was an important step in the legal proceeding. At times the witness 
testimony accounted for more of the trial record than the combined affidavits submitted by 
the litigants, giving the observers of these conflicts a louder (or at least more frequent) voice 
than the parties themselves. The full spectrum of colonial society can be found in the witness 
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logs: from Spanish dons to enslaved negras. Shop owners and poor migrant workers might 
both serve as character witnesses. This diversity is important as it illustrates the communal 
aspect of law and justice in the Spanish Empire and the “public” nature of marriage and 
marital conflict. 
In essence, two themes dominate the testimonies of witnesses: recounting events and 
judging actions. And who better than the clergy to pass judgment on matters of marriage and 
morality? After all it was these religious men who posted banns, joined couples in the 
sacrament of marriage, and at times brought ex officio cases of bigamy and other marital 
crimes.239 Within the ecclesiastical court, we find several church officials, the supposed 
moral arbiters and most trustworthy men in society, being called to testify in divorcio trials. 
Their testimonies touch on the intermediate position of priests along a legal continuum. 
Bianca Premo has described the way that parish priests served as an early point of 
accountability as women would denounce men to the local clergy in hopes of some sort of 
intervention. Such attempts at involving the Church fathers, she contends, fall short of what 
might be considered “official” or “legal” action. Premo argues, however, that reaching out to 
priests was part of the range of options available to and used by women, alongside written 
demandas for divorce.240 In her discussion, she builds on the concept of infrajusticialidad of 
Tomás Mantecón, who noted that community accountability in early modern Cantabria did 
not fit neatly into the legal/extralegal binary.241 Premo too found instances of women 
                                                 
239 Boyer, Lives of the Bigamists. 
240 Premo, “Before the Law.” 
241 Tomás Antonio Mantecón Movellán, Conflictividad y disciplinamiento social en la Cantabria rural del 
antiguo régimen (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, Fundación Marcelino Botín, 1997); and “El peso de la 
infrajusticialidad en el control del crimen durante la Edad Moderna,” Estudis 28 (2002): 43–75. 
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reaching out to local priests for redress as part of an attempt to resolve issues in communal 
ways. In this way, keeping local clergy apprised of marital conflict served as potential 
immediate accountability as well as part of a larger process that could lead to lawsuits. And 
indeed, the informal role of priests does appear at times in the marital trials of Lima. 
However, priests also occasionally engaged in the formal process through their testimonies.  
We find various clergy testifying in these cases. In the divorce proceeding brought by 
doña Isabel de Montoya against her husband Pedro Alonso de Barios, a bachiller presbítero 
(university-educated priest) was called to testify about the troubled marriage.242 In 1623 a 
clérigo presbítero (diocesan priest) served as a key witness in the divorce case between doña 
Isabel Belvis[?] and Diego de Medina.243 An ecclesiastical judge, obviously not the one 
adjudicating the case, testified in the trial initiated by Elena Garcia discussed in greater depth 
later in this chapter. In 1609 Padre Amon de Rivera, a presbítero (priest) and cura (curate) in 
the mission school of Cheta, testified in the divorce proceeding between María de Esquivel 
and Alonso Ortiz de la Puente. Within his statement, he testified that he had witnessed 
Alonso physically and verbally abusing his wife. What is interesting is that the father 
provides no account that he intervened to stop it.244 As a member of the clergy, he certainly 
had the moral standing to judge the actions of Alonso as unjust, and act on that conclusion. 
                                                 
242 AAL, D 8.3. In this and several other instances, I will use the concise English definition of colonial titles and 
terms found in Ophelia Marquez and Lillian Ramos Navarro Wold, eds., Compilation of Colonial Spanish 
Terms and Document Related Phrases (Midway City, CA: SHHAR, 1998). When necessary, I will provide a 
more thorough discussion and explanation of linguistic equivalents (or the lack thereof).  
243 AAL, D 9.SE, 1611-23.  
244 AAL, D 4.2, fol. 13r-14v.  
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Yet, he chose to hold his opinions for the courtroom.245 Despite his position of authority, the 
ecclesiastical court, not the home or the street, was the venue for his judgment.  
While it seems that those church leaders would be the most authoritative of 
witnesses—their testimonies being trustworthy and their implied or spoken moral judgments 
presumably unimpeachable—these religious figures did not monopolize the witness lists in 
marital cases. Instead, “ordinary” community members filled folio after folio answering 
questions for the ecclesiastical judges. Business partners, co-workers, and even perfect 
strangers were called to testify. In the divorce case brought by Isabel Franca against her 
husband, Sebastian de Talabe in 1618, a stranger with apparently no connection to the couple 
testified about a fight between the two that he witnessed at the festival of Our Lady of Santa 
Ana.246 Though several other witnesses with closer connections to the couple were also 
presented, this “outsider” opinion also mattered.  
Given the importance of kinship in the early modern Spanish Empire, we might 
expect family members to be the most informed about the goings on of a couple. And it is 
entirely possible that kin did possess extensive knowledge about matrimonial conflicts. 
However, these close ties presented a problem for colonial jurists. Though the testimonies 
already discussed might strike the modern reader as lacking any semblance of objectivity, 
weeding out biases was of great concern in the legal systems of the Spanish Empire, both 
secular and religious. The familial relationship gave opposing litigants reason to question the 
                                                 
245 For other examples of clerical testimony, see AAL, D 3.7, 3.10, 5.2, 7.11, 7.3, 9.SE (Dona Ysabel Belvis y 
Diego de Medina).  
246 AAL, D 8.1.  
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reliability of the witness and their subsequent testimony. Likely for this reason, parents, 
siblings, cousins, and others appear with infrequency before the colonial court.   
Despite inherent limitations of familial testimony, occasionally family members 
would be called to testify. In 1617 while appealing for divorce, doña Florencia [last name 
illegible] called her cousin as the only witness in the case.247 In the divorce proceedings 
between doña Ana María de Guzman and her husband Capitan don Juan de Barrios, Ana 
María’s sister was called as a witness. But rather than appearing as part of the gathering of 
information, her testimony related largely to the fact that her residence served as the casa 
honrada to house Ana María early in the case.248 There was also the case between Isabel 
Muñoz and Juan Gonzalez in 1616. Here Juan actually called Isabel’s father to testify. 
Because the family member was called by the opposition, the judge permitted the testimony 
to be admitted. But again, these family testimonies were the exception, not the rule.249   
As we know from the last chapter, family members could make their presence felt in 
marital conflicts in other ways. Mothers at times provided shelter for their married daughters 
fleeing from domestic abuse. We also see how brothers could, at times, represent litigants 
within marital litigation. But this representation was rare, even more so than the appearance 
of family members as witnesses. This reinforces some of the theological tenets of marriage 
that envisioned the creation of a new family, and some semblance of the severing of ties with 
the old family. Obviously, in practice, such relationships did not end; in some cases they 
perhaps grew stronger. But within the process of ecclesiastical litigation, these familial 
                                                 
247 AAL, D 7.10. 
248 AAL, D 7.12.  
249 This does not mean that the family had little impact on these conflicts, as chapter 2 makes clear.  
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voices were subdued or silenced altogether. This silence, in turn, provided an opening for 
other voices to be heard.  
Though kin-networks brought people of the city together, so too did daily economic 
transactions. Indeed, the role of business in creating a community is clear in witness 
representation and testimony from these cases. Take for example, the case in which Mariana 
de Zerralba appealed for a divorce from her husband, Juan Gomez Escudero. At one point, 
the trial centered on Juan’s abuse of his wife during a trip to the local pharmacy. Luis de 
Rivera, natural de Quito (native of Quito), was called to testify about the event. In 
responding to the interrogatorio’s first question—how do you know the involved parties—he 
answered, “I know them because I was at the pharmacy of Justo Chavez where the 
aforementioned Juan Gomez was.”250 Luis had no intimate details about the parties, and it is 
entirely possible he did not even know their names before the trial. But his trip to the 
pharmacy made him a bystander and witness to the marital conflict. Though he could not 
speak to the character of the spouses or their relationship, he could and did bear witness to 
the scene at the pharmacy.  
Those engaged in business together also created a community that litigants could 
draw on for assistance in these marital trials. In June of 1610, Juana Faxardo requested a 
divorce from her husband, Joseph Vernal. Of the seven witnesses called, four worked in 
some branch of the silversmith industry. Francisco Frasquin was a tin-plate maker, Pedro de 
Godoy, Pedro Garnica, and Francisco de Aguilar were all silversmiths. In this case, the silver 
industry created a community that would police marital matters. This case also turns our 
                                                 
250 AAL, D 4.6, fol. 50. “los conoce porque estuvo en la botica de Justo Chavez donde está el dicho Juan 
Gomez.” 
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attention to another important social dynamic in the colonial world, the penninsular-criollo 
divide. For the sixteenth-century, Lockhart has argued that Castilian communities more or 
less transplanted themselves unexpurgated within the colonies, creating mini-communes of 
Sevillanos or Cuencanos.251 Though by 1600 the walls around these exclusive communities 
began to fall, community formation based on ties to Iberia—or at least claims to connection 
to the motherland—remained. With the exception of one witness, all the others in this case 
claimed to be European immigrants to the colonies. One witness was from Milan, with the 
others hailing from cities in Spain,252 including Toledo, Seville, Cija, and Madrid. This case, 
though admittedly only one anecdotal representation, illustrates a broadening of the 
immigrant communities described by Lockhart. Even if Spanish regional identification 
ceased to be a driving factor in community formation in the colonies, Spanish birthplace 
remained a means to establish networks. And indeed from later studies, we know that among 
the elite political culture, peninsular identity remained an important, divisive marker. Only 
one of the witnesses in this case, doña María de la Torre, claimed to be a criolla (and even 
this claim itself nods back to Europe). As mentioned in the introduction, those whose 
appearance and performance of honor made them respectable before the courts, without the 
defects of Indian or African blood (even if they were indeed of partial indigenous decent), 
often neglected to identify their heritage or birthplace. Because they were tainted with moral 
hindrances of the lower racial order, they need not classify themselves. Doña María appears 
to be trying to invoke her Spanish heritage. These communities built on sameness obviously 
                                                 
251 James Lockhart, Spanish Peru, 1532-1560: A Social History, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1994).  
252 By this point, litigants were referring to the “kingdom of España.”  
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played a role in court cases, but as we will see, Lima’s social and geographical landscape 
brought a more comprehensive choir of voices into marital litigation.  
 
Neighbors/Housemates 
Proximity of residence proved to be an important factor when choosing witnesses. Those that 
lived near or with the litigants were the overwhelming majority of witnesses. Sometimes 
these were folks that lived in the same neighborhood, on the same street, “in the same 
house,” or were actually part of the household of the litigants (i.e., slaves and servants). 
Whereas scholars have pointed to the mercado (market) and plaza mayor (central square) as 
primary sites of community news and gossip, the casa (which at this time often signified a 
multi-family structure, and not necessarily the single family home) proved to be the point of 
contact in Limeño marital news.253 In most cases, it is what happened within the home that 
was important to the court. And in the crammed metropolis of Lima, the home lacked 
intimacy and privacy. Instead the matters of the couple became the information of many. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Lima was a colonial urban environment. After his 
arrival, Francisco Pizarro set out to construct a European- (even Baroque) style city. Orderly 
streets at perpendicular intersections gave the city its shape. His plans focused, not 
surprisingly, around the cathedral and the royal buildings in the center of the city, in addition 
to spaces for the cabildo (municipal government office) and the jail. Alejandra Osorio has 
explained that the city center, by way of colonial processions, served as “a historical 
                                                 
253 On the role of the plaza in the early modern Spanish empire see Tom Cummins and Joanne Rappaport, “The 
Reconfiguration of Sacred and Civic Space: Architecture, Image, and Writing in the Colonial Northern Andes” 
Latin American Literary Review 26, no. 52 (1998): esp. 176. For works on the market as a social hub, see 
Mangan, Trading Roles and “A Market of Identities: Women, Trade and Ethnic Identities in Colonial Potosí” in 
Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America, ed. Andrew Fisher and Matthew O’Hara 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).  
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genealogy of colonial rule embroidered into a narrative of power.”254 Indeed, the very layout 
of the city privileged and pointed to manifestations of colonial power. Yet, moving outward 
from the plaza, these architectural modes of power began to lose their potency. Beyond the 
city center lay the living spaces for the rapidly expanding and diverse Limeño population. 
The bulk of the residences were callejones, which can be described as corridors with single-
room living spaces surrounding a common patio.255 Each room housed an entire family 
making living quarters cramped and neighborhood communities spatially close together. 
Beyond the single-family residential room, were rooms inhabited by other families. These 
structures could house more than a dozen families, meaning anywhere from 50 to 100 people 
would be living in close quarters.256 This spatial element is key when seeking out the 
intricacies of intimacy and domestic matters in colonial Lima. This urban living meant the 
community had intimate knowledge of one another’s coming and going. In marital trials, this 
knowledge was often invoked to challenge husbands through testimonies about their abuse 
and other failures to live up to marital masculinity. The transcripts from Lima demonstrate 
ways in which the home could be a protected space, but these cases also illustrate that 
relationships could not be bound by doors or walls, especially for women. Furthermore, these 
relationships could ultimately serve to challenge the authority of patriarchs (i.e., husbands) 
whose wives initiated court proceedings. The design of the city resulted in extremely 
compact living spaces around the callejones and in other multi-room buildings. As noted 
above, this spatial organization blurred traditional borders of public and private space.  
                                                 
254 Alejandra Osorio, “The King in Lima,” Hispanic American Historical Review 84, no. 3 (2004): 453.  
255 Osorio, “The King in Lima,” 456.  
256 Ibid.  
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Witnesses living in these multi-family structures testified that they “lived in the same 
house,” but putting a name to this relationship has proved difficult. I have opted to refer to 
these figures as either neighbors and housemates, though neither term fully depicts the 
intricacies of the living situation and the social ties. These figures maintained their own 
living space to some degree, but they likewise acknowledged the communal aspect of their 
housing. Their frequent appearance in these documents should not be altogether shocking. 
After all, in addition to shopping at the same tiendas (shops) and mercados (markets), they 
shared walls and slept mere feet from one another. The patios were also shared spaces where 
residents interacted on a daily basis. Their constant contact meant that they possessed 
personal, sometimes intimate, knowledge of one another’s problems and issues, sometimes 
matters as private as impotency.257 As the frontline of the community, these people were 
called to share these private and often damning revelations before the ecclesiastical tribunal. 
As Alejandra Osorio has noted, such residential areas “turn[ed] private lives into public 
knowledge.”258  
Within the courts, this public knowledge became legal evidence, as evidenced in the 
divorce proceeding between Catalina Diaz and Antonio de Torrero. Catalina, like the wives 
mentioned in chapter 1, criticized Antonio on two separate, but related, fronts: his domestic 
violence and his failure as the family provider. She began by addressing his mistreatments, 
stating that he “had treated me badly, both in deed and in word.”259 Recounting these abuses 
                                                 
257 For more on the transmission of communal knowledge of impotency in Spain, see Behrend-Martínez, Unfit 
for Marriage.  
258 Osorio, “The King in Lima,” 456.  
259 AAL, D 8.9, 1619, fol. 1-1R: “me atratado mal a le obra y de palabra.” 
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she noted that she had given him no reason or cause.260 Further expanding on Antonio’s 
violent acts, Catalina described occasions when “he laid his hands on me” and other times 
when he resorted to weapons, namely his sword.261 The worst, according to her, were the 
times when he drew his sword with the sole intention of killing her. Given his actions and his 
uncontrollable temper, Catalina insisted that there was “a great risk to my life.” All told, 
Catalina spent nearly half of her demanda criticizing Antonio’s treatment of her. 
In addition to the physical abuses, Catalina also criticized Antonio’s other husbandly 
failures. “Since the beginning of the marriage,” she told the court, “he has not supported me, 
clothed me, or fed me.”262 Her language here highlights the clear expectations of a husband 
to provide clothing, food and other sustenance for his wife. In this instance, Antonio had 
failed on all counts. Such a situation left Catalina to fend for herself. This all had taken place 
over the four years the couple had been married. Filling in the blanks, this meant that 
Catalina had served as her own provider for this time. Her patience, toleration, and endurance 
of Antonio’s failures had finally been exhausted, leading her to the courts. But Catalina was 
not left to plead her case alone, nor was she the only one to focus on Antonio’s husbandly 
failures. She called witnesses to present testimonies to the court on her behalf, while Antonio 
left his fate in the hands of the judge. The first three testigos in the court records were all 
soldiers residing in Lima and all of them corroborated the characterization of Antonio found 
in Catalina’s demanda, even in the absence of an interrogatorio to guide their testimony. 
                                                 
260 AAL, D 8.9, 1619, fol. 1-1R. 
261 AAL, D 8.9, 1619, fol. 1-1R: “me a puesto las manos.” 
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Submitting his testimony first was Juan de Valdes, simply identified as a soldado 
(soldier). He said that he interacted and spoke regularly with the couple, due in large part to 
the fact that he lived in a chamber of the “casa” where the couple resided. Twice in his 
testimony Juan contended that Antonio mistreated Catalina “in deed and in word.”263 In 
detailing the mistreatments, Juan told the court about Antonio’s use of a sword against his 
wife. He ultimately concluded that “Antonio is a man of poor judgment and has no 
appreciation for matters of importance.”264  
Continuing in his critical testimony, Juan proceeded to attack Antonio’s role as the 
provider of his family. He testified that Catalina never received the proper necessities for 
survival from her husband, and instead “she was left in poverty.”265 Through his testimony, 
Juan undercut Antonio’s masculinity on two fronts. First, the physical and verbal abuses 
were inappropriate and showed “poor judgment.” The abuses presented Antonio as a man 
without restraint, and a husband who could not or would not treat his wife as a wife. Second, 
he failed as the familial provider. As the “overseer” of the family, he was charged with being 
the protector and provider; whether because of laziness, a spendthrift nature, or other 
mitigating factors, he was failing in this essential act.  
Two other soldiers also testified and corroborated much of what Juan had noted, but 
provided further detail. Juan Ruiz, an artillero del galeón (naval artilleryman), recounted a 
story exemplifying Antonio’s violent uncontrollable temper. One day Juan Ruiz heard 
Antonio screaming and yelling at Catalina. He was in such a rage that the words of his 
                                                 
263 AAL, D 8.9, fol. 5. “de obras de palabra.” 
264 AAL, D 8.9. “Antonio un hombre de poco juizio y que no tiene aprecio de las cosas de ynportancia.” 
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outburst were incomprehensible to those around. Antonio’s feelings boiled over as he 
reached for his sword and pulled it from its sheath. The soldiers and other neighbors came 
rushing when they heard the commotion, which suggests just how loud and out of control 
Antonio had been. By the time that they had arrived to see the disturbance, Antonio stopped 
his attempted assault but left his wife hurt and distressed. Juan Ruiz claimed vehemently that 
Antonio’s “deeds and actions appeared to go beyond what is just.”266 He also believed 
Antonio would likely pursue his cruel intentions again. The other soldiers echoed similar 
notions emphasizing that Antonio’s actions were cruel and unjust.  
Other witnesses repeated the same accusations as the soldiers. A vecino (citizen) of 
Lima who had known the couple for three years corroborated the story of the attack. He also 
criticized Antonio's failure to provide for his wife. Isabel, a former housemate, was also 
brought before the court. She affirmed much of what had already been presented. She said 
that not once did Antonio bring home food, clothing, or anything of sustenance for Catalina. 
In doing so, she highlighted the wholesale failure of the family provider. In addition to his 
cruelty in “word and deed,” Isabel specifically singled out a time when Antonio went after 
Catalina with a sword.267  
This case presents quite possibly the most striking example of the approach of 
community members to domestic violence and other marital issues. Throughout the case we 
find no evidence or suggestion that any of the witnesses to the brutality made attempts to stop 
the violence against Catalina, even though their testimonies make certain that they did not 
condone the treatment. In fact, they provided quite damning assessments of his actions and 
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his character. Yet, this did not spring them into action. Even the soldiers, the supposedly 
fearless defenders of the empire, chose not to intervene physically, though surely the three of 
them could have made their presence felt by Antonio. Instead, they all appear to hold their 
actions for the courts. Their rush to the scene could very well have been intentional, as a way 
to demonstrate their surveillance and judgment with plans to share their observations at a 
later court date.268 And this trend is pervasive in the litigation from colonial Lima. Priests, 
soldiers, and shop owners, to name a few, witnessed (or at the very least, claimed to witness) 
brutal assaults bordering at times on murder among other illicit behaviors but apparently 
made no attempt to act to stop such deeds. This trend, I argue, speaks to the endurance of the 
patriarchal model. Within the confines of his marriage, which started at his home and 
extended throughout the city, the husband was in many ways protected from intervention. 
Before the ecclesiastical court, or the Church itself, the husband lost the shield that prevented 
assaults on his manhood and an interruption to his authority.    
With the judge’s ear, the witnesses all recounted the treacherous behavior of Antonio 
and likewise commented on the unmanly nature of his actions. They focused on two of the 
most prominent shortcomings of marital masculinity already noted in chapter 1: failure of 
family provision and physical and verbal abuse. These housemates had heard the verbal 
abuse and seen the physical violence meted out by Antonio. These witnesses also noted the 
lack of provisions brought home by Antonio. In their testimonies, he had failed miserably as 
the provider of the family.   
Within the close living quarters these housemates provided a picture of the couple’s 
troubled marriage. But rather than let the judge draw conclusions about what they witnessed, 
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these witnesses included their assessment of the appropriateness of Antonio’s actions. For 
these housemates, the abusive husband was a man of poor judgment, his actions went beyond 
what was just, and he did not appreciate important things. Time and again he was noted as 
cruel and unjust. These condemnations show a clear picture of what a husband should be and 
document Antonio’s shortcomings. Though they did not intervene during the abuse, their 
views on an appropriate married life come through in their testimonies. These statements 
reveal their consensus on marital masculinity, and their willingness to criticize those that fall 
short of the expectation.  
 
Servants and Slaves269 
“Neighbors” in colonial society comprised a cosmopolitan group, much like the rest of the 
city. The utopian segregation idealized by early colonists and the crown failed to materialize 
throughout much of Spanish America. In his seminal The Limits of Racial Domination, 
Douglas Cope depicts a Mexico City devoid of racial segregation in terms of residence. 
Instead, Africans, Indians, and Spaniards lived quite literally on top of one another, with rich 
Spaniards occupying casas altas above the rooms of African, and Indian residents, providing 
one of many examples of the failure of an all-encompassing casta system.270 Imperial 
attempts in Lima to keep Spaniards separate from the rest of colonial society likewise failed. 
Ecclesiastical court records provide numerous examples of the intermingled living of the 
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city’s diverse population. Slaves, free blacks, indigenous, and mixed-race people resided 
alongside, and therefore interacted with, Lima’s Spanish and Spanish-descent population.271  
Urban slaves were far more likely to have lived with their masters, rather than in 
slave quarters, which would have been the norm in the haciendas of rural Latin America or 
the engenhos of Brazil.272 Even those that did not reside with their masters were likely to live 
in the city, unsegregated from free Limeños. In addition to housing, the very nature of work 
by urban slaves placed them in more consistent, close contact with the free population. Many 
women acted as domestic servants, cooking and taking care of the children of their masters. 
Male slaves could be artisans or day laborers who contracted work throughout the city for 
their owner’s profit, and sometimes their own. This same work was common to the free 
population of negros, mulatos, and others of African descent. They interacted daily in the 
social and cultural world of Lima. This interaction, in some instances, revealed to them the 
goings on of the vida maridable of the Spanish populations, who constitute the overwhelming 
majority of divorcio cases.  
To be clear, the Black population (enslaved or free) suffered numerous restraints on 
their freedom. But these restraints did not extend completely into the legal system. Slaves 
had, in theory, unfettered access to the ecclesiastical legal system. Slaves could and did bring 
legal suits against their masters and other slaves, with varying degrees of success.273 Though 
                                                 
271 The Spanish population I refer to here also includes a number of mestizos who “passed” as, or were 
considered to be, Spaniards.  
272 Phillips, Slavery from Roman Times to the Early Transatlantic Trade, 198. 
   
273 Wisnoski, “‘It is unjust for the law of marriage to be broken by the law of slavery’”; Bennett, Africans in 
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free Africans and mulatos did not incur all of the same prohibitions, they too faced legal 
restrictions because of their race. However they also initiated court proceedings. Beyond 
acting as litigants, all people of African descent were also permitted to testify in the 
ecclesiastical courts, and we find them in droves in the marital cases examined for this study.  
The sheer number of people of African descent that appear in the transcripts depicts 
the diversity of cosmopolitan Lima.274 In a sample of 37 cases from 1594-1618, I found 171 
witnesses who submitted testimony to the court.275 Negros, mulatos, and other testigos of 
African descent accounted for 24% (41) of the total witnesses. Of those 41, 25 (15% of the 
total witnesses) were enslaved. This included slaves testifying against their masters or against 
other couples with whom they had interactions.276 Peninsulares accounted for 9%, indios 4% 
and self-identified mestizos 1%. The remaining 63% did not identify their racial/ethnic 
status. What is even more fascinating is that women of the lower racial classifications, 
mainly those of African descent, account for approximately two-thirds of all non-Spanish 
witnesses.  
While the appearance of African and indigenous witnesses was lower than their 
representation among the population, such legal activity demonstrates the vast knowledge 
these slaves and free people of color had about the marriages of the Spaniards in Lima and 
their importance within the legal process. The importance, or lack thereof, of the status of 
                                                 
274 Worth remembering that the black population hovered around 40 to 50% during the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century. Bowser, The African Slave.  
275 The current sample includes all cases in legajos 3-5, when complete records are more consistent and the 
transcripts more easily deciphered. For the earlier period, I have included 8 other cases (without prejudice for 
content) to broaden the scope of the sample. The latest case included in the sample is from AAL D 7.1. This 
unscientific sample is meant to provide a glimpse of the spectrum of witnesses.    
276 Testifying against one’s master happened with less frequency. In one case, however, four of the eight 
witnesses called were slaves of the couple. AAL, D 5.5.  
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witnesses in Lima differs from what has been argued for Castile during the same period. In 
his discussion of the chancellería of Valladolid, Kagan notes how “false witnesses” could be 
used, wherein “drunks and poor beggars” would be brought before the court and paraded as 
nobles. In such cases, the assertion of high status and reputation was necessary, even if it had 
to be fabricated.277 Status in Lima appears to have been less emphasized, at least within 
marital trials in the ecclesiastical court.  
The calidad of witnesses, influenced by their race, wealth, and standing in the 
community to name a few factors, no doubt factored into how their testimony might be 
received. However, it would be unwise to assume that testimony from the least privileged in 
colonial society was simply discounted, or even highly suspect. Though judges rarely provide 
commentary on witnesses that would allow us to evaluate their role in the court, the 
frequency of testimony by Africans and afro-descendants signals how the court perceived 
them. By the time witnesses were called in cases, procuradores (legal professionals) had 
been involved and actively assisting their clients. These were lawyers who made their 
decisions based on years of legal experience and what they had found to be most successful. 
That lawyers frequently and consistently called persons at the lower ends of the racial order 
strongly suggests that they served as useful and dependable witnesses. Furthermore, I have 
yet to find an instance of a judge or litigant protesting the trustworthiness or dependability of 
witnesses based on race, though such objections were made based on prejudicial 
relationships.278 Without existing commentaries on the perception of these witnesses, and in 
                                                 
277 Kagan, Lawsuit and Litigants, 42, where he cites AGS: E, leg. 26, fol. 103. The document is dated 1533 See 
also AGS: CC, leg. 2725, “Memorial de averiguaciones contra Lic. Diego de Ameçega fiscal de Granada.” 
278 See for example, AAL, CCM 1.23.  
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the absence of judge’s responses to their testimonies, we are left to speculate on this apparent 
shift away from pervasive prejudice based on status at the center of colonial society. It is 
quite possible that because of the domestic nature of work of the black and indigenous 
populations, judges overlooked their perceived moral shortcomings giving more weight to 
the intimate perspectives they were thought to have. I will present a few of the testimonies 
themselves, which give a sampling of how these witnesses addressed “marital masculinity.” 
Through their words, we can see how free and enslaved Africans not only provided accounts 
of domestic disputes, but also how they passed judgment on these men before the court.   
Let us begin with the case of Elvira de Toro and her husband Francisco Hernandez. 
Elvira had accused him of frequent and near-fatal physical abuse, and sought a permanent 
separation to protect her life. To corroborate her characterizations of Francisco, Elvira called 
eleven witnesses, including three slaves and two free mulattos.279 One of the witnesses, 
Esperanza Jalofa, was a ladino slave of a local licenciado. She did most of [her and] her 
master’s grocery shopping at the pulpería of Elvira de Toro. She had been shopping at the 
store for two years, when early one April morning in 1607 she was confronted with a violent 
outburst by Francisco. Esperanza noted that upon arriving she saw him brutally assaulting 
Elvira. Amid the violent episode, she also recalled Francisco shouting at his wife calling her 
“puta” and other inappropriate words. Appalled by what she saw and likely fearing for her 
life, Esperanza fled the scene.280 But before leaving, she grabbed a sword from beside the 
bed, most likely an attempt to prevent Francisco from using it on his wife. This is one of the 
                                                 
279 AAL, D 3.4, fol. 1.  
280 AAL, D 3.4, fol. 4-5: “esta testigo le solto fue corriendo y tomo su espada que estava junto a la cama de los 
suso dichos.” 
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boldest acts by witnesses of domestic violence recounted in the pages of divorce transcripts. 
Though not confronting this abusive husband directly, she went to great lengths to limit his 
brutality. 
She also testified that she “heard it said” that such beatings occurred frequently at the 
couple’s house. This hearsay signified the public scandal caused by his conduct, which, 
according to both Spanish legal practice and canon law, made the offenses all the more 
egregious. She concluded from her discussions with the neighbors, combined with what she 
had witnessed over the years, that Francisco was a “vagabond” and gambler who left his wife 
often and never provided for the family. Instead, Elvira provided for herself and their four 
children through her pulpería.281   
The other witnesses recounted much of what Esperanza presented to the court. 
Antonio Olivares, moreno (free, Peruvian-born African), was across the street when the 
abuse happened. He testified that he heard screaming and what sounded like a person being 
beaten. The sounds had his attention and as he looked on to assess the situation, he saw 
Francisco run out of the house. Antonio described him as out of breath like someone who had 
just finished a fight, whereas his wife appeared beaten and crying. Similar to Esperanza he 
noted that rumor had it that Francisco was an “aimless bum” who would leave the city for 
days at a time and return only to mistreat his wife.282 According to the testimony, he never 
                                                 
281 Ibid. 
282 AAL, D 3.4, fol. 4. “anda vagamundo y se va y viene fuera desta ciudad y quando vuelve le da mala vida y 
haze malos tratamientos a la dicha su muger.”  
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worked and provided nothing for the family. According to Esperanza, Antonio, and the other 
witnesses, Francisco failed as a husband on multiple fronts.283  
  Let us now turn to another case and the testimony of one María de Villegas, a mulata 
libre, who went into great detail describing the relationship between Ana Colon and Antonio 
de Arratia. She had known the couple for at least four months, during which time she had 
lived in the same house. She opened her testimony with some scathing condemnations of 
Antonio. María focused initially on Antonio’s foul language, noting that he “ordinarily” 
verbally abused Ana calling her “una puta perra negra” (a black whore bitch).284 As the 
testimony continues, variations on this insult were hurled at Ana during various spats and 
beatings. These insults stood in stark contrast to María’s depiction of Ana, who she claimed 
was “very virtuous and honest, who loved and cared deeply for her husband.”285 
After establishing the upright character of Ana, María described a beating of Ana at 
the hands of her husband that left her bedridden and initially unable to speak or feel portions 
of her body. María and other witnesses even thought that the battered woman might be dead. 
And that was but one of the incidents recounted. At least three times during a four-month 
span Antonio had attacked his wife using a number of weapons, including a butcher’s knife, 
and stated on several occasions that he would have to kill Ana. He was never successful, but 
María’s testimony of his brutality depicted a violent man. In closing the testimony, María 
                                                 
283 This case ends with Elvira choosing to return to the marriage at the urging of doña Isabel Porras y 
Marmolejo, an abbess at the Recogimiento de Divorciadas. For more on this relationship and the influence of 
Isabel de Porras, see van Deusen, 87.  
284 This could have been a compound insult or just the words that he might choose from when verbally abusing 
his wife.  
285 AAL, D 3.12, fol. 13. “muy virtuossa y onestamente queriendo y amando mucho al dicho su marido.” 
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reiterated her ultimate conclusion: “If they [the couple] remain together... I am certain he will 
kill his wife out of great hatred and hostility.”286 
The testimony also touched on the provider side of marital masculinity. She argued 
that Antonio did not provide for his wife, claiming he brought home no food, forcing Ana to 
go hungry for days at a time. In the final lines of the testimony, María made explicit her own 
judgment of Antonio. “Antonio de Arratia is a lazy man with a very bad and brutal 
nature.”287 Through her stories and judgments of Antonio, María systematically criticized his 
shortcomings as a husband. A similar path was taken by another person of color who 
presented a testimony on behalf of Ana. Francisca de Villegas, a free mulata, also described 
numerous abuses perpetrated by Antonio which often left María near death. Likewise, she 
told the court of his verbal abuse and foul language, as well as his inability to provide for his 
household. Following these stories, Francisca passed judgment on Antonio using similar 
language to the previous testimony: “Antonio de Arratia has a very bad and brutal nature 
without cause or prompting.”288 According to witnesses called by his wife, Antonio was a 
bad man, and more specifically a bad husband.  
The judgments leveled here by Esperanza, María, and Francisca criticized the actions 
and character of these elite men. Specifically these testimonies articulated their shortcomings 
as husbands. In colonial society, rights and responsibilities went hand in hand. The authority 
of these husbands was intimately tied to their fulfillment of the expectations of marital 
masculinity. The failures then resulted in the relinquishing of their patriarchal authority, 
                                                 
286 AAL, D 3.12, fol. 13.  
287 Ibid.  
288 Ibid.  
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against their will. These challenges came from outside normal channels (i.e. from socially 
marginalized women), but were still possible only within the patriarchal structures of the 
ecclesiastical authorities. 
While the initiating party called the overwhelming majority of witnesses, husbands 
too drew on community support for their defense. And like the litigants listed above, they did 
not choose testigos only from the political and social elite. In the case of María Perez and don 
Diego de Castilla, María called 11 witnesses, seven of whom were Indian or mulatto and one 
simply identified as a “resident in this city.”289 Diego responded with only one witness of his 
own, despite the case going on for more than a year and totaling more than 87 folios. The 
sole witness called by Diego was a free negro simply known as Damian in the record. 
Interestingly, this was no smoking gun witness. While Damian had known Diego for six 
years, he admitted in the record that he did not know Maria. Damian did provide some 
limited testimony on the lack of frequent cohabitation by the couple; due to an accusation of 
impotence this was more a concern for the court than normal. Yet, he provided little else 
other than to say that he knew Diego to be a “buen indio” (good Indian).290 While certainly 
complimentary of Diego, the testimony lacked specificity or an assertion of fulfillment of 
husbandly roles, adding little to Diego’s case.  
Considering these cases together, we see that neither race, class, nor gender provided 
a barrier to witness testimony. All sectors of Lima’s population helped to voice the public 
opinion of marital conduct, a vital part of colonial justicia. Similarly, non-Spaniards 
                                                 
289 This case began as a divorcio proceeding, but the court also considered arguments for an annulment based on 
an impotence accusation against Diego. AAL, D 2.8.  
290 AAL, D 2.8, fol. 62. The testimony responded to an interrogatorio, written presumably only for this witness.  
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appearing as witnesses felt no need to cower to social superiors, but instead leveled harsh, 
scathing criticisms. They specifically homed in on matters of marital masculinity, namely 
avoiding physical violence and verbal insults, providing for the family, and living the 
married life at home. These men and women lacking in social capital held an effectual place 
in ecclesiastical litigation. And while recounting some of the intimate details of these married 
couples, those less esteemed in society were also more than willing to provide their own 
moral assessments in their testimony. We find that slaves also agreed on matters of marital 
masculinity and willingly criticized husbands for falling short of these social expectations. 
Despite their place in the social hierarchy, they were able to help hold husbands accountable 
for deviant actions.  
 
Conclusion 
As cases of marital conflict came before the ecclesiastical tribunals of Lima, the reputation of 
each side came under scrutiny. Throughout the transcripts each party fought to portray 
themselves as “good” spouses. Likewise, they often cast aspersions on their spouses citing 
their vices or inclination to immorality. In addition to the character of the litigants, the events 
that served as the key points of friction in these conflicts often had two sides. The 
“remembering” of a drunken night after a festival or a weekend outside the home varied 
widely.  
The hundreds of testimonies contained within the divorcio proceedings are diverse 
and cover a wide range of topics. Some litigants were merely character witnesses, while 
others served as eyewitnesses to particular events germane to the dispute, and still others 
were called to confirm a single fact or two, like the marital status of the couple. Amidst the 
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diversity of witnesses presented above, one might expect to encounter a number of 
contrasting views on marital norms, roots of conflicts, appropriate treatment, as well as the 
other topics that took the attention of the court. However, through the cacophony of voices, 
we can also hear a recurring melody projecting a marital masculinity at the core of marriage 
in colonial Peruvian society, even as some men refused to live up to these central tenets. 
Testigos, especially those called by the wife, homed in on a core of values expected 
of husbands. Though reifying the importance of the character of husbands, attributes that 
placed men in power and made women subjective and dependent, witnesses criticized these 
deviant husbands for the various shortcomings in the patriarchal arena. These witnesses 
served to surveil and police matrimonial matters. They represent a clear bridge between 
public and private life. They constitute yet another set of voices taking husbands to task. To 
be clear, their challenges to patriarchal authority were made possible only through the legal 
system, which lent them a platform to air their observations and opinions. In residences and 
in the street, challenges to husbands were rarely noted in court proceedings, and we have no 
evidence to believe that they occurred with any frequency. If stepping between a marital 
quarrel was acceptable, or even admirable, witnesses would have eagerly trumpeted their 
own noble deeds. If such interventions occurred but were frowned upon or even condemned 
by the courts, husbands would have found a way to point out such interferences to the judge 
to cast aspersions on witness testimonies. Yet, these slaves, neighbors, and priests held their 
actions and words for the court. In short, the authority of the husband could be challenged, 
but only within the institution of the court.  
But within this forum, the sharp critiques of witnesses produced real consequences, 
even if they did not always result in complete legal victories. These testigos, whose gender, 
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race, and social status run the gamut of colonial society, questioned the very manhood of 
these patriarchs. Witnesses criticized not only their failure to control their emotions by 
lashing out at “honorable” women, but also their inability to provide for their households, a 
stinging accusation. Witnesses also attested to their various vices, from gambling to drinking, 
from uncontrollable libido to laziness. Likewise, even when they did not end up securing a 
divorce for the petitioning wife, these testimonies helped to prolong the institutionalized 
separations that ran concurrent with divorce proceedings. In the end, all of these figures had a 
say in what constituted “la vida maridable” (the married life) and marital masculinity.  
Furthermore, witness testimonies speak to the public nature of marriage in colonial 
Lima. The church had sought to make marriage its own domain. And while they were 
successful in keeping marital matters out of the secular courts (for the most part), marital 
norms remained dependent on community surveillance and reporting. While ex officio cases 
were possible, they were infrequent.291 The majority of cases, instead, were brought by 
dissatisfied spouses. But unsurprisingly, they could not make their cases on their own. 
Instead, they relied on witnesses to help bolster their position. These witnesses took part in 
intrusive, if not deliberate, surveillance that observed spousal treatment. The process, 
however, did not end at observation. Instead, these neighbors, acquaintances, and other 
community members made clear their expectations of spouses, especially husbands, and 
lobbed potent criticisms as they deemed fit. Their testimonies served a two-fold purpose: to 
recount events and to judge actions. In doing so, their surveillance turned to policing of the 
married life; in these cases, they specifically set out to address marital masculinity.  
                                                 
291 However, ex officio cases related to bigamy—and held in inquisitorial courts—were far more common. See 
Boyer, Lives of the Bigamists.  
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 The socio-ethnic make-up of these witnesses provides important context for 
understanding communal influence in adjudicating marital matters. The extensive 
representation of slaves and free people of color in court contradicts simple dichotomies of 
the colonial hierarchy. To put it another way, the appearance of these witnesses show the 
extent to which all of colonial society helped to assess marital masculinity, thereby policing 
patriarchal authority. Such policing was certainly reliant on the ecclesiastical judicial system. 
However, within this system, the biases of colonial society, such as race and class, were less 
pervasive. In the court of law, even enslaved women of color had a voice in what it meant to 
be a good man and a good husband. Within the colonial structures of ecclesiastical courts, 
patriarchal power was subject to limitations based not only on the judges instilled with overt 
authority, but also on the testimonies of the larger population, despite gender, race, or other 
qualifiers. However, as the next chapter will show, married slaves encountered mixed results 
in the court when their own matrimonial matters were the focus.  
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Chapter Four: Suing for the Married Life: Marital Masculinity and Slavery in the 
Colony 
 
From Married in Mexico to the Courts of Lima 
In April of 1600 Juan Villegas, a moreno slave, completed the long journey from Mexico 
City to Lima, Peru.292 While the voyage would have been about half the distance, in many 
ways it mirrored a Middle Passage journey from Africa. Against his will, Juan was uprooted 
from the place he had come to call home. Without notice, he was torn away from his wife, 
children, friends, and community. Taken to one of New Spain’s ports, most likely Panama, 
he was boarded on the ship of Captain Juan de Semancas and taken to the South American 
port city in order to be sold in the Viceroyalty of Peru. Perhaps most troubling, his future 
home and life remained entirely uncertain.293 The marital home that Juan Villegas had 
created in Mexico City had been violated because of his status as a slave.  
 Once in Lima, Juan sought out the ecclesiastical court in an attempt to prevent his 
proposed sale and secure his return to his family. Appearing before the court, Villegas told 
the judge of his forced migration from Mexico and stated that his current owner, Alonso 
                                                 
* A previous version of this chapter was published in English as “‘It is Unjust for the Law of Marriage to be 
broken by the Law of Slavery’: Married Slaves and their Masters in Early Colonial Peru” Slavery & Abolition: 
A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 34, no. 2. This research has also been published in Spanish as “‘No 
es justo que la ley de matrimonio se quebrante por la ley de servidumbre’: Esclavos casados y sus amos en 
Lima, siglos XVI-XVII,” trans. Daniel Guzman Salinas, Historia y Cultura: Revista del Museo Nacional 
Arqueología, Antropología e Historia del Perú 27 (2014). 
292 Though in later periods moreno signified a free person of African descent, in early colonial Peru, the term 
was used to describe acculturated slaves or those who were born in the Americas.   
293 While the reason for such a sudden continental migration is not made explicit, we can speculate based on the 
testimony of one of the witnesses. The first slave brought to testify regarding Juan’s sale, Domingo Hernández, 
told the court that Juan was the slave of now-deceased don Pedro de Villegas, alguacil mayor in Mexico City. It 
is possible that after don Pedro passed away, his beneficiaries wanted the money made from selling Juan rather 
than his services. AAL, CN 1.4, fol. 1.  
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Rodriguez de Bado, instructed Captain Semancas to find a buyer for the slave in “these parts 
of Peru.”294 Villegas argued that such a sale was “against all reason and justice, for I am 
married and joined, according to the order of the Holy Mother Church of Rome, to Catalina 
Sanchez morena.”295 And indeed, selling or moving a married slave away from his or her 
spouse violated the Church’s protection of marriage. Medieval and early modern law codes 
prohibited masters from preventing their slaves from marrying. Gratian’s Decretum (twelfth 
century) addressed slave marriage by citing Pope Hadrian’s response to a query from the 
Archbishop of Salzburg on slavery and matrimony: “a slave can contract marriage against his 
lord’s will” because “according to the word of the Apostle [Gal. 3:28], in Christ Jesus there 
is neither free nor slave who can be barred from the Church’s sacraments. So also marriages 
can by no means be prohibited to slaves. Even if contracted contrary to the master’s objection 
and will, this is no reason for dissolving them by ecclesiastical judgment.”296 Despite the 
social and legal pressures placed on them, we now know that slaves married in relatively 
high numbers. Either for love, religious conviction, or to assert one of their limited rights in 
the oppressive world in which they lived, more than 2,200 enslaved couples married between 
1632-1648 in Lima’s parishes. And though data for earlier years is incomplete, the numbers 
                                                 
294 AAL, CN 1.4, fol. 1. Juan, like other slave litigants, appears to have had the assistance of ecclesiastical 
procuradores. The role of these clerks has been understudied, especially their interactions with Africans within 
the court, and the function of the legal aid in this particular case is not entirely known. For one foray into 
procuradores and their interactions with the African populations in Lima, see José Ramón Jouve-Martín, 
Esclavos de la ciudad letrada: esclavitud, escritura y colonialismo en Lima (1650-1700) (Lima: Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 2005) 
295 AAL, CN 1.4, fol. 1.  
296 Gratian, Marriage Canons from the Decretum, trans. John T. Noonan (Berkley: Boalt School of Law, 1963), 
brackets are Noonan’s. For an even earlier take on slavery and marriage in canon law, see Adam Serfass, 
“Slavery and Pope Gregory the Great,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 14, no. 1 (2006): 77-103.  
  
139 
 
seem to be only slightly lower.297 In addition to reiterating slaves’ right to marry, the 
thirteenth-century Siete Partidas also emphasized the importance of married slaves living 
together. As the code noted, any transaction that would prevent slaves from living together 
was prohibited. In certain situations this could require a master to sell a slave “in order that 
the husband and wife not be separated.”298 The validity and importance of slave marriage 
was reiterated at the third Council of Lima, which echoed the same protections of the 
sacrament. In listing the prohibitions against masters, the 1582 synod cautioned more broadly 
that “nor...should the law of natural marriage be negated by the law of human slavery.”299 
With cohabitation and fulfillment of the conjugal debt essential to Christian marriage in the 
early modern period, moving a married slave was unacceptable.300 While acknowledging his 
subjection as a slave, Juan pointed out that the logic and laws governing the institutions of 
marriage and slavery overlapped. In essence, the law required Juan to be at two places at 
once: with his master and with his wife. Showing a deft knowledge of the law and how this 
contradiction should be interpreted, Juan posited: “it is unjust for the law of marriage to be 
broken by the law of slavery.”301  
                                                 
297 Michelle McKinley has undertaken extensive research of marriage registers in Lima. See her forthcoming 
monograph, Fractional Freedoms: Slavery, Intimacy and Legal Mobilization in Colonial Lima, 1600-1699, 
(used with author permission).    
298 Las Siete Partidas, Vol. 4, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott, ed. Robert I. Burns, S.J. (University of Pennsylvania 
Press; Philadelphia, 2001) IV, Title V, Laws I and II.   
299 Rubén Vargas Ugarte, S.J., Concilios Limenses (1551-1772), Tomo 1 (Lima: Arzobispo de Lima, 1951), 
Tercer Concilio, Actio Segunda, Cap. 36. My sincere gratitude goes to Tiffany D. Vann Sprecher for help with 
the translation from Latin.  
300 Gratian, Marriage Canons, also cited Pope Julius as declaring “If, however, all are under one law, then 
neither a free man nor a slave can be sent away, once he is joined in marriage.” However, it is not completely 
clear if this refers to the moving of a person or them being “sent away” from the marriage.   
301 AAL, CN 1.4, fol. 1. And yet, while Juan argued that the institution of slavery should not hinder his 
marriage, he implicitly acknowledged, to some extent, the validity of the “law of slavery.” For views on the 
relationship between resistance and conceptions of slavery and liberty in the colonial period, see Frank Proctor 
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 None of the slaves who appeared in Lima’s ecclesiastical court articulated the legal 
principle as clearly as Juan Villegas, yet their willingness to initiate legal proceedings as well 
as the content of their arguments demonstrate the broad exposure of this position. The 
acknowledgement of this legal contradiction is part of a tradition within Hispanic philosophy 
on the problem of slavery that can be traced back at least to the Siete Partidas, which 
comments on the evil and troubles caused by the institution while permitting its 
continuation.302 Juan’s assertion on how to resolve this legal conundrum was not a 
controversial position. Quite the contrary, he simply distilled what the Church had already 
decided, which unsurprisingly prioritized the maintenance of the sacrament over the secular 
rights of slave owners. Through his petition, Juan was placing his duties as a husband above 
his subjugation as a slave. By seeking cohabitation, he made clear his intentions to reside 
with his wife and secure his conjugal rights. This chapter will examine attempts to maintain 
slave marriages in the face of opposition from masters. I will argue that Juan and other slave 
husbands built their petitions within a framework of marital masculinity. They opposed 
masters on the grounds that they needed to be good husbands by living out the married life, 
mainly in terms of cohabitation. This chapter establishes that these married slaves clearly 
understood their options for legal recourse and engaged the courts, and by doing so they 
                                                 
III, Damned Notions of Liberty: Slavery, Culture, and Power in Colonial Mexico (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2010); and Sherwin Bryant, “Enslaved Rebels, Fugitives, and Litigants: The Resistance 
Continuum in Colonial Quito,” Colonial Latin American Review 13, no. 1 (2004): 7-46. 
302 For more on slavery and the Siete Partidas, see Robin Blackburn, Making of New World Slavery: From 
Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800 (London and New York: Verso, 1997), 50-52; McKinley, “Fractional 
Freedoms: Slavery, Legal Activism, and Ecclesiastical Courts in Colonial Lima, 1593-1689,” Law and History 
Review 28, no. 3 (2010): 749-790.  
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made these theoretical rights a social reality.303 By asserting their rights they successfully 
challenged and limited masters’ authority. However, as some of the cases will demonstrate, 
there was a hierarchy of marital masculinity—one that privileged Spanish marriages over that 
of slaves (and married Spaniards over enslaved husbands). Asserting marital rights still 
functioned within certain parameters of the slave-master hegemonic paradigm. 
 
Slavery in Colonial Lima 
The bulk of research on slavery in Latin America has maintained a focus on the periods and 
regions that saw the highest imports: Brazil and the Caribbean, especially in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Studies also have centered overwhelmingly on the rural slaves 
laboring on large plantations. The reasons for these emphases are obvious and 
understandable. As Fredrick Bowser has noted, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
“African slavery both reached its apogee and met its end in those areas.”304 Scholars have 
attempted to broaden our view with more recent studies on areas such as Mexico, Peru, and 
Central America; however, these remain the minority.305 Building on these latest 
contributions, this chapter brings the urban slave of Peru to the scholarly discussion.  
                                                 
303 Here I follow Alejandro de la Fuente’s interpretation of slave litigation, especially that it “gave concrete 
social meaning to the abstract rights regulated in the positive laws.” “Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: 
The Tannenbaum Debate Revisited,” Law and History Review 22, no. 2 (2004): 342.  
304 Frederick Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1974), vii.  
305 On Mexico, see Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico; Frank Proctor III, Damned Notions of Liberty; and 
Brian Owensby “How Juan and Leonor Won Their Freedom: Litigation and Liberty in Seventeenth-Century 
Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 85, no. 1 (2005): 39-79; for Peru, see Jouve-Martín, Esclavos 
de la ciudad letrada; McKinley, “Till Death Do Us Part: Testamentary Manumission in Seventeenth-Century 
Lima, Peru,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies (2012); Lolita Gutiérrez 
Brockington, “The African Diaspora in the Eastern Andes: Adaptation, Agency, and Fugitive Action, 1573-
1677,” The Americas 57, no. 2 (2000): 207-244; Rachel S. O’Toole, “From the Rivers of Guinea to the Valleys 
of Peru: Becoming a Bran Diaspora within Spanish Slavery,” Social Text 25, no. 3 (2007): 19-36; for other 
South American regions, Sherwin K. Bryant, “Finding Gold, Forming Slavery: The Creation of a Classic Slave 
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The inclusion of slave marriage is essential to this study of marriage, authority, and 
masculinity. As noted throughout the previous chapters, slaves made up a significant portion 
of the population in early colonial Lima, and their relationships affected how the sacrament 
was understood in society. The question of marital masculinity is also deepened when we 
include enslaved husbands. Expectations of men varied based on race, and the dynamics of 
manhood for married slaves were far more complicated than their free counterparts.  
Living the married life in Lima proved far more difficult for the enslaved residents 
than their free counterparts. Foremost, their bondage to their masters created logistical 
difficulties in cohabitation. Their limitations in mobility, as well as numerous other 
restrictions, left them constrained. Furthermore, while other colonial residents had to deal 
with the watchful eye of neighbors, or the occasional interloping in-law, slaves had to 
contend with the intervention of masters. This became especially cumbersome as masters 
tried to overstep their authority by selling or moving a slave away from his or her spouse, an 
act strictly prohibited by canon and secular law.  When masters attempted such acts, slaves 
sprang into action going before the ecclesiastical court. They claimed that this relocation 
would prevent them from “making the married life.” Through these cases, I examine how 
social conceptions of gender and race ran contrary to the law and assess the impact of these 
conceptions on the married lives of slaves. These cases become far more complicated than 
previous marital conflict cases, as we must take into account an extra layer of authority—the 
master.  As we follow these petitions, we will see how the gender and racial hierarchies of 
                                                 
Society, Popayan, 1600-1700,” The Americas 63, no. 1 (2006): 81-112; Lyman L. Johnson, “‘A Lack of 
Legitimate Obedience and Respect’: Slaves and Their Masters in the Courts of Late Colonial Buenos Aires” 
Hispanic American Historical Review  87, no. 4 (2007): 631-657; for Central America, see Robinson A. 
Herrera, “‘Por Que No Sabemos Firmar’: Black Slaves in Early Guatemala,” The Americas 57, no. 2 (2000): 
247-267; Paul Lokken, “Marriage as Slave Emancipation in 17th-Century Guatemala,” The Americas 58, no. 2 
(2001): 175-200.  
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colonial society significantly limited redress in the ecclesiastical court, even as the laws 
provided a room for the institutional agency of slaves.   
 As noted throughout this dissertation, the established bureaucracy of Lima allowed 
for a level of litigiousness not possible in the far reaches of the Spanish Empire, or even in 
some of the larger settlements of Spanish America such as Trujillo.306 Moreover, people from 
all walks of life passed through these courts—men, women, poor, rich, Spaniards, native 
Andeans, Africans, mulattos, etc.307 Making use of the legal system, the enslaved African 
population and their mixed race offspring, who accounted for close to half of Lima’s nearly 
25,000 residents, appeared as plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses.308 The very existence of 
slaves in the judicial record—and what is more, their success within the courtroom—
demonstrates that the legal institutions invented and crafted as hegemonic technologies of 
colonialism also served as methods of recourse for the oppressed classes in colonial society. 
While prevented from carrying firearms and even knives, negros in the early modern Spanish 
Empire possessed the potent weapon of the law.309 And as will be shown throughout this 
chapter, they wielded this weapon with skill and, to some measure, success. 
                                                 
306 For legal activity within the Spanish Empire, see first and foremost Richard Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in 
Castile, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); for Quito, Tamar Herzog, 
Upholding Justice; for Trujillo, O’Toole, Bound Lives, 1-13, 122-156. 
307 Many scholars, however, argue that the wealthy did litigate with the most frequency. Though I am aware of 
no such quantitative studies, I am inclined to side with this position considering the bulk of disputes over 
property and inheritance.  
308 Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, Appendix A, 340. I use the term “plaintiff” here to mean the 
party who initiated the trial and who raised accusations. I use “defendant” to mean the accused. Litigants use no 
such language to identify themselves or their opponents, opting instead to use full introductions and names or 
the popular “suso dicho (aforementioned),” or less frequently “mi parte (my party)” and “parte contraria 
(opposing party).” For clarity, I have opted to use the modern legal referents.  
309 Much more has been written about how the indigenous populations utilized the colonial courts. Many of 
these works have shaped how I understand litigation by Africans, especially the seminal works of Lewis Hanke, 
The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (London: Cumberlege and University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1949); Woodrow Borah, “The Spanish and Indian Law: New Spain” in The Inca and Aztec 
States 1400-1800: Anthropology and History, edited by George Collier, Renato I. Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth. 
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 A host of litigation by and about slaves in colonial Lima, especially those cases 
related to family and religious matters, is catalogued as Causas de Negros in the 
Archbishop’s archive. These transcripts cover a wide range of issues including the search for 
runaway slaves, accusations of hiding an illness when selling a slave (which essentially 
constituted fraud), failure of payment for a purchased slave, selling another owner’s slave, 
and even marital disputes over the failure to disclose one’s status as a slave.310 These records 
begin in 1593, towards the end of Lima’s coming of age in the latter years of the sixteenth 
century. Whether or not cases preceded these records, we cannot be sure. None of the cases 
read for this research referenced previous litigation by the parties that might give some 
indication of earlier legal activity. Yet, that absence alone does not negate the possibility. 
This study focuses on the cases that arbitrate conflicts between married slaves and their 
masters, which often involved slaves protesting a move or sale of themselves or their spouses 
that would separate the couple and prevent them from living a proper married life. Of the 143 
Causas de Negros cases from 1593-1630, 40 center on master-slave conflicts over marriage 
and cohabitation.311    
                                                 
(New York: Academic Press, 1982); Steve Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and Challenge of Spanish Conquest: 
Huamanga to 1640 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Susan Kellogg, “Hegemony Out of 
Conquest: The First Two Centuries of Spanish Rule in Central Mexico,” Radical History Review 53 (1992): 27-
56; Kellogg, Law and the Transformation of Aztec Culture, 1500-1700 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1995); and Brian Owensby, The Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008). 
310 This last point is discussed in depth by Michelle McKinley in “‘Such Unsightly Unions Could Never Result 
in Holy Matrimony’”: Mixed-Status Marriages in Seventeenth-Century Colonial Lima,” Yale Journal of Law 
and Humanities 22, no. 2 (2010): 217-55. 
311 These forty years, which begin with the earliest extant case, account for the period when slaves made up a 
significant portion of the Limeño population. By the middle of the century, rising Iberian immigration, a 
rebounding indigenous population, and decline in the reliance on slaves in the capital drastically changed the 
makeup of Lima’s urban society. After surveying all Causas de Negros for this period, I have isolated and 
analyzed all cases regarding slave marriages. This sample also includes two cases that are misfiled in Causas 
Litigios Matrimoniales as AAL, CLM 1.22 and 1.23.  
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 The proceedings followed a fairly rigid order and structure. Litigation began when a 
slave (and in a few instances, an advocate of a slave) presented the initial charge, demanda, 
to the court.312 The demanda would open with the slave stating his/her name to the court, as 
well as noting their racial categorization and at times geographic origin. The slaves of Lima 
included both African-born and criollo (born in the Spanish Empire) men and women. 
Similar to the diversity of slave litigants in Quito found by Kris Lane, the slaves of Lima’s 
ecclesiastical court were identified as Bran, Congo, Biafara, and Terra Nova, denoting 
regions of the Guinea coast.313 Criollos born in Lima, Panama, and Mexico City as well as 
“Old World” slaves born in Spain are also found within the transcripts. Following their racial 
status, plaintiffs would state their legal status as slaves and identify their masters by name, 
title, and, less often, occupation.  
Only after these identifying characteristics would slaves proceed to proclaim marital 
status, naming their spouses and corresponding masters. Non-enslaved couples almost never 
included additional identifying information before claiming their marital status and naming 
their spouses. This order of information presented by slaves, though repeated consistently, is 
somewhat puzzling considering the venue and content of the cases. The Church envisioned 
married slaves, first and foremost, as spouses taking part in the holy sacrament of matrimony. 
Their responsibility to their spouses, as is argued throughout by slaves, superseded their 
                                                 
312 In two cases I have found, a master of one slave intervened to prevent a move while also offering to purchase 
the spouse as a possible solution. In these cases, it is entirely possible that making a beneficial financial 
transaction was guiding their action more than noble defense of marriage and slave rights. AAL, CN 1.14 and 
CN 1.22.   
313 Kris Lane, “Captivity and Redemption: Aspects of Slave Life in Early Colonial Quito and Popayán,” The 
Americas 57, no. 2 (2000): 229.  
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commitment to their masters. This subtle legal procedure provides yet another example of the 
internal contradiction of the Church’s position on slavery and marriage.  
 After introducing the major parties involved, the plaintiff might give a brief 
background of the “normal” living conditions of the couple (e.g., where they lived, for how 
long) before accusing the master of attempting to sell or move the spouse, occasionally 
noting the potential destination and other times simply noting it was “out of these parts” or 
“out of this city.” This geographic designation is important because masters were allowed to 
move or sell a married slave within the same community.314 Such sales were prohibited only 
when the resulting distance would place undue burden on the relationship. The slave would 
continue by briefly arguing that such a move would be unjust because it violated or 
prevented the “married life.” After presenting the improprieties sought by the master and the 
corresponding contradiction to Catholic orthodoxy with regards to the sacrament of marriage, 
the demanda would request that the judge prevent the master from selling or moving the 
slave outside the city. Whether the initial fear was moving or selling, the litigants often 
sought to eliminate both possibilities. The petition closed with a powerful and sweeping 
request, “Your mercy...I ask for justice.”315  
 The demanda was always followed by a response given by the ecclesiastical provisor 
through his notary. In his response, the judge would hand down an initial ruling, specifically 
request certain information omitted from the demanda, or call for witnesses to affirm or 
contradict the plaintiff’s argument. Whereas in divorce cases judges regularly ordered 
                                                 
314 Las Siete Partidas, Vol. 4, IV, Title V, Laws I and II.   
315 Though pido justicia was the most popular phrasing, there were several other variants on the theme. This 
was a common refrain to end many types of judicial petitions in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts, 
including petitions for divorce. For recent work on concepts of justice in colonial courts see Bianca Premo, 
“Before the Law”; and Herzog, Upholding Justice.  
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women into the recogimiento by default, the provisor in slave marriage cases frequently 
barred the move or sale of a slave, at least until further information could be gathered. Here 
is where the cases start to diverge, some ending abruptly while others continue with further 
accusations, witness testimony, or rebuttals from the defense. Most noteworthy about the 
form of these cases, similar to all ecclesiastical litigation of this period including the divorcio 
cases discussed in previous chapters, is that definitive, final judgments rarely exist. A judge 
would rule on the case throughout, altering the previous decision as new information 
necessitated. However, it was not uncommon for a case to end with an appeal to modify his 
order. While loss of pages after 400 years is possible, it is more likely that the judge rejected 
these final arguments or the parties reached a settlement outside the court. Cases ending with 
unaddressed arguments or appeals were not uncommon in Latin American ecclesiastical 
courts. Herman Bennett’s research on African slaves in Mexico City cited numerous cases 
that ended without a clear conclusion.316 This lack of definitive results, however, does not 
prevent us from probing these conflicts between slaves and their masters. 
   
Fighting for the Married Life 
Though a firm timeline from Juan Villegas’s arrival in Lima to his appearance before the 
ecclesiastical court is not given, the subsequent testimonies suggest that he was not in Lima 
long before appearing before the court. Far away from the surroundings he knew best, Juan 
remained mindful of the method of redress available to him. Though he could have been 
familiar with the location and practices of the ecclesiastical courts in Mexico City, he had no 
firsthand knowledge of the Limeño courts. Even still, he was quick to locate the provisor’s 
                                                 
316 Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico City, see especially Chapter 5.  
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office and file his petition. This quick action speaks to the broader transcontinental legal 
culture and the widespread legal knowledge that cut across the colonial Spanish American 
population.317  
 After gaining the judge’s ear, Juan articulated his grievance with clarity and force. 
Normally, the risk of a slave being sold away from a spouse would be enough for the judge 
to issue an initial ruling preventing any forced interruption to the married life. However, in 
this case, Judge Miguel Salinas failed to hand down such a decision. Instead, he responded 
with another typical ruling to pursue more facts related to the case. The likely reason for such 
a verdict was that Lima was not the community of the parties involved, meaning slave and 
master were unknown to court officials and, to a certain extent, to the broader society. 
Additionally, the normal “do not sell” ruling would serve little purpose, because the couple 
was already separated. Without more testimony, Judge Salinas appeared hesitant to require 
the captain to return Juan to Mexico. So he decided to pursue witnesses that might be able to 
speak to the marital situation of Juan and, therefore, the legality of selling the slave in the 
South American capital.  
 Quite surprisingly to the modern reader, there were several witnesses in Lima who 
could speak to the marital status of Juan and Gerónima back in Mexico. The first witness 
called was Domingo Hernández, a “negro ladino...criollo,” who not only knew Juan’s 
previous master, but also knew of his wife and their marriage. Though Domingo affirmed the 
marital status of Juan Villegas to Catalina in Mexico, and its compliance with Church 
                                                 
317 A Panamanian slave, Sebastian Congo, was also brought to Lima to be sold, and like Juan, made use of 
Lima’s court. AAL, CN 5.3. It is possible that these slaves appealed to courts in Panama and Mexico before 
their departure. It is also possible that their wives were pursuing litigation in their home jurisdictions after the 
husbands were moved.    
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doctrine, maybe what is most interesting about his testimony is what happened to his words 
after they were taken into the court record. Throughout the entire case we find only two lines 
underlined: “And [I know] that he is married, according to the order of the Holy Mother 
Church, to Catalina Sanchez morena criolla of Mexico, the slave of don Alonso de 
Arellano.”318 The judge’s or notary’s highlighting of this passage illustrates its importance. 
The firm identification by Domingo of Juan’s wife as well as her master gave credence to 
Domingo’s testimony. Furthermore, establishing that Catalina Sanchez was a slave was 
essential to Juan’s case; if she had been a free woman, the law placed responsibility on her to 
move with her spouse to maintain cohabitation.319  
 A second slave’s testimony, “negro Juan de la Cruz criollo,” was also submitted into 
the court records. Originally from Mexico City, de la Cruz was able to add credibility to 
Domingo’s testimony. He too affirmed the marriage, though he confessed to the court he 
could not recall the name of Juan Villegas’s wife. De la Cruz also submitted a powerful 
statement; not only were the two married but he had seen them get married and witnessed 
them living together.320 Because neither witness mentioned how long Juan Villegas and 
Catalina Sanchez had been married, Juan de la Cruz’s declaration about their living 
conditions in Mexico was vital information. Additionally, joining the moral and legal debate, 
he expressed his belief that forcing Juan Villegas to live in Peru apart from his wife was 
unjust because it prevented the married life.  
                                                 
318 AAL, CN 1.4, fol. 2.  
319 It is also possible the court was considering contacting his wife’s master to negotiate a sale, which was not 
uncommon. 
320 Though he also could not recall the name of the church.  
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 The third and final testimony also came from a slave formerly of Mexico. Sharing his 
full name with the first witness, Domingo Hernández had lived in Mexico eight years ago 
and knew the slave couple, because he was owned by the same master as Catalina.321 
Domingo declared his knowledge of their marriage but also informed the court that Juan had 
been forced to leave behind two children. This abandonment of his wife and children makes 
the forced migration of Juan all the more appalling. Domingo argued that Juan’s absence had 
left Catalina and their children in “a bad state.”322 These testimonies from other slaves about 
their lives in Mexico demonstrate a transcontinental community among slaves, a community 
that proved vital to litigation by the unfree population.323 Without these witnesses, Juan’s 
appeal could have failed to persuade the judge. Instead, the network of slaves came to his aid, 
attesting to the validity of his claims.  
 After hearing the testimony of the witnesses, Judge Salinas ordered that Juan be sent 
back to Mexico under the control of don Alonso de Arellano, the master of Juan’s wife, 
Catalina. Though Juan had a long journey ahead, he would soon be reunited with his wife. 
This resounding victory for Juan provides but one example of the success slaves achieved in 
the ecclesiastical court. Juan knew the court afforded a means of recourse and sought out this 
help in his new surroundings. With the help of his network of fellow slaves, he verified his 
                                                 
321 Domingo was a common first name and Hernández a common family name making this coincidence neither 
surprising nor problematic.    
322 This “mal estado” should be read in the same vein as the mala vida, which abandoned and abused wives also 
invoked when bringing accusations against their husbands in courts in the early modern Spanish Empire. See 
Richard Boyer, Lives of the Bigamists: Marriage, Family, and Community in Colonial Mexico, abr. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 122-127 and Boyer, “Women, La Mala Vida, and the 
Politics of Marriage,” in Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America, ed. Asunción Lavrin (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 252-286.   
323 For more on slaves as witnesses in legal cases, see Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico.  
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marital status, the key component of the case. By ruling in favor of Juan, the Church once 
again reinforced the clear emphasis on upholding slave marriages, even at the expense—of 
authority and finances—of their owners. The court agreed with Juan that “it is unjust for the 
law of marriage to be broken by the law of slavery.” He fought for the right to uphold his 
marital masculinity and was victorious.  
 
The Christian Life and the Married Life  
In 1603, Gracia Conga, a negra esclava of don Pedro Grillo, appeared before the court to 
fight for the right to carry on her marriage with her husband, Francisco Congo negro esclavo, 
without the obstruction from his master. Gracia accused don Francisco Ramos Baltasar, the 
dueño (master) of her husband, of sending him to work at a bakery somewhere outside of 
Lima, though she does not identify the city or region. Her single page demanda, the average 
length for an initial accusatorial affidavit, ends requesting that the court prevent any move or 
sale of her husband by his master. Gracia, in the last line of her complaint, explained that 
preventing such a move was necessary in order to ensure that Francisco “live the married life 
(hacer vida maridable) with me.”324  
 As was customary, the court responded first by acknowledging receipt of Gracia’s 
petition and confirming that the provisor had reviewed her accusation. In this case, as in 
many others, the court made a swift initial judgment, though not completely ending the 
litigation. Ecclesiastical courts functioned on a system of rulings and appeals. Any ruling 
could be appealed, though an appeal did not always warrant a new response from the judge, 
and each party could, and often would, present affidavits ad nauseam seeking the 
                                                 
324 AAL, CN 1.13, fol. 1.  
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“appropriate” ruling. “El señor doctor don Julio de Soto canónigo of the Holy Church and 
provisor and vicar of the Archbishopric”—the long title illustrative of his position and 
importance—sent notification to Ramos Baltasar that ordered “[You] will not take nor sell 
[your slave] outside of this city.”325 The judge provided clear reasoning for his judgment: “so 
that Juan can live the married life with his wife Gracia Congo.”326 
 “To live the married life” was the issue at hand. It is important to note that this 
language is not unique to slave marriage cases but occurs in a variety of marital suits in the 
Spanish Empire. “The married life” served as the legal-religious terminology for all cases 
addressing marital norms including divorcio, annulment, and bigamy, among others. The 
intricacies of this early modern phrase was never fully defined or explained by contemporary 
jurists or apologists. Though the full cultural significance is hard to know, it certainly 
involved cohabitation, fulfilling the conjugal debt, and performing expected gender roles 
within the home.327  
 There was rarely an elaboration by the court about the hardship that such distance 
might cause, or the ways it might inhibit the married life. This lack of explanation suggests, 
quite strongly I would argue, that judges and litigants shared a mutual understanding of this 
tenet, even if the nuances are hidden from the modern reader.328 Furthermore, that the judge 
                                                 
325 AAL, CN 1.13, fol. 1R.  
326 AAL, CN 1.13, fol. 1R.  
327 For more on the vida maridable see, Allyson Poska, “When Love Goes Wrong: Getting out of Marriage in 
Seventeenth-Century Spain,” Journal of Social History 29, no. 2 (1996): 871-82; Sara Vicuña Guengerich, 
“Marriage Fictions: Inca Women and Marriage in Early Colonial Peru,” Colonial Latin American Review, 
forthcoming (2014).  
328 We need more research to help uncover the complete social realities of this term and the extent to which the 
meanings of the married life for slaves might diverge from the free population.  
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simply followed Gracia’s justification in his ruling demonstrates her understanding the legal, 
religious, and social expectations and rights of married couples. And as we will see in the 
other cases, Gracia was not exceptional in this regard but rather served as one example of the 
ways in which slaves understood the legal precepts regarding marriage, as well as how to 
employ them. 
 Returning for a moment back to her demanda, Gracia specified that she was married 
“according to the order of the Holy Mother Church.”329 This specific articulation of their 
marital status presented the couple as good Catholics following the Church’s push for 
Africans to wed. As Gracia built her argument against her husband’s master, her language 
solidified the position of herself and her husband firmly within the Christian realm. 
Portraying oneself before the court was particularly important for the enslaved populations of 
Latin America. In his research on the legal maneuvering of slaves in colonial Quito, Sherwin 
Bryant has shown that slave litigants entered into a legal discourse that included enslaved 
rebels and fugitives, those who chose more unlawful and often violent means of redress. And 
within this setting, Bryant argues, “[s]lave litigants, then, held the challenge of presenting 
and representing themselves as ‘insiders,’ subjects of the king, who deserved royal mercy 
instead of the harsh punishments prescribed for their more radical brethren.” And this tactic 
had tangible benefits because “[b]y claiming their rights under the law, when they might 
have functioned as rebels and fugitives, litigants forced the system to work as well as it 
did.”330 In the same way, slaves appearing before the ecclesiastical court presented 
themselves as insiders vis-a-vis their faithfulness to the sacrament.  
                                                 
329 AAL, CN 1.13, fol. 1R.  
330 Bryant, “Enslaved Rebels,” 11. 
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This formal matrimonial language was consistently used throughout slave trials in 
colonial Lima, as well as the courts in other parts of Spanish America.331 Juan Villegas, 
whose story opened this chapter, presented his marriage in the most Catholic terms, as did 
the witnesses that testified to his valid marriage. So too did Domingo de Montoya as well as 
Gerónima Biafara, whom we will discuss below. In every single case consulted, the 
petitioning party asserted that their marriage took place “according to the Holy Mother 
Church” or some close variation on the phrase.332 This language was not altogether absent in 
cases concerning marriage among the non-African populations, but it was far from the 
standardized rhetoric we see in the slave marriage cases examined. Spanish and mestizo 
women in Lima’s court at times used far less formal descriptions of their relationships. For 
example Ines de Serna acknowledged her marital status by simply calling Miguel de Lira her 
“marido (husband).”333 Isabel Franca noted her matrimonial state only by saying she was 
“the wife of Sebastian Telabe.”334 Likewise, Elena Garcia used only “wife of Martin Garcia” 
to describe her marriage to the court.335 The frequency of the full articulation of marital status 
in slave trials shows the importance of asserting this orthodoxy.336 And by claiming this 
orthodoxy, these enslaved Christians also laid claim to the rights that accompanied the 
sacrament. In presenting the marriage as a proper Christian union, the litigants made clear the 
                                                 
331 Proctor, Damned Notions of Liberty, Chapter 2.  
332 For example, some specified the Holy Church of Rome. 
333 AAL, Divorcio 1614, Ines de Serna contra Miguel de Lira, fol. 1. 
334 AAL, Divorcio 1608, Ysabel Franca contra Sebastian Telabe, fol. 1.  
335 AAL, Divorcio 1614, Elena Garcia contra Martin Garcia, fol. 1. 
336 Notaries and procuradores likely played a role in the uniformity of the language presented. For more on their 
role, see Jouve Martín, Esclavos de la ciudad letrada.   
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issue deserved the ecclesiastical court’s attention. Though this language certainly came to be 
a near-boilerplate necessity for litigants, its use remained important for establishing the rights 
to cohabitation as good, married Catholics.  
 Further invoking Catholic values within this case, Gracia claimed that her husband’s 
master was acting “without fear of God and impeding the justice of Holy Matrimony.”337 
Here, Gracia takes her religious rhetoric to another level, challenging the faithfulness of her 
master. This was indeed the problem that the Church anticipated from the “necessary evil” of 
slavery: masters acting for personal gain with disregard for the faith. Just as the Siete 
Partidas had outlined the rights of slaves, they had also charged the Church with the 
enforcement of these rights, especially in instances requiring a challenge to masters’ power. 
By creating a religious divide with herself on the side of the Church and her master against 
God and the sacrament, Gracia elicited the intervention of the ecclesiastical judge.  
 This short case was handled quickly, though not without some interesting twists. Don 
Francisco Ramos was apparently the new owner of Francisco Congo and bought him with the 
intention of moving. It appears that Ramos had little interest in separating the couple and 
violating the sacrament. Instead, he responded to the court requesting that he be given a 
license to return the slave to his previous owner, Captain Marcos Gonzales. The court found 
this to be a reasonable solution and notified both parties that Francisco Congo should be 
returned to Captain Gonzales. Barring any delinquency from either master, Gracia would be 
seeing her husband soon.   
 
Cross-prosecution  
                                                 
337 AAL, CN 1.13, fol. 1. 
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In 1606, Domingo de Montoya appealed to the ecclesiastic legal system to save his marriage 
to his wife María “criolla de Caboverde.”338 A slave of Limeño merchant (mercader) Juan de 
Montoya, Domingo followed his slave identity with his marital status, “married and joined in 
the order of the Holy Mother Church with María de la Caboverde, slave of doña Clara [del 
Corro], a widow.”339 According to Domingo, María’s master was attempting to sell her away 
to a new owner who lived outside Lima. And, apparently, del Corro was willing to go to 
great lengths to sell María. Domingo testified that María’s dueña had jailed her in 
anticipation of the sale and move. In this case, the qualm was not only the potential 
separation of the couple but also a present prevention of the married life. The court could not 
let such a sale occur, he argued, because with María gone, “we could not live out the married 
life.”340 Domingo requested the court not only prevent the sale of his wife by del Corro, but 
also that María not be “sent out of the city.” Many of the slave litigants protested both the 
selling and shipping away of their spouses, even when most stated that their main concern 
was a permanent sale requiring relocation. The wide parameters of restrictions requested, and 
often granted, at least initially prevented masters from circumventing the letter of the judge’s 
ruling by moving a slave but still claiming ownership.  
 After reviewing the demanda, Judge Salinas found Domingo’s accusation sufficiently 
persuasive to immediately order doña del Corro “do not take nor sell your aforementioned 
slave out this city by sea nor by land nor by any other way.”341 In the ecclesiastic court 
                                                 
338 María’s racial identification vacillates between morena and criolla.   
339 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 1. 
340 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 1.  
341 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 1R. The use here of manera alguna was likely meant to stress the broad restriction of the 
ruling. 
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system, as Michelle McKinley has noted, “the defendant’s guilt was presumed and could 
only be overcome with countervailing evidence.”342 This presumption of guilt extended to 
masters even when the accusations came from slaves. Enslaved litigants’ petitions were taken 
seriously, and their masters forced to defend themselves before the court. The power of an 
accusation, then, was not considerably weakened regardless of the race, gender, or 
free/enslaved status of the litigants. Though participants in these courts were not completely 
“equal before the law,” the legal system provided a more level playing field in the social and 
cultural landscape of colonial Peru.   
 To ensure that Domingo and María could “cohabitate and live out the married life,” 
Judge Salinas let it be known that failure to abide by his ruling would result in 
excommunication, arguably the most harsh punishment handed down by the ecclesiastical 
court.343 This punishment revealed how serious the Church treated attempts to impede the 
sacrament of matrimony. Just as the ecclesiastical and Inquisitorial courts held spouses 
accountable in bigamy, annulment, and divorcio cases, slave masters too were confronted 
with the gravity of their actions. Interfering with a marriage was not so much a crime against 
the slave, but a sin against God. Such offenses had tangible and spiritual consequences. 
 After the court’s initial ruling, Domingo returned to the court.344 His second petition 
is strikingly similar to his first, though he did request some further restrictions on his wife’s 
master. He urged provisor Salinas to also demand that del Corro “not mistreat [María] nor 
                                                 
342 McKinley, “Fractional Freedoms,” 772.  
343 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 1R.  
344 Though his testimony is not dated, the decisions by the judge responding to each affidavit were given on 8 
February and 9 February, respectively.  
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impede her marriage.”345 Additionally, Domingo asked that the court reach out to the 
overseer of the jail where María was being held, in hopes that he would help remedy the 
situation that her master failed to address. Responding to the accusations by Domingo, 
licenciado (lawyer) Francisco Quixada appeared before the court “in the name of Pedro 
Guerra de Contras,” the son-in-law of Clara del Corro.346 Until the last folio, these two men 
served as the voice of del Corro. The lawyer presented six consecutive folios of argument 
contesting the judge’s initial decision. The seemingly overzealous submissions of affidavits 
served as a tactic for the wealthy to perpetuate litigation until those with less money and time 
could not or would not continue. Notaries often charged by the page, and the del Corro 
family showed a willingness to pay these fees. Their use of extensive flourishes, such as a 
royal seal next to their elegant, ornate signatures, was likely an additional effort to impress 
the judge.  
 Pedro wanted to return to the village of Santa. To help make this trip a possibility, 
Quixada co-opted the married life to argue for his client’s right to take the slave, claiming 
that he needed to travel with his wife to Santa.347 So while placing the marriage of Domingo 
and María in jeopardy, Pedro sought to protect his own marital masculinity by fulfilling his 
obligation to cohabitation. In the end, their tactics proved effective. Pedro was permitted to 
take María with him on his journey, but required to return María to Lima to live the married 
life after eight months. To ensure María’s safe and timely return, provisor Salinas demanded 
a deposit of 200 pesos, slightly more than one-third the cost of a slave in Lima at this time, 
                                                 
345 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 2. 
346 AAL, CN 1.15, fol. 3.  
347 I have not been able to locate this colonial town and cannot speak to the distance this would place between 
the married slaves.  
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that would be forfeited were Pedro to exceed the agreed upon timeline.348 So ultimately, the 
marriage of Pedro was more important than Domingo’s; the marital household of Domingo 
was disbanded, if only temporarily, to bring together Pedro and his wife.  
 The case of Domingo and María, just like proceedings initiated by Gracia, follows a 
prosecutorial trend apparent throughout these early seventeenth-century cases: slaves 
litigating against their spouses’ owners. In only three of the forty cases do we find slaves 
litigating directly against their own masters. The continuity of this pattern cannot be easily 
discounted. Its consistency, regardless of the gender of the initiating slave, demonstrates the 
extent of the slave-master authoritarian relationship. Slaves could legally litigate against their 
masters, but this was not the norm. Instead cross-prosecution, the litigation by slaves against 
their spouse’s owner, served as the primary manner in which slave marriages were protected. 
While the laws permitted slaves to litigate against their masters, certain social restraints 
apparently prevented or discouraged the practice. And even in one of the only cases in which 
a slave takes legal action against her/his own master, we do not see a direct challenge to 
masters’ power. Returning to the case that opened this chapter, Juan Villegas—as the slave in 
limbo—initiated the case against his master. But as we read past the demanda, we find that 
the identity of Juan’s master was not clear. Furthermore, he was under the care of Captain 
Semancas, who had no claim to ownership over Juan, nor was his master even on the same 
continent. In this instance, while Juan petitioned on his own behalf, he was not directly 
challenging his master. He was not currently under his master’s control, making difficult any 
                                                 
348 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 2. Bowser noted the average market price of slaves purchased in 1600 as 579 and 542 
pesos for men and women, respectively. Linda Newson and Susie Minchin saw prices closer to 600 by 1630.  
Bowser, The African in Colonial Peru, 345; Newson and Minchin, “Diets, Food Supply, and the African Slave 
Trade in Early Seventeenth-Century Spanish America,” The Americas 63, no. 4 (2007): 532. 
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retribution for the perceived act of insubordination. As this case and the numerous cases of 
cross-prosecution show, masters would have their authority challenged, but rarely directly 
from their own slaves. This meant that the responsibility to hold masters accountable to 
Church doctrine on marriage often fell to the spouses of the offended party.  
    
Gender Imbalance 
Just as we rarely see slaves litigating against their own masters, we also seldom find wives 
initiating court proceedings. Though they do occur, as in the case of Gracia Conga recounted 
above, they account for just over 15% (6 of 38) of the total prosecuting parties during the 
period under study. What accounts for this imbalance and what motivated the few women 
who did make their way to court? The most apparent answer to the first question is that 
patriarchal and paternal notions and norms limited African women’s legal activity.349 
Scholars of Spanish and Spanish American legal history have long noted the high instance of 
female litigation during the early modern period, with some scholars tracing their legal 
activism into the twelfth century.350 The legal parameters that allowed for female agency in 
the court systems gave women of Spanish territories more autonomy than their British and 
German counterparts, but still left them disadvantaged relative to the male population.351 And 
while litigation by female slaves was certainly permitted by law, its infrequency suggests that 
                                                 
349 This includes philosophies about a woman’s role in the marriage as well as the customs that dictated female 
labor during this period. On the latter point, the domestic nature of women’s work could have prevented or 
limited their access to the courts. Likewise, women may have been more likely than men to be taken out of the 
city to accompany the master’s household.  
350 Heath Dillard, Daughters of the Reconquest: Women in Castilian Town Society, 1100-1300 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
351 For some overview on these differences, see Gauderman, Women’s Lives in Colonial Quito. 
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prosecution was preferably a man’s, or more specifically a husband’s, role at this time in 
Lima. It is possible that defending the marriage in this way factored into marital masculinity. 
Just as a husband was meant to protect the individual members of his family, he was also 
expected to protect the marriage itself.   
 But what, then, do we make of Gracia Conga and the other women who went against 
the social grain? Let us look back to the earliest extant case between married slaves and their 
masters to see another woman who defied the gendered trend of litigation. In the summer of 
1593, Gerónima Biafara appealed to the court to protect the marriage between her and her 
husband, Diego de Leon.352 Gerónima’s qualm was not with her own master, but rather, her 
husband’s master, Sebastian de Leon.353 She worried that Diego would be sent or sold away 
by Sebastian, and requested that the court prevent any move that would impede their married 
life. Without requesting any further evidence or testimony, the court so ordered that “Diego 
de Leon, slave and husband of Gerónima Biafara not be sent nor shipped out of this city.”354 
 Gerónima’s fears are quickly revealed as prescient. Sebastian de Leon, the supposed 
owner of Diego, responded to the court the same day the provisor ordered him not to move 
Diego from Lima. Sebastian lamented to the court that he could not be bound by such a 
ruling, because he had already sold Diego. He disclosed the sale he made to one Hernando de 
Pozo. His story is soon confirmed as de Pozo submitted his affidavit to the court “as the 
                                                 
352 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 1. While she presented herself in the demanda as “Gerónima de tierra Biafara,” she signed 
(or more likely, someone signed for her) Gerónima Biafara and is referred to as such throughout the case. It also 
is worth mentioning that Biafara was one of the most common slave apellidos found the first decades of the 
court records denoting their region of origin in Africa.  
353 Gerónima originally named Diego’s master Juan de Leon, the barber. Either Sebastian de Leon, the barber, 
was kin to Juan or Gerónima simply got the first name wrong. The latter would not be surprising as it is not 
what her or her husband would have called him.  
354 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 1. 
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master of Diego Biafara.”355 It is then possible that Gerónima, and not her husband, appealed 
to the court, because the latter was already experiencing the forced migration, which could 
have inhibited his ability to pursue litigation. Though he was still in Lima, he apparently had 
already been moved to his new master’s home. His absence likely motivated Gerónima to go 
to the court before their situation became more dire. Knowing that waiting for her husband to 
find his way to the court might be too late, Gerónima petitioned for protection of the 
marriage herself. As noted earlier Gracia Conga found herself in a similar position, as her 
husband had already been moved away. With her partner outside of Lima, and therefore 
without access to the ecclesiastical judicial system, Gracia’s initiation of litigation was one of 
the few, if not only, options available to the couple. Not only were there no cases in Lima of 
women litigating directly against their masters—exemplifying the trend in cross-prosecution 
discussed above—but their actions before the court generally came as a last resort. The 
marriage had already been disrupted, and the husband’s mobility severely limited. Though 
Gracia received the outcome she sought in the court, as we will see, Gerónima and Diego 
were not as fortunate.  
 
The Price of Slave Marriage 
Hernando de Pozo stated his awareness of the court’s order that Diego should not be moved 
away from his wife and the importance of not impeding the making of the married life. Yet 
he petitioned the court for a brief stay in the judge’s ruling. Additionally, he asked the judge 
to “give me a license for a limited time so that I might take [Diego] with me to the provinces 
                                                 
355 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 1.  
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of Chile.”356 A request to travel to the “kingdom of Chile” might at first glance seem like an 
outrageous request, however, such mobility, especially within the Americas, was quite 
common among slaves at this time. Surveying the Causas de Negros cases from 1593-1633 
reveals numerous slaves who arrived in Lima from Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, and even 
Spain. Though traveling with one’s slave would normally be acceptable, Hernando de Pozo 
was keenly aware that the marriage of Diego served as a substantial barrier to such a 
migration.  
 De Pozo’s request for a license shows a certain respect for the court’s initial ruling 
and slave marriage implicitly, yet he did seek to find some relief or flexibility in the 
judgment. In doing so, he tried to downplay the time away from Lima, and therefore the 
strain upon the marriage of Diego and Gerónima. Conceding that the married couple should 
not be apart forever, he promised to “return [to Lima] with great urgency.”357 Furthermore, 
de Pozo enlisted the moral assumptions at the center of the case: the importance of 
cohabitation and the married life. Rather than stress some sort of fiscal deadline or important 
business that might cause undue financial stress, de Pozo utilized a tactic we have seen in the 
case of Pedro Guerra de Contras. De Pozo framed his argument in terms of the laws of 
marriage—referring not to Diego’s matrimonial rights but to his own. He told the court that 
his wife, children, and family were back in Chile and that he needed to return to them. The 
judge was forced to choose between the marriage of the master and the marriage of the slave, 
allowing only one party to uphold his marital masculinity and fullfill the expectation of 
cohabitation. In this instance, Judge Miguel de Salinas sided, at least in part, with the master. 
                                                 
356 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 2R. 
357 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 2. 
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Judge Salinas permitted de Pozo to take Diego for six months. To ensure his return, de Pozo 
was required to post a bond of 200 pesos.  
 Hernando de Pozo and Pedro Guerra de Contras were not the only masters to provide 
concerns about their married life as a rebuttal to the prevention of moving a slave. In July of 
1633, Juan Mendez sought to take his slave Lucia Bran out of Lima. Because Lucia was 
married to Antonio Bran, slave of one Captain Antonio de Quieros, the court had seized 
custody of Lucia to prevent the proposed move. The extant transcript begins with Juan’s 
appeal of this judicial sanction. Juan argued that he should be able to return to Pisco, a 
colonial agricultural town about 150 miles south of Lima, where “I have my home, my wife, 
and my children.”358 He also offered to pay a bond to the court to ensure he would return 
with Lucia. Provisor Feliciano de Vega found Juan’s reasoning to be persuasive and 
provided him with a license to take Lucia to Pisco after receiving a bond of 200 pesos, the 
same price paid by the masters discussed above.359  
  In these rulings the court upheld the importance of slave marriage, or at least the 
façade of its importance, by ensuring a reunification of the couple through bond payment. 
But these decisions consented to the separation of married couples against their will for 
extended periods of time, essentially severing the married life. There is also reason to doubt 
the adherence to stipulated timelines. Once in a remote part of the viceroyalty, such as Chile, 
a master could more readily evade the attention of the Archbishop, keeping the couple apart 
indefinitely.360 The successes of Juan Mendez, Hernando de Pozo, and Pedro Guerra de 
                                                 
358 AAL, CLM 1.3. This case (along with CLM 1.22) is misfiled in the Causas de Litigios Matrimoniales 
collection.  
359 AAL, CN 1.3, fol. 2. 
360 We know too little about this bond system to speak authoritatively on its practice. Evidence at the Archivo 
General de la Nación (Peru), however, suggests that fiadores could post these bonds on behalf of owners. In 
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Contreras demonstrate that slave marriages could be impeded. While slaves often found 
redress in the ecclesiastical courts, masters could build their own arguments around the 
married life to secure legal victory. Apparently the importance of the marriages of the 
wealthy, free population trumped African matrimonial concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
In the cases examined for this chapter we find a flurry of competitions over control of the 
married life. We consistently see judges, husbands, and masters asserting their patriarchal 
rights and arguing over where their authority began and ended. Simultaneously, these debates 
circled around orthodoxy and power. The Church’s staunch position on the importance of the 
sacrament of marriage and its extension to all colonial residents despite race or slave/free 
status carved out an intermediary space in which the jurisdiction of judges, masters, and 
enslaved husbands overlapped. Slaves—with the help of Catholic doctrine—gained valuable 
control over their bodies. According to the law, they could marry, maintain marital 
cohabitation, and prevent sales and forced migrations.361 These freedoms should not be 
understated or quickly discounted. The equitability of matrimonial rights, regardless of race 
and legal status, was markedly different from other aspects of slave life.  
                                                 
these instances, the fiadores would have been quite diligent in ensuring masters met their deadlines for return. 
Personal correspondence, Michelle McKinley, 20 December 2012.  
361 Any discussion of rights and/or treatment of slaves invokes the iconic Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen: 
The Negro in the Americas (New York: Vintage Books, 1946). For varying opinions on the utility of the 
Tannenbaum thesis for current scholarship, see the articles in the special issue Law and History Review 22, no. 
2 (2004), Alejandro de la Fuente, “Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba” and “Slavery and the Law: A 
Reply”; María Elena Díaz, “Beyond Tannebaum”; and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, “Still Continents (and an 
Island) with Two Histories.”  
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In these cases, the clear limitation on masters’ authority and rights was rooted in the 
power of the Church. And because of this, slave owner rights were most severely constrained 
in the centers of Spanish control. As Herman Bennett has argued for Mexico City, “Though 
life in cities offered the enslaved a specific challenge—constant supervision—it also afforded 
them opportunities to circumvent their masters’ authority,” and in these urban settings 
“patricians confronted the full manifestations of absolutism.”362 This Christian absolutism 
created ideological and tangible limits on slave owner authority. As these cases have shown, 
the sacrament of marriage served as one vital sphere in which masters possessed little 
control, in theory. Due to the legal activism of slaves in Lima, this limitation was put into 
practice, drastically altering the slave-master relationship.  
 Nevertheless, these freedoms and the means to achieve them were structured in the 
patriarchal paradigm of early modern society. What we find here is the border at which 
colonial domination and hegemony meet. Even as codified institutional standards permitted 
and encouraged slave autonomy and agency in regards to marriage, social forces and legal 
practice constrained those avenues for justice and freedom, and prevented enslaved women 
and men from living out the married life uninterrupted. The marital household of slaves lost 
importance in the eyes of the Church when set against the vida maridable of masters. Being 
prevented from cohabitation meant enslaved men could not uphold the expectations of 
marital masculinity, despite their best efforts. The trends in litigants show a clear gender gap, 
as women were far less likely to appeal for their marital rights. Additionally, owners were 
rarely challenged directly by their own slaves, suggesting a reification of masters’ authority 
even in the ecclesiastical court. Quite clearly, prescription and practice diverged.   
                                                 
362 Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico, 32 and 193. 
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 From the outset we see how patriarchal norms eroded legal rights, a constant theme 
throughout the marital records in Lima’s ecclesiastical courts. As noted before, the majority 
of these petitions came from male slaves. Though women had legal standing and 
occasionally brought suits, slave wives appear infrequently. Instead their fates are often left 
to their husbands. These men’s petitions sought to restore or protect the married life. In their 
arguments to the judge, they insisted that cohabitation was essential to being married, and 
therefore essential to being a good husband. Just as slaves clearly articulated the orthodoxy 
of their marital unions, enslaved husbands articulated the importance of cohabitation and 
their yearning to fulfill this duty. For these litigants, being a good husband meant living with 
their wives. They sought to fulfill the expectations of marital masculinity, but as we have 
seen previously, these arguments were not guaranteed to be successful. Slave petitions could 
be and were rebuffed by masters seeking to assert their “property” rights and their own 
aspirations to be good husbands. Once again, petitions surrounding marriages hinged on men 
being good men. In the case of masters and slaves, however, being a free husband trumped 
being a slave husband.  
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Conclusion: Unending Marriages  
Musicians: A man and wife may disagree 
  But decent folk, of course, 
  Know reconcilement, eve the worst, 
  Is better than the best divorce.363  
 
So we have seen that husbands were not above reproach. Wives could and did challenge and 
criticize them. But the venue and content of their petitions gives us an important part of the 
story. Outside of the tribunal, men faced few repercussions when they failed to live up to the 
ideals of marital masculinity. Surely there were consequences that go unnoted in the 
historical documentation: wives intentionally burning meals, friends hurling criticisms at the 
neighborhood chichería (pub), or business partners or local shops severing economic ties. 
Nevertheless, all extant evidence points to the community giving discretion to husbands, not 
because the norms for husbandly conduct were particularly ambiguous, but because overt 
intervention was not the norm. We know from witness testimony that neighbors, colleagues, 
and others had intimate knowledge of the goings on of the couple, not the least of which 
included abuse and neglect on the part of husbands. Yet, they chose not to cross into a 
husband’s domain. The few instances we do have of husbands’ rights being significantly 
altered comes from other sources of patriarchal authority. In chapter 1 we see that judges 
were the most influential in these cases, and their protective orders the most common 
punishment against husbands (though worth noting this result was not always a clearly 
positive one for wives). Chapter 2 showed how parental intervention could challenge 
husband’s authority. The witnesses discussed in chapter 3 did not intervene directly in the 
marriages, but instead submitted their observations and personal judgments of character to 
                                                 
363 Cervantes, “The Divorce Court Judge,” 19. 
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the court, essentially deferring to the Church’s conclusion. In the cases from chapter 4, slave 
husbands’ marital rights could be impeded by their masters, whose patriarchal and paternal 
power trumped Catholic doctrine. In short, the correcting of patriarchs came only through 
hierarchies of patriarchal authority.  
 This evidence points further to the utility of the court in colonial Latin America: a site 
that was at once a locus for resistance and a haven for hegemony. In many ways the Church 
had managed to bring domestic disputes and communal policing into the colonial 
courtrooms. It became a place where both wives and husbands sought to air grievances of 
marriages gone wrong. Community members, likewise, saw the witness stand, perhaps more 
so than the street, as the place to call out neglectful husbands. As the site for the resolution, 
to whatever extent these conflicts were truly resolved, the ecclesiastical tribunal functioned 
to fortify structures of colonial control, reinforcing patriarchy even as it placed patriarchs on 
trial.   
 As Cervantes suggests, and cases from Lima confirm, the Church had a decided 
interest in keeping couples together. Nevertheless they permitted petitions from abused and 
neglected wives and acted on these petitions. The initial decision to remove a divorciada 
from her home and place her in a recogimiento was an important step. The act provided 
safety from further violence and upset a husband’s governance of his household. And with 
his wife absent from the home, a husband had lost power over her. The household had been 
ruptured. He had failed as the manager of his domain. Furthermore, he could no longer 
demonstrate his marital masculinity in a number of other ways. He could not protect his wife, 
for she was outside the home. He could not assert appropriate sexual virility. Likewise, a 
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husband was left to his own devices, no longer the beneficiary of the domestic and economic 
contributions of his wife.  
 On the surface, this initial legal decision can be read as evidence rejecting patriarchal 
norms in colonial society. A deeper reading of the cases, however, reveals that women 
remained “subjects,” under the supervision of the Church. In the recogimiento, many of them 
lacked food, clothing, and other necessities that their husbands were meant to provide. 
(Curiously, the Church found it logical to ask husbands accused of not caring for their wives 
to provide for them in the recogimiento). Initiating divorcio cases provided slight relief for 
wives, and likely leverage in negotiating treatment and living conditions with their 
husbands—men whose reputations suffered as a result of the proceedings. The court then was 
not in the business of limiting gender domination. Its decisions even reified important beliefs 
regarding men, women, and power in the empire. First, women needed to be watched over. 
The recogimiento served to confine them and allow the Church to “protect” their honor, in 
the absence of a husband. Second, a “bad” husband was better than no husband at all. The 
courts were hesitant to grant divorcios. Perhaps Cervantes was not far off when he opined 
that the court believed that the worst reconciliation was preferred over the best divorce. 
Husbands that demonstrated abject failure in nearly all aspects of marital masculinity could 
still have their familial authority restored. Courts went through the legal motions, but its 
impact on violence and neglect committed by husbands remained limited.  
  These cases from Lima prove instructive for future research at the intersection of 
gender, family, law, and colonialism. The Church, through the ecclesiastical court, went far 
beyond policing the religious landscape of colonial Lima. The courts were also a place where 
the gender and racial hierarchies were refined and reinforced. Delineating these power 
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structures was integral to the stability of the newly formed societies in Spanish America, and 
the cases of the ecclesiastical tribunal reveal how the Church was active in this colonial 
project, even though such issues were not outlined in canon law, and in some instances stood 
outside the bounds of the Church’s declared role. The ecclesiastical court, then, was not 
bound by the written law, but instead took part in a back and forth conversation with 
parishioners, a discussion that brought social norms into the legal realm. Indeed, the courts of 
Lima reveal how legal practice can reify gender and racial hierarchies even when these 
hierarchies are not strictly codified in the law.  
 The Church’s role in crafting what the family should be, in the centers of Catholicism 
and in its American colonies, has been self-evident. From the extensive attention paid to 
orthodox marriage in canon law to instructional literature like Fray Luis de León’s La 
Perfecta Casada (The Perfect Wife), domestic issues clearly received the attention of priests 
and religious leaders. These cases make clear, however, that the role of religious institutions 
in the imperial project went further. Not unlike the way it functioned in Spain, the 
ecclesiastical tribunal reified gender domination. Even as women were given potential 
recourse through their access to legal institutions, the path to litigation and the processes of 
protesting husbands served mainly to fortify patriarchy. Women could challenge men, but 
only on the basis of their manhood. In a sense, the argument these women constructed (along 
with their allies) trumpeted patriarchy. Their criticisms called out men who were weakening 
the patriarchal system by failing to live up to the expectations of marital masculinity. As the 
foundational unit of society, the family was the cornerstone of stability in colonial Lima.   
 This research also challenges us to rethink our treatments of masculinities, and 
specifically conceptions of manhood for married men. Even as new research seeks to 
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highlight the multiplicities of manhood, the tropes of don Juan and machismo remain 
pervasive in the literature. There is no doubt evidence of men who privileged sexual conquest 
over marital fidelity, and the cases presented herein bear that out. Yet, we must take more 
seriously the possibility that honor in the form of faithfulness to one’s wife and family 
proved important in early modern societies. We must also begin to consider how the imperial 
project influenced domestic life and, in particular, masculinity. Within the colonial context, 
what it meant to be a married man took on added meaning. Upholding the racial hierarchies 
became integral to being a husband in Lima. Violations to the social structure, such as using 
racial epithets or illicit sexual encounters that crossed racial lines, showed men to be unable 
or unwilling to maintain communal standards. These factors stand outside of traditional 
understandings of “domestic life” that guided ideals for married couples. This should, in turn, 
encourage us to think more broadly about the expectations of husbands and wives, to think 
beyond those acts that directly impacted the home. Perhaps our understanding of domestic 
and private life remains too narrow and compartmentalized.   
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